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Abstract
Despite an abundance of research on the impacts of city-county consolidation,
the majority of studies to date have focused on outcomes related to efficiency,
effectiveness, and economic development.

However, two areas which have gone

relatively unexplored, particularly from a quantitative perspective, relate to the
impact of consolidation on minority representation, as well as the determinants of
successful referenda often required in establishing these forms of government. The
existing literature on representation is sparse, and often relies on anecdotes or a
small number of individual examples. Further, while several in-depth studies have
attempted to assess the factors which contribute to successful and unsuccessful
consolidation attempts, analyses often rely on qualitative assessments of aggregate
results and macro-level dynamics.
Using a variety of data and methods, this study presents new perspectives
on these under-explored aspects of consolidation. In examining African American
representation, this analysis provides both aggregate and county-by-county results
showing that while representation has increased in most consolidated governments,
a great deal of progress remains in order to reach parity. Further, individual county
results raise questions about the negative impact consolidation continues to have,
including in more recent cases, and in states formerly covered under preclearance
provisions of the Voting Rights Act.

Additionally, with regard to consolidation

campaigns, findings reveal that race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status play a
large role in voting patterns related to referenda approval. Together, these results

vi

provide further insights on factors contributing to consolidation approval, as well as
the potential impacts that adopting a new form of government will have on the African
American community. In all, these findings have implications for academics, elected
officials, and reformers who wish to better understand the nature of consolidation
campaigns, and serves as a reminder of the continuing challenges faced in trying to
achieve equitable representation in local government.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 1942, Charles Merriam argued that “[t]he adequate organization of modern
metropolitan areas is one of the great unsolved problems in modern politics” (Jones,
1942, p. ix). Some 75 years later, and this notion still holds true with regard to
local government and local governance. Structural arrangements have a significant
impact on elected officials, public employees, as well, of course, on the citizens they
serve, and the “adequate organization” of metropolitan areas is still something of great
debate. Merriam notes that “our difficulties are increased by the necessity of bringing
about some working reconciliation of city government with county government and
also with many other types of local districts,” in addition to the growing complexities
associated with intergovernmental relations in a federalist system between local, state,
and the national government (Jones, 1942, p. ix). These issues continue to challenge
local administrators and elected officials, as well as those who study the increasingly
complex government networks in order to find the organizational arrangements that
will best fit the needs of each metropolitan area.
For years, scholars, voters, and government officials have toiled with the issue
of consolidating government functions—including comprehensive city-county mergers
or other structural changes—on the premise of increased efficiency and effectiveness
in service delivery.

While some contend that common measures of efficiency,
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effectiveness, equity, or responsiveness can be justified by employing measures such as
economies of scale—whereby administrative costs are spread over a greater number
of residents—while others argue that “the existence of multiple local governments
increases citizens’ choices of tax and service packages, expands opportunities for
political participation, and enhances government responsiveness to citizen needs and
preferences” (Pelissero, 2002; Morgan et al., 2007, p. 258). Advocates for citycounty consolidation often cite additional benefits, such as accountability, or harmony
between intergovernmental agencies; however, conclusive empirical evidence still does
not support all of the claims made by those proposing consolidated government.
While a great deal of attention is often paid to consolidation in the literature,
despite the limited success of referenda or performance-based outcomes, it should
be noted that consolidation—while still a relatively rare event—is still one of the
most frequent reform strategies of the last half-century (Harrigan and Vogel, 2003).
Over the years, a number of studies on the impacts of city-county consolidation
have been conducted, with a particular focus on the “good government” reforms
related to efficiency and effectiveness (e.g. Benton and Gamble, 1984; Condrey, 1994;
Leland and Thurmaier, 2010) And while a number of articles and books have been
written examining the aspects of consolidation campaigns and charter provisions (e.g.
Carr, 2004; Leland and Thurmaier, 2004, 2010), and raising questions related to
equity issues and the impact on minority communities (e.g. Marando, 1979; Swanson,
2000; Bollens, 2003; Clarke, 2006), work remains to be done in establishing more
generalizable trends. Thus, the intent of the following chapters is to add to the body
of knowledge in this area by taking a more quantitative perspective and assessing
what we know based on existing case studies, previous analyses, and anecdotes in
order to both update our assessments as well as to build a richness of understanding
by incorporating both quantitative and qualitative perspectives. To these ends, the
information presented in the following chapters will address the following questions:
What impact does city-county consolidation have on African American citizens?
What patterns emerge in consolidation campaigns and referenda results? What can
2

we learn from recent successful and unsuccessful consolidation attempts? And how
do all of these findings compare to previous studies on consolidation?

1.1

Consolidated City & County Governments

As Rush (1941) explains, the fundamental notion of city-county consolidation involves
the making of “an existing city and an existing county into one geographical unit”
(p. 210). However, in some cases, such as Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee
or Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky, some level of government fragmentation
remains, as not every incorporated city chooses to consolidate into one functional
government, leaving these cities and towns as independent and resulting in only partial
consolidation (Rusk, 2003; Leland and Johnson, 2004). For this reason, scholars often
differentiate between “comprehensive consolidation” (Rosenbaum and Kammerer,
1974) or “structural consolidation” (Leland and Johnson, 2004), in which the entire
geographic area of a county is consolidated into one government, and other structural,
geographic, governmental, or intergovernmental arrangements which seek to address a
specific problem or problems, yet stop short of a comprehensive or structural change.
As Rusk (2003) explains, most states do not have specific laws outlining the
requisite processes for local governments to initiate or approve of city-county
consolidations. Rather, state legislatures are often required to approve of specific
plans put forth by local officials; or, in certain cases, implement consolidations solely
by a legislative act, as in the case of New York City and Indianapolis-Marion County
(Rusk, 2003). In fact, of the earliest cases of consolidated city-county governments
which took place in the Nineteenth Century, St. Louis was the only reform which
was not enacted by the state legislature (Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000). However,
as Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) explain, St. Louis is a unique case in that the City
of St. Louis separated from St. Louis County in 1876, forming its own independent
“city-county” government. Due to the unique nature of this change, and since this
case is considered a separation and not a consolidation of governments, St. Louis is
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often excluded from comprehensive lists of consolidated city-county governments (e.g.
Leland and Thurmaier, 2010). A comprehensive list of the 43 consolidated city-county
governments in the United States is presented in Table 1.1.

1.1.1

The Evolution of Consolidation

In the earliest example of consolidation in the United States, the City of New Orleans
and Orleans Parish were given the same territorial boundaries, granted in the first
session of the newly-formed legislative council of the Territory of Orleans in 1805
(Rush, 1941). By 1854, the City of Boston and Suffolk County, as well as Nantucket
Town and County—both in Massachusetts—as well as the City of Philadelphia, and
all of the outlying incorporated areas had consolidated, adding to the number of
early metropolitan areas with similar government structures (Rush, 1941; Leland and
Thurmaier, 2010). In the case of New York, Rush (1941) notes that the origins of
consolidating the five boroughs into what is now known as New York City began
nearly a century before its eventual consolidation in 1874. Following the legislature’s
action that year, the city further expanded following a 1898 vote of the citizens of
New York, Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx, and other contiguous areas, forming what
was known as the Greater City of New York, despite the objections and subsequent
veto overrides of the mayors of New York and Brooklyn (Rush, 1941).
While the earliest instances of local government consolidation in the United
States occurred in the Nineteenth Century, interest among government reformers
who viewed these structural changes as a means of promoting goals such as efficiency
and effectiveness dramatically increased by the middle of the Twentieth Century
(Zimmerman, 1970). As metropolitan America underwent rapid suburbanization
in the post-World War II era, a second wave of institutional reforms occurred as
renewed interest in political reorganization was seen as the solution to problems
with efficiency and regional equity in areas which experienced rapid growth through
the 1960s (Foster, 1997).

The consolidation of Baton Rouge and East Baton
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Table 1.1: Consolidated City & County Governments
Year

City

County

State

1805
1821
1821
1854
1856
1874
1902
1907
1947
1952
1957
1962
1962
1962
1967
1969
1969
1969
1970
1971
1971
1972
1972
1975
1976
1976
1981
1987
1990
1995
1995
1997
1998
2000
2000
2002
2003
2006
2006
2007
2008
2008
2012

New Orleans
Boston
Nantucket Town
Philadelphia
San Francisco
New York City
Denver
Honolulu
Baton Rouge
Hampton
Newport News
Nashville
South Norfolk
Virginia Beach
Jacksonville
Juneau
Indianapolis
Carson City
Columbus
Sitka
Holland
Lexington
Suffolk
Anchorage
Anaconda
Butte
Houma
Lynchburg
Athens
Augusta
Lafayette
Kansas City
Broomfield
Louisville
Hartsville
Haines City
Cusseta City
Georgetown
Camden
Tribune
Statenville
Preston
Macon

Orleans Parish
Suffolk County
Nantucket County
Philadelphia County
San Francisco County
New York County
Denver County
Honolulu County
East Baton Rouge Parish
Elizabeth City County
Warwick County
Davidson County
Norfolk County
Princess Anne County
Duval County
Greater Juneau Borough
Marion County
Ormsby County
Muscogee County
Greater Sitka Borough
Nansemond County
Fayette County
Nansemond County
Greater Anchorage Area Borough
Deer Lodge County
Silver Bow County
Terrebonne Parish
Moore County
Clarke County
Richmond County
Lafayette Parish
Wyandotte County
Broomfield County
Jefferson County
Trousdale County
Haines Borough
Chattahoochee County
Quitman County
Camden County
Greeley County
Echols County
Webster County
Bibb County

LA
MA
MA
PA
CA
NY
CO
HI
LA
VA
VA
TN
VA
VA
FL
AK
IN
NV
GA
AK
VA
KY
VA
AK
MT
MT
LA
TN
GA
GA
LA
KS
CO
KY
TN
AK
GA
GA
NC
KS
GA
GA
GA

Note: Year indicates when consolidation was approved by voters or the state legislature.
New York includes: Brooklyn, Bronx, King, Queens, and Richmond Counties.
Adapted from Leland and Thurmaier (2010); National Association of Counties (2011).
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Rouge Parish, followed by Nashville-Davidson County, Jacksonville-Duval County,
and Indianapolis-Marion County are some of these notable metropolitan governments
which underwent reforms during this second wave of renewed interest. In the earliest
cases of consolidation—taking place during the Nineteenth Century—all, with the
exception of St. Louis, were the result of state (or territorial) legislative action, while
more recent attempts rely on putting a referendum before voters, who must approve
of a city and county merger, rather than simply state officials. It should be noted,
however, that in many states, state constitutions and statutes had to be changed in
order to accommodate these referenda, as many states simply did not allow for the
consolidation of city and county governments. One such state is Tennessee, which
amended its state constitution in 1953 with the urging of local officials in Nashville
and Davidson County, who wished to put a referendum before its residents (Hawkins,
1966). In all, there are 14 states which specifically authorize consolidation, while many
other states, despite not having specific statutory requirements, allow consolidations
on a case-specific basis, as authorized by the respective state legislatures (Rusk, 2003).
As (Rusk, 2003) notes, many of the consolidated governments in the United States
exist in the South. Both Rusk (2003) and Leland and Thurmaier (2010) explain that
state and local laws governing the process by which consolidations may take place are
more favorable in the South. Further, Leland and Thurmaier (2010) offer “diffusion
of innovation” as a potential explanation, in that local government officials in the
region—or even the same state—look to similar, nearby cases and adopt structural
changes that are viewed as successful. Additionally, Lyons (1977) offers similar insight
as to the southern phenomenon, explaining that the southern states tend to have only
two types of general-purpose governments—counties and municipalities—as opposed
to northeastern states which often have, for instance, townships. Another point, made
by Zimmerman (1970), focuses on the relative lack of a competitive political system
in many southern locales due to the fact that Leland and Thurmaier (2004) also
note the prevalence of this occurrence, in that the “majority of modern consolidation
attempts occur in the South, particularly in the State of Georgia” (p. 6). They further
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explain that, with few exceptions, the overwhelming majority of consolidations taking
place in recent decades have occurred in the South, with the prevalence in Georgia
continuing to hold true (Leland and Thurmaier, 2004). Interestingly, of all the cases
of consolidation from the 1980s to the present, 13 of 17 have occurred in the South,
with seven of the 13 located in the State of Georgia alone. What accounts for this
prevalence? While this question has largely gone unexplored, Fleischmann (2000) has
offered some preliminary explanations to this question. Fleischmann (2000) attributes
the frequency of consolidation in Georgia, in part, to the number of counties in the
state (159 total, second only to Texas), and a desire of both state and local officials
to “redress what many perceive as both too many governments and too little local
coordination among them” (p. 215).
However, other factors unique to the South, and Georgia, in particular, are related
to coverage under the Voting Rights Act and the sizable African American populations
in many parts of the region. Following the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
and subsequent reauthorizations, Georgia was included as one of the nine states
covered as a whole which had to submit electoral changes to the Department of
Justice for preclearance review. Marando (1979) argues that as African Americans
“approached political control of the central cities of the South, consolidation has been
proposed to enlarge the geographic area of the central city to encompass “whiter”
suburban rings” with the intent of diluting the Black vote (p.

414).

Further,

Feiock et al. (2006) note that in earlier consolidation cases, occurring through the
1960s, race largely shaped the campaigns by exploiting both racial tensions and
latent attitudes within the community. Similar to Marando (1979), Feiock et al.
(2006) argue that successful consolidation efforts during this period were bolstered
by proponents “suggesting that consolidation would be an effective mechanism to
stunt growing African American political power or to prevent African Americans
from ever gaining significant power” (p. 277). With regard to the cases which have
occurred in Georgia, as well as other southern states, Leland and Thurmaier (2004)
explain that preclearance provisions “often act as additional barriers that southern
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localities have to overcome,” and that they also “provide a unique variation in the role
that representation of African-Americans in the consolidation adoption process” (p.
7). Together, these elements related to race and dilution, coupled with the fact that
consolidation is primarily a southern phenomenon, raise important questions as to
the implications for both representation and the referenda which occur in this region.

1.2

The Case For (and Against) Consolidation

As proponents of consolidation, Foster (1997) outlines four major goals of the
reform movement, which include “economic growth, efficiency, equity, and government
responsiveness” (p. 29). Reformers often seek to resolve these issues through various
structural changes to local government, which can include consolidation as a means
to address the perceived problems stemming from government fragmentation. Many
smaller, autonomous locales tend to lack any type of intergovernmental coordination,
and are often committed to act in their own interests, rather than the metropolitan
region as a whole (Foster, 1997). However, reformers argue that “control over service
delivery and governance in the hands of a centralized unit...would boost efficiency and
equity by internalizing externalities, realizing economies of scale, lowering transaction
and information costs, and distributing more equitably the costs and benefits of
service delivery” (Foster, 1997, p. 30). According to findings from the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1965), the majority of cases in the midTwentieth Century involved financial matters relating to taxation and the equitable
allocation of government costs. In nearly every one of the 18 cases examined by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1965), financial considerations
and taxation were prominent issues for those who opposed structural changes. While
evidence of consolidation leading to more effective or efficient service provision is
mixed (e.g. Parks and Oakerson, 1989; Foster, 1997), Altshuler et al. (1999) note that
previous studies have indicated that smaller, fragmented government units are “more
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efficient for labor-intensive services, whereas larger units are more efficient for capitalintensive services (because of economies of scale) and for certain overhead functions”
(p. 106).
Another argument in favor of consolidation relates citizen satisfaction, in the
form of greater accountability and a higher degree of expertise in these governments
(DeHoog et al., 1990; Lyons and Lowery, 1989). Further, proponents of consolidation
also argue that consolidating city and county governments will “allow for expression
of interests and development of policies shared by the entire region, such as
greater economic growth and development” (Altshuler et al., 1999, p. 105). It is
this argument—the benefits of a “metropolitan-wide” perspective on planning and
economic development—which has become the new focus of government reformers as
initial claims of efficiency and effectiveness have been met with mixed results. Thus,
government reformers’ focus on the city and county, at-large, has often been viewed
as a way to make services more efficient or effective, but has also led to, for instance,
lower levels of representation for racial and ethnic minorities (Martin and Schiff,
2011). Because of this, Altshuler et al. (1999) argue that “there may be a trade-off
between the values associated with equity (in particular, the reduction of unequal
opportunity) and values that have undergirded the traditional American system of
local government, such as efficiency, choice, and local autonomy” (p. 105).
While each city and county differ, in many instances, several groups and
individuals commonly emerge as proponents or opponents of consolidation efforts.
In an overwhelming number of cases, metropolitan (central city) newspapers actively
and adamantly support consolidation (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, 1965; Scott, 1968; Leland and Thurmaier, 2010).

Additionally, local

Leagues of Women Voters, central city Chambers of Commerce, central city
commercial interests, city officials, “good government” groups, civic research agencies,
as well as radio and television stations often promote consolidation (Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1965; Scott, 1968; Leland and Thurmaier, 2004).

Conversely, there are often a number of individuals and groups
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opposed to consolidation in many cases. For example, as opposed to their central
city counterparts, suburban newspapers are frequently opposed to consolidation,
as are county government employees, whose jobs may be in question due to any
significant structural changes (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
1965).

Additionally, farmers and agricultural organizations, rural homeowners,

suburban commercial interests, residents who fear a loss of identity, as well as fringe
government officials and employees often oppose such efforts (Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations, 1965; Scott, 1968). Contrary to other forms of
political change in the United States, which often tend to be incremental in nature
and marked by slower, smaller modifications, consolidation is an abrupt change not
only to a government’s structure, but also the political, social, and economic dynamics
of a particular locale (Rosenbaum and Kammerer, 1974).
In all, it is difficult to point to one particular case of city-county consolidation
as a shining example of good government.

Additionally, it is challenging for

one community to find a successful program or policy in use in one locality that
can be easily transposed to their own government. Like many things, there are
rarely easy solutions to problems in government, and despite claims often made by
proponents, consolidation is not the silver bullet which can solve problems plaguing
local governments. Efficiency gains as a result of consolidation can be achieved in
certain situations or in particular agencies; however, data is still inconclusive from
year-to-year or case-to-case. Quite simply, for any example of efficiency gains in one
situation, a researcher could find inefficient or greater expenditures in another case.
Economies of scale in practice, opposed to abstract theory, is also not supported by
empirical evidence in most cases. Geography, desired service levels, and a discord
amongst economists regarding the optimal number of residents required to maximize
economies are only some of the reasons why this argument cannot be proven in many
instances. Other claims, such as greater accountability or economic development have
also been met with conflict, and are much more difficult to demonstrate compared to
claims of efficiency or effectiveness.
10

While the most prevalent and significant findings from researchers still have to
do with efficiency gains, it is still not clear whether consolidation is causal, rather
than just a corollary. Better planning and more effective communication are often
associated with consolidation, and whether the merger itself is the cause, or the
results are simply concurrent, the process can lead to a more equitable and somewhat
more efficient distribution of services. Equity generally comes at a cost, however,
and whether one believes in the reform model, the public choice perspective, or is
skeptic of any form of consolidated services, ultimately the decision resides with the
voters in each case as to the reasons for or against pursuing a metropolitan form
of government. Thus, regardless of the theoretical perspectives over the nature of
government structure in metropolitan areas, the debate continues on whether there
is empirical evidence that consolidated government is more desirable or whether the
argument is strictly rhetorical.

1.3

Existing Research and Further Questions About
Referenda and Representation

Referenda
As Hawkins (1966) notes, “it is sometimes suggested that the success or failure
of proposed changes in governmental structure rests in large measure with the
proponents of change” (p. 79). In many of the cases to date, this perspective
still holds true, as many of the consolidation campaigns analyzed from an empirical
perceptive have shown the issues identified by reformers, relative campaign strength,
and the ability effectively convey the need for change to the electorate are often
identified as the deciding factors in these cases. However, it should also be noted
that, as Swanson (2004) argues, “interpretations of outcomes generally go to the
victors,” and it “often takes years for clarifications to emerge, and then outcomes
generally reflect the views of those in prominent positions” (p. 41). For the most part,
11

comprehensive analyses of consolidation campaigns and referenda come from sources
such as Rosenbaum and Henderson (1972); Leland and Thurmaier (2004), both of
which have developed and refined models of successful consolidation, or comprehensive
case studies of one particular locale, in the case of works by Hawkins (1966) and
Lyons (1977). Subsequent updates to the Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) model
have been suggested; however, the Leland and Thurmaier (2004) model is the most
comprehensive and thorough of these updates, and includes contributions from many
scholars who have worked to improve our understanding of these occurrences. Another
consideration is that many of the consolidated governments have never been studied,
as they are often too small or have occurred too recently to have undergone any
comprehensive study. Conversely, several cases have been examined numerous times,
and are included separately in the tables below. Other analyses are somewhat less
comprehensive, and as Swanson (2004) noted, are subject to change based on time,
and the interpretations used. That is not to say that individual articles are not helpful
in these cases—many of them are—however, with many sources, the focus tends to
be primarily on outcome variables related to efficiency, effectiveness, or economic
development, with the narrative of events surrounding the consolidation referenda in
these cases serving only as a backdrop. Thus, many of the prevalent studies specific
to consolidation campaigns and referenda employ the Rosenbaum and Kammerer
(1974) model, or are tests of that model (Johnson and Feiock, 1999; Johnson, 2004b).
Additionally, earlier cases which were the result of legislative action and not referenda
are excluded (e.g. Rush, 1941; Owen and Willbern, 1985). With these factors in mind,
a summary of the findings which have empirically examined the successes and failures
of recent consolidation efforts are presented in Table B.1 and Table B.2, respectively.
Representation
Trounstine (2010) provides an exceptional review of the literature on representation
in metropolitan areas, noting some inconsistencies on the impact that some structural
reforms have had on minority voters. For instance, it is unclear as to what specific
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factors lead to the election of minority candidates—be it the number of available
resources, voter turnout, or the role that reformed institutions play (Trounstine,
2010). As Trounstine and Valdini (2008) explain, many scholars subscribe to the
conventional theory that “concentration drives the relationship between district
elections and representation of racial and ethnic minorities;” however, according to
the authors, a great deal remains untested. This is particularly true in the case
of consolidation. While many studies reference the negative impact—or potential
negative impact—that consolidation has had or will have on African Americans,
in particular, a great deal of this is simply anecdotal. Much of this rests of the
argument that minorities benefit from enhanced representation in local governments
with unreformed structures (e.g.

electoral districts, partisan elections, and the

like) (Leland and Johnson, 2004). However, the question remains as to whether
consolidation is, in itself, a distinct type of reform, with potentially different impacts
on representation and various subgroups, or are outcomes similar to the existing
theories regarding council and electoral structure? Further, as Leland and Johnson
(2004) point out, many questions about how best to achieve “fair” representation,
and “whether or not increased minority representation on governing bodies will
result in public policies more favorable to the minority community” still need further
development (p. 31). As mentioned earlier, some scholars have attempted to answer
these questions, with regard to race and socioeconomic status. A summary of these
studies focused on the outcomes and impacts of consolidation are listed in Table B.3.
Few scholars would argue that many of the reforms promoted during the late19th and early-20th Centuries did not have a disparate impact on minority groups.
For instance, Davidson and Korbel (1981) note the prevalence of at-large elections
in the South, which were often used to dilute minority voting strength. One of the
major obstacles in cases of vote dilution, however, is proving intent. As Welch and
Bledsoe (1988a) explain, public officials actively pursuing a strategy of vote dilution
do not explicitly sate their intentions or lave behind evidence as such. Because of
this, the burden of proof shifted for plaintiffs challenging vote dilution under Section
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2 of the Voting Right Act following the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Mobile
v. Bolden (1980). Prior to the ruling, plaintiffs had to demonstrate an “intent to
discriminate for at-large electoral systems to be invalidated;” however, subsequent to
this, “plaintiffs would need only show that an electoral system had the effect or result
of diluting minority group influence to prevail” (Bullock, 1995, p. 142). Yet, while
earlier reforms had the effect—if not the intent—of vote dilution, many previously
reformed structures, such as at-large districts, have either been abandoned or modified
to include a mixed structure of district and and-large seats (Welch, 1990). Many of
these reforms have come at the behest of courts which have ruled in favor of plaintiffs
successfully presenting evidence of vote dilution. Further, Marando (1979) argues
that as African American populations have grown, combined with the development
of judicial protections, gives minorities the “electoral strength not to be ‘consolidated’
out of political control” (p. 414). As such, the question remains as to what extent this
dilution still exists after the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, particularly in
more recent cases.
With these questions in mind, Chapter 2 explores the theoretical arguments
and the existing literature as it relates to structural changes to government, race
and representation in local governments, and the factors that influence voters to
ultimately approve of consolidating city and county governments. Chapter 3 focuses
on an unfortunate result of consolidation—the dilution of racial and ethnic minority
representation—which, as of late, has largely gone unexplored. Next, Chapter 4
tests the existing body of literature as it relates to recent campaigns for and against
consolidation in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the factors
which lead to the approval or rejection of consolidation referenda. Finally, a summary
of the relevant findings, limitations, and suggestions for future research are presented
in the concluding chapter.
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Chapter 2
Perspectives on City-County
Consolidation
Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) explain that, from a general perspective, the
consolidation literature can be grouped into two categories: writings of partisan
reformers, and those of social scientists. However, as exploration of structural reforms
has developed, these categories have become more intertwined and government
officials have realized the importance of utilizing empirical research, and have
increased their reliance on expertise in the areas of regional and metropolitan
governance.

Beyond sample charters or recommendations, a blending of the

reformist and research-oriented analyses have become more prevalent in this area
as interest in government consolidation as a means of addressing existing problems
and improving local governance have continued. Thus, a number of reports from
nonprofits and government committees have contributed to the body of knowledge
involving consolidation efforts since the recent decades (e.g. United States Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1993; Murphy 2012). Further, institutes
focusing on consulting and advisory roles at a number of universities, such as
the University of Tennessee’s Institute for Public Service and the University of
Georgia’s Carl Vinson Institute, work with local officials considering government
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reforms and present them substantive information. These reports and other sources of
information often take the form of chronologies and case studies of both successful and
unsuccessful attempts, and often include detailed information about state laws, citizen
attitudes, previous local attempts, and recommendations of these experts before a
decision on whether to peruse a referendum is ultimately made. In this chapter,
the existing perspectives on city-county consolidation will be explored, including
general approaches to structural change, theoretical and empirical arguments for and
against consolidation, and, finally, the current state of the literature relating to both
representation and campaign referenda.
Despite a number of studies having been conducted on consolidated city-county
governments, Leland and Thurmaier (2004) explain that the collective literature on
consolidation efforts is, to date, “a patchwork of theoretical concepts and causal
models that lack a careful synthesis to permit scholars and practitioners to draw
inferences” (p. 5). While a great deal of research points to some generalizable
trends in these metropolitan areas, as well as the impacts of major changes to
government and governance in these areas, much of what we know about consolidated
governments stems from the evolution of single and comparative case studies rather
than comprehensive data over time, or among multiple cases.

From a general

perspective, arguments for and against consolidation rest on the tradeoffs and
fundamental differences between more centralized and more fragmented government.
Early on, government reformers viewed structural reforms, such as consolidation, as a
means of achieving better outcomes relating to efficiency, effectiveness, or economies
of scale, while later scholars argued that competition—inherent in fragmentation—
would lead to these same goals. Many of these perspectives are intertwined in any
debate involving aspects of city-county consolidation, and are at the core of both the
initial campaigns surrounding the efforts to consolidate, as well as the eventual form
a newly-consolidated government takes.
According to Greer (1962), the challenges associated with changing metropolitan
government structure are threefold: “(1) the underlying cultural norms of Americans
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concerning local government, (2) the resulting legal-constitutional structures, and (3)
the political-governmental system built upon them” (p. 124). The driving forces,
undoubtedly, behind consolidation efforts are those of reformers who seek structural
and organizational solutions to what they perceive as the ills of fragmentation. These
reformers often promote their normative visions for what government ought to do,
often, arguably, ignoring the broader social, political, or economic implications in
favor of an administrative or organizational solution to their perceived problems
(Rosenbaum and Kammerer, 1974).

In the cases of Jacksonville and Tampa,

Florida, Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) conclude that it was not the specifics
of consolidation plans that ultimately contributed to the ultimate success or failure,
respectively, of these referenda. Rather, in these cases, elites within both communities
formed their opinion of these proposals based upon the deliberation and deal-making
that took place when drafting the consolidation plans. As the authors note, some
Jacksonville-Duval County and Tampa-Hillsborough County residents were opposed
to consolidation not because of “any obvious substantive or philosophical aspect of
the plans themselves,” but made comments “ranging from allegations that specific
individuals gained or suffered unduly from consolidation to vague predictions of harm
that defied precise description” (Rosenbaum and Kammerer, 1974, p. 76). In these
two instances, specific reforms did ultimately impact the alignment of community
leaders once the campaigns began; however, the impact on public perception had
less of an effect (Rosenbaum and Kammerer, 1974). From this, we can gather that
in some cases, community leaders are more likely to support or reject consolidation
based on the specifics of each proposal. Conversely, often voters tend to cast their
ballot based on their general view of government and politics, as well as what they
perceive to be as the impact not only on themselves, but on broad segments of the
community. Thus, there appears to be evidence that voters think about structural
changes, including consolidation, in broad terms, as a referendum on government
itself rather than a specific means to an end, or as a way of addressing particular
problems with local governance.
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2.1

Structure, Consolidation & Competition

Many of the roots for metropolitan government can be traced back to the advocates of
the municipal reform movement and the early scholars of public administration, such
as Woodrow Wilson, Frank Goodnow, and Fredrick Taylor, who promoted effective
administration, good government, and efficiency (Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000).
Scholars focusing on the theoretical approaches to local government and urban politics
typically classify structural changes to government as one of two broad perspectives:
the reform model, which advocates for a metropolitan approach to governance, and
the public choice model, which is characteristic of a decentralized, market-based
alternative (Visser, 2002; Feiock, 2007; Savitch and Vogel, 2009). More specifically,
Leland and Johnson (2004) summarize the four major theoretical perspectives guiding
advocates for city-county consolidation. These perspectives include the “classical” or
reformist perspective, which focuses on efficiency and good government. Next, the
metropolitan renewal perspective, rooted in social equity theory, which advocates
for a regionalist approach to solving issues with urban decay, tax disparities, and
sprawl. A “composite” perspective, which incorporates aspects of efficiency and
equity, and also focuses on representation—particularly minority representation—
in consolidated governments and the resulting public policies.

And, finally, the

fragmentation perspective, stemming from Tiebout (1956); Ostrom et al. (1961);
Ostrom and Ostrom (1971), and others who have advocated for economic efficiency
over technical efficiency through greater public choice (Leland and Johnson, 2004).
Fundamentally, the debate over city-county consolidation rests on assumptions
made by scholars, practitioners, and eventually voters, who must ultimately decide
whether government consolidation or fragmentation is in their best interests and that
of their communities. By fragmentation, scholars are referring to “the separate units
in a local government system” in which there are “many units in a geographical area,
either in absolute terms or standardized by population” (Boyne, 1992, p. 334). The
characteristics of these separate local government units has been the focal point for
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many scholars of metropolitan governance over the last century (Nelson, 1990). For
decades political science and public administration scholars have struggled to find the
“one right way to organize metropolitan America” in search of structural uniformity
that can address both the challenges of efficiently and equitably managing urban
areas as well as the need for accountability and responsiveness to citizens (Parks and
Oakerson, 1989, p. 19).
As Leland and Thurmaier (2010) explain, “Efficiency and effectiveness are at
the forefront of discussions about local government management across the United
States,” yet the authors suggest that one of the reasons that city-county consolidation
attempts have been largely unsuccessful is that ”there is little evidence to convince
voters that consolidated governments are more efficient than separate cities and
counties” (p. 1). Further, the authors note that reformers often promote consolidation
“on the basis of cost savings, yet are unable to point to a particular case that
would convince elected officials and voters to adopt such a radical reform” Leland
and Thurmaier (2010, p. 3). Selden and Campbell (2000) note that “[m]uch of
the debate in the metropolitan reform literature has focused on the significance
of jurisdictional fragmentation,” where “traditional public administration scholars
have viewed fragmentation as a problem and offered city-county consolidation as one
solution” (p. 170). Conversely, political economists and public choice theorists “have
seen the advantage of market competition and choice in jurisdictional fragmentation
and argued against reforms that would centralize authority and reduce the number
of local governments” (Selden and Campbell, 2000, p. 170).

2.1.1

Theoretical Perspectives on Consolidation

The Reform Model
In general, characteristics of reformed local governments include council or commissionmanager governments, at-large and nonpartisan elections, and smaller legislative
bodies as opposed to unreformed institutions, of which partisan elections, strong
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mayoral systems, political wards or districts, and large councils and commissions
are characteristic (Hawkins, 1969). Those who advocate for the reform model view
government fragmentation as inefficient, largely due to service duplication or overlap,
and argue that fragmentation prevents metropolitan areas from solving regional
problems such as social, economic, or fiscal disparities, and failing to address regional
economic development (Visser, 2002). Government reforms, including consolidation,
have been promoted as a means of addressing these problems. Alternately, the public
choice perspective derives its assumptions based on those of rational choice theorists,
who assume that groups and individuals are utility maximizers when choosing between
alternatives, such as levels of taxation and local government services (Foster, 1997).
As Foster (1997) points out, public choice advocates prefer a system that allows
residents to “maximize their chances for matching individual preferences to services
received” (p. 35).
Carr (2004) explains that consolidation efforts are typically framed in terms of the
“heroic” efforts of reformers, in that “reform” entails improvement and the removal
of defects, and “often implies that the change will end irresponsible, immoral, or
corrupt practices” (p. 14). Similarly, as Leland and Johnson (2004) note, many
government reforms extending from the Progressive Era through the Twentieth
Century were designed to drive-out the corruption and patronage indicative of local
political machines, where waste, fraud, and abuse were often seen as the inevitable
results of this system.

Thus, the debate surrounding city-county consolidations

throughout this time period focused primarily on government performance (Leland
and Johnson, 2004). The drawback, however, is that by altering existing political,
structural, and/or governmental arrangements, reformers are potentially addressing
existing problems or biases and creating new problems that can disproportionately
affect certain subsets of the community (Carr, 2004).
As Foster (1997) explains, the reform perspective adopts a normative approach to
government and metropolitan organization, rejecting a positivist view of institutional
arrangements and focusing on “how institutions ought to be arranged to achieve the
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efficiency and equity goals that are the hallmark of reform” (p. 29). Further, reformers
take a holistic view of metropolitan regions, and consider the interdependence of
economic, political, and social forces when determining what is best for the area,
rather than individual citizens or particular enclaves within the community (Foster,
1997). Similarly, local officials and urban specialists point to the fact that fragmented
local government units can impede comprehensive planning, as coordinating with
multiple government entities and agencies can become burdensome (Rosenbaum and
Kammerer, 1974). As a result, not only are comprehensive planing goals burdened my
overlapping government units, but taking a more “regional perspective” (as opposed
to only being concerned with one particular government entity) can help foster more
extensive development patterns and broader economic development approaches.
According to Foster (1997), behind efficiency—which is often cited as the primary
goal of the reform movement—the “equitable distribution of resources” became the
secondary goal, as “achieving parity in public service levels and eliminating fiscal
disparities...were essential for the healthy functioning of the metropolis” (p. 29).
To this end, Foster (1997) introduces the concept of structural illusion, in which
“complex jurisdictional arrangements are associated with higher information and
transaction costs” and “prevent citizens from effectively articulating their demands for
services and acting as the budgetary watchdogs of local government” (p. 30). These
complex arrangements can lead to confusion and apathy among voters, and result in
higher taxation and increased overall expenditures due to overlapping, autonomous
jurisdictions (including special districts) often found in many urban and suburban
areas (Foster, 1997). In terms of equity and transparency, unincorporated areas
of a county are often served by special purpose governments—often times several
overlapping districts—which can create confusion and contribute to a lack of political
visibility (Foster, 1997). These special districts are typically created in an “ad hoc”
fashion to address deficiencies in service delivery or availability, which can create
multiple layers of government, and also lead to inefficiencies by failing to realize
economies of scale as metropolitan regions grow (Foster, 1997).
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A frequent criticism of the metropolitan perspective is that reformers dismiss the
ability of smaller, special-purpose governments, to meet citizens’ preferences with
regard to service provision (Foster, 1997). From a reform perspective, consolidating
government units, expanding the economies of scale, and offering increased service
provision are the preferred and most equitable arrangements. However, Ostrom et al.
(1961) argue that the “preferred state of affairs” within a locale—which balances
citizens’ demand for services with their relative level of taxation—can be better
met when citizens are given a choice of political and institutional arrangements
with which to meet their service demands. As Foster (1997) notes, contrary to
frequent claims, metropolitan areas became increasingly complex over the course of
the Twentieth Century and “suffered few of the service delivery disasters predicted by
reformers” despite a significant increase in political fragmentation via special districts
(p. 34). Further, it is difficult to diagnose problems hindering more efficient, effective,
and responsive governance in metropolitan America when each metropolitan area
encompasses a wide range of geographic, socioeconomic, demographic, and structural
factors. According to the United States Census Bureau (2016), metropolitan areas are
defined as any locale with an urban area whose population is 50,000 or more; which,
as of 2013 estimates, includes 382 metropolitan statistical areas (United States Office
of Management and Budget, 2015). When focusing on the relative size of recent
consolidated city-county governments (e.g. Table C.1), population sizes range from
just over 1,200 residents in Tribune-Greeley County, Kansas to roughly 800,000 in
Indianapolis’ Unigov at the time of consolidation. To this end, Foster (1997) argues
that it is “impossible to assume inherent efficiency at these varying scales merely
because they are designated metropolitan” (p. 35).
The Public Choice Perspective
In a departure from the reform perspective that took hold in the first half of the
Twentieth Century, public choice theorists began applying “economic principles and
techniques to political concerns, such as voting behavior, bureaucracies, resource
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allocation, and processes of collective action” by the 1950s (Savitch and Vogel, 2009;
Foster, 1997, p. 35). As Savitch and Vogel (2009) note, public choice theorists were
largely influenced by both Tiebout (1956) and, subsequently, Ostrom et al. (1961), in
which advocates for market-like approaches to local governance view competition
between governments as the best way to achieve effective and efficient service
delivery. In the eyes of public choice theorists, and in direct contrast to reformers,
fragmentation is seen as a “virtue rather than a vice to be corrected” (Savitch and
Vogel, 2009, p. 111). From a public choice perspective, local governments should
be forced to compete for both residents and businesses by providing lower taxes,
increased responsiveness, and a desirable level of service delivery.
Public goods, in this case are those which “there is no cost for an additional
consumer to enjoy the benefits of these goods, and for which it is difficult or impossible
to exclude an individual from enjoying the good once provided” (Foster, 1997, p. 35).
These pubic goods—such as national defense or public parks—are different from goods
or services provided to citizens which may rely on user fees or some form of taxation.
In the case of public goods, Foster (1997) argues that “utility-maximizing consumers
have no incentive to reveal their true willingness to pay for these goods,” which creates
a classic “free-rider” problem(p. 35). In these cases, individuals are happy to enjoy
the provision of goods and services without shouldering the costs associated with
those goods, or of paying any additional costs of those services based on their own
use or consumption. For this reason, public goods are typically provided according to
political decision-making, such as voting and taxation, rather than market principles,
in order for citizens to reveal their true preferences and require them to share the
costs of these public goods and services (Foster, 1997). The conventional wisdom of
budgeting from a public administration perspective is that bureaucrats and agencies
seek to maximize their budgets. As Schneider (1986) explains, “prestige and power
associated with controlling more programs, and growth in the number of programs
almost inevitably leads to growth in expenditures” (p. 258). In order to counter this
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trend, public choice theorists view competition among service providers as the best
approach to ensuring the most efficient outcomes for citizens.
Foster (1997) explains that the provision of public goods is a “collective
community choice of whether to offer a good or service and, if so, to determine the
appropriate quantity, quality, form of financing, and method of production” (p. 36).
Alternately, the production of public goods simply involves the “technical process of
manufacturing the good or service” (Foster, 1997, p. 36). An important point made
by advocates for public choice is that the same governmental unit that determines the
provision of services does not need to be the same unit that produces it (Foster, 1997).
This perspective leads to additional “choice” in metropolitan areas where residents
have made a collective decision regarding the provision of a particular service, in that
the production of that service need not be their respective government entity. For
instance, intergovernmental (or interlocal) agreements allow nearby or overlapping
government units to enter into mutually-beneficial agreements. Additionally, special
districts allow locales to create new, single-purpose units, and contracting allows local
governments to seek private firms to provide services rather than rely on the public
production and personnel to take on a new or increased form of service provision.
Further, a more recent trend in public-private partnerships allows for even greater
competition regarding the production of services traditionally performed by local
governments.
While Tiebout (1956) argues in favor of a polycentric political structure, in
which citizens “voting with their feet” leads to “stimulating the interjurisdictional
competition necessary to induce efficient production of public goods,” Foster (1997)
posits that, with the exception of education, the majority of citizens will not
“vote with their feet” in order to make their preferences known (p.

36).

As

both Foster (1997) and Savitch and Vogel (2009) argue, the costs associated with
moving are high, and for low-income residents, especially, choosing to leave a
community based on a troublesome service is simply not a viable option. Additionally,
rational choice theorists often ignore the attachment citizens have to their particular
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“place,” and fail to account for other considerations as to why residents would
choose to remain in a particular locale other than purely self-interested, economic
reasons (Savitch and Vogel, 2009). Finally, critics of public choice proponents who
advocate for fragmentation argue that while local governments may cooperate via
interlocal agreements, these activities are often limited to noncontroversial aspects of
governance, and that locales still compete, rather than coordinate, on matters related
to economic development (Savitch and Vogel, 1996, 2009). The economic development
aspect, as may scholars and reform proponents have noted as of late, is one of the
most viable arguments in favor of consolidating local governments.
Other Persepctives on Governance
A newer approach to local governance, which Savitch and Vogel (2009) classify as
the new regionalism perspective, or what Feiock (2007) refers to as institutional
collective action (ICA), entails collaboration and shared service provision through
interlocal agreements. Wallis (1994) describes this new perspective as “a shift in
focus from formal structural arrangements to informal structures and processes for
setting policy and mobilizing action” (p. 292). Due to the logistical difficulties
associated with forming a new, consolidated government, as well as the political
challenges and low success rates of these referenda, intergovernmental collaboration
presents an alternative to the traditional “consolidation versus fragmentation” debate
the by offering what Savitch and Vogel (2009) have dubbed “metropolitan governance
without the government” (p. 107). As of late, the focus of scholars and practitioners
in local government has shifted from an “either-or” paradigm between public choice
and metropolitan reform, and resulted in a compromise between the two—the new
regionalism approach (Savitch and Vogel, 2009). This new approach to governance
provides locales with the ability to solve problems related to efficiency and equity
while avoiding the political obstacles often indicative of structural change (Downs,
1994; Savitch and Vogel, 2009). Noting the resistance which often occurs, Downs
(1994) argues that local officials, who often have a vested interest in the status
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quo,“fearthatmajorstructuralchanges,especiallystronger regionaldecisionmakingpowers,mightweakentheircontrolortakeawaytheirofficesentirely” (pp. 188-189).
Those subscribing to new regionalism take a different perspective on service
provision than those of the reform or public choice schools. New regionalism moves
away from the formal institutions of government and focuses on governance as a
collection of “informal horizontal networks” which are “more concerned with reducing
disparities between the central cities and suburbs” (Savitch and Vogel, 2009, p.
112). As Parks and Oakerson (1989) argue, “there is no ’one right way’ to organize
metropolitan America;” rather, “metropolitan areas require patterns of governance
that are sufficiently open to allow for diverse solutions that respond to variable
conditions” (p. 20). For new regionalists, some of the primary policy goals are focused
on the reduction of “racial, economic, and fiscal disparities between the core cities
and their suburbs” (Savitch and Vogel, 2009, p. 113). The focus on equity is similar
to the goals of government reformers, in that they wish to achieve a more equitable
tax system and services. Additionally, more fragmentation and increased government
autonomy through contracting and competition relies upon assumptions for greater
efficiency based on the public choice approach. However, the new regionalism also
strives to reduce disparities and ensure metropolitan-wide success through what
Savitch and Vogel (2009) refer to as a “problem-oriented approach.” From this
perspective, local government units cooperate to achieve desired outcomes and utilize
metropolitan planning strategies aimed at reducing sprawl, maintaining affordable
housing, and decreasing the environmental impacts of metropolitan growth (Savitch
and Vogel, 2000, 2009).
From a different perspective, Foster (1997) explains that metropolitan ecologists
criticize reformers’ idealistic view that citizens—particularly those in larger metropolitan areas—will give up local control and “the benefits of small-scale democracy
for large bureaucracies and unproven gains in service efficiency” (p.

42). This

relates to similar to findings by Greer (1962), who found that many residents
are opposed to structural reforms when those reforms are viewed as relinquishing
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local (or sub-local) control over services and decision-making, particularly when the
benefits of those structural changes are, at best, unclear. Similar to a systems
theory perspective, metropolitan ecologists view institutional change as a response to
environmental factors, and that local governments respond through “accommodation,
adaption, and adjustment” rather than through a wholesale reorganization of the
political and structural arrangements (Foster, 1997, p. 42). From the ecological
perspective, reforms that promote “radical reorganization,” such as comprehensive
consolidation, have been viewed as “excessively disruptive invasions that unduly
jeopardized metropolitan political stability” (Foster, 1997, p. 43). In contrast to
seismic shifts in local government structure, ecologists argue for incremental changes,
similar to “muddling through” (Lindblom, 1959), in which local officials respond
to these environmental changes and citizen demands through smaller, measured
adjustments to policy and service provision (Foster, 1997).
For metropolitan ecologists, structural changes to local government “are not
spontaneous but rather the outcome of deliberate legal and institutional processes
established by state and federal governments” (Foster, 1997, p. 44). For instance,
prior to the consolidation of Nashville-Davidson County in April 1963, the process
“took twelve years, a constitutional amendment, legislation in three sessions of the
legislature, and two referenda to overcome the political barriers that stood in the
path of consolidation” (Coomer and Tyer, 1974, 3-4). To this end, Marando (1974)
notes that while state laws affect certain aspects of local government change, such
as annexation, these relatively “routine” changes are typically left up to the local
governments and its citizens, whereas structural changes that are seen as less routine,
such as city-county consolidations, are subject to political processes at both the state
and local levels (Rigos and Spindler, 1991). Thus, citizens and local governments are
subject to a greater degree of “top-down” influence in a federal system, such as the
United States, than public choice theorists often acknowledge. While Rusk (2003)
notes that it is somewhat rare, particularly post-World War II, governors and state
legislators “can and do act as metrowide policymakers” (p. 98). Thus, it is not as if
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governments can simply form, dissolve, centralize, or fragment according to current
circumstances, or in response to the “market” for certain taxation and service levels.
Aside from the rigidity involved in the incorporation or dissolution of local
government entities, as Foster (1997) points out, there are often legal, institutional,
and political factors limiting or affecting choices dealing with issues such as
annexation, taxation, and consolidation. For this reason, it is simplistic to simply
assume local governments can respond to the preferences of citizens and businesses
without considering the complexities of local governance that are often beyond the
control of local officials.

In response to this, governments may form interlocal

agreements with other municipalities or the county, establish new special districts,
engage in annexation, or pursue functional consolidation—in which city and county
functions or offices are consolidated—as alternatives to full, structural consolidation
(Carr and Feiock, 2004; Leland and Thurmaier, 2004). Not only are these alternatives
more common, but in many instances these alternatives are easier from both
administrative and political perspectives, compared to full consolidation, when
considering the processes involved in merging, as well as the difficulties local officials
often encounter when trying to convince residents to approve of consolidation via
referendum. Thus, as Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) note, attempted structural
reforms are more likely to be successful when consolidating only two or three
governments, and excluding other entities, such as schools and special districts.
Regardless of the form, it is clear that structural changes to government, and
substantive changes to governance, are difficult tasks, and each present their own
benefits, as well as challenges.
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2.2

Racial and Ethnic Representation in Local
Government

For decades, scholars have examined the impact of electoral structures and voting
policies on racial and ethnic minorities.

While many studies tend to focus on

congressional districts and redistricting, a great deal of literature has examined the
nature of local government structures and the impacts of electoral arrangements
dating back to Jim Crow and the Progressive Era. Despite an increase in representation over the years, minorities are drastically under-represented on many local
government councils and commissions, and consolidated city-county governments
carry a stigma that the act of consolidation drastically dilutes minority voting
strength. Martin and Schiff (2011) note that despite much of the debate surrounding
city-county consolidation focusing on outcomes related to efficiency, effectiveness, or
accountability, an unintended consequence of consolidation is the impact on ethnic
minority representation. Swanson (2000), building on previous work from Seamon
and Feiock (1995), notes that voter turnout in the 19 years after consolidation in
Jacksonville/Duval County, Florida had dropped by 18 percent—more than any
other urban area in Florida. To this end, Hajnal (2010) notes the importance of
voter turnout, emphasizing that while minorities are greatly underrepresented on
local legislative bodies, increased turnout in local elections can substantially reduce
underrepresentation. Thus, a system which has been shown to decrease turnout can
have detrimental effects on the minority communities in consolidated governments.
For this reason, it is especially important to better understand the voting patterns
and demographics in these local elections, as well as a more in-depth analysis of those
who favor and oppose city-county consolidation.
At-large elections, promoted heavily during the Progressive Era, were supported
by reformers as a means of creating local government structures where elected officials,
and, by extension, their policies, would be focused more on the municipality as a
whole, rather than specific districts and various segments of the community. It was
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thought that by reducing the competition that often occurs when allocating resources
and making political decisions that may benefit one particular group or neighborhood,
greater cooperation and improved governance would result. Thus, by policymakers
taking a more holistic perspective rather than focusing on specific segments of the
population, or only considering more short-term political interests, more equitable
outcomes would be achieved (Leland and Johnson, 2004). The problems that result,
however, in taking an at-large perspective to governance is that certain subgroups
within a municipality are excluded, and often not considered when crafting policies,
allocating resources, or representing particular interests when those groups constitute
a minority of the population. Similarly, many scholars point to at-large elections as
the most frequent institutional barrier that minority groups have to overcome.
Hajnal (2010) also cites small council size, nonpartisan elections, off-cycle
elections, and council/manager form of government as other institutional barriers
that make it difficult for minorities to overcome. In many consolidated governments,
reducing council size, changing to or maintaining a system of nonpartisan elections,
and scheduling off-cycle elections—and even the consolidation referenda themselves—
often occur in these locales. Complicating matters, as Welch and Bledsoe (1988a)
point out, is the fact that despite at-large systems having been used to discriminate
against minority voters—particularly African Americans—proving that fact has
been rather difficult when it comes to the courts.

In short, “public officials

rarely, if ever, leave behind a well-documented record of their illicit motives”
(Welch and Bledsoe, 1988a, p.

13).

In all, these factors make it clear that

structural changes have negatively impacted racial and ethnic representation in local
governments, particularly in consolidated governments, which often possess several of
the characteristics described above; however, establishing clear connections between
either the intent or the impact of these structural changes has been difficult to
demonstrate from a comprehensive perspective.
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2.2.1

Consolidation & Minority Representation

As Marando (1979) explains, “the race issue—specifically dilution of Black voting
power—has been considered by many observers to be a hidden objective of consolidation” (p. 414). From a historical perspective, race and ethnicity have often
played a prominent role in politics at all levels of government, and the politics
surrounding consolidated city-county governments are no different. Even in recent
years, the issue of race and representation—particularly the structural impacts on
representation—have continued to be a challenge for communities of color across
the nation.

Following Marando (1979), many scholars have made note of the

negative impact that consolidation can have on minority representation within local
government, and in turn, the low levels of support for consolidation within African
American communities (Swanson, 2000; Leland and Thurmaier, 2004; Martin and
Schiff, 2011). The question remains, however, as to whether the intent (Marando,
1979), or the unintended consequence (Martin and Schiff, 2011) of consolidation
continues to have an impact on communities of color more than five decades after
the passage of the Voting Right Act.
In previous studies, Swanson (2000) and Bollens (2003) have noted that consolidating city and county governments can have a disparate impact on minorities, and
those of lower socioeconomic status. With regard to disparities in services, Altshuler
et al. (1999) argue that reducing governmental fragmentation would lead to more
equitable access and increase the quality of essential services, like education, that are
of “fundamental importance to equal opportunity” (p. 104). Although the authors
do acknowledge that some racial and socioeconomic sorting may continue to occur at
the neighborhood level, Altshuler et al. (1999) posit that metropolitan-wide parity
would be better achieved as access to better services “would no longer be dependent
on where in the metropolitan area an individual resided” (p. 104). Thus, it is not
only the direct provision of services that are impacted by more equitable service levels,
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and the quality of services like education, but the more distal outcome as a result of
access to better schools has a lasting benefit to the metropolitan area as a whole.
Clarke (2006) argues that “the elimination of the city government undermines
minority voting strength and results in dilution where the region’s racial minorities
are concentrated in the city,” and that because of this, jurisdictions are required
under the Voting Rights Act to create rules that ensure a “commensurate level of
power and voting strength” post-consolidation (pp. 646-647). Further, Clarke (2006)
goes on to explain that “studies have long identified and recognized that consolidation
and government reorganization are tools that can be manipulated and used to dilute
African-American voting strength” (p. 662). While Davidson and Korbel (1981)
have also found evidence of vote dilution, they note that in many cases where cities
and counties have smaller minority populations, it would be difficult for a minority
candidate to win, regardless of the circumstances in that locale. Additionally, it is
important to point out that different minority groups benefit from different electoral
arrangements, such as at-large elections versus districts.

As Lien et al. (2009)

point out, while African Americans certainly benefit from majority-minority districts,
“compared to Blacks, Latinos need a much higher concentration of their own ethnic
population in the county to elect Latinos into local offices” (p. 492). Further, Asian
candidates have typically been elected from the most diverse local districts, as they are
elected with the lowest electoral share from their own racial group, and have actually
been more competitive in counties that have higher Latino populations (Lien et al.,
2009). Thus, as with many different subgroups, the differences leading to electoral
success for a particular candidate can vary; however, in most cases, the relative size of
a minority population does impact the chances of a minority candidate being elected.
With regard to metropolitan governance, Banfield (1957) noted that “[t]he
problem is not. . . merely one of creating organization for effective planning and
administration. It is also—and perhaps primarily—one of creating, or of maintaining,
organization for the effective management of conflict, especially of conflict arising from
the growing cleavages of race and class” (p. 90). In many cities and counties with
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large minority populations, organizations and community groups which are focused
on racial and ethnic minority issues, such as the NAACP, as well as minority elected
officials often make known their opposition to city-county consolidation. Although
a number of the studies on city-county consolidations cite an adverse effect on
minority groups, there is little quantitative evidence of this in current literature.
Additionally, as noted earlier, Leland and Thurmaier (2004) argue that the literature
on consolidation is “a patchwork of theoretical concepts,” and needs more research
and refinement in order to fully explain the underlying factors impacting or emanating
from these forms of government (p. 5). With this, the need for more generalizable
results is evident, in consolidation research, in general, as well as its potential effects
on particular individuals and communities. With little evidence, questions remain as
to whether or not minority groups continue to be adversely affected by consolidation
efforts, and if structural and electoral changes are linked to measurable differences in
representation.
While there are a number of consolidated city-county governments around the
country, Leland and Thurmaier (2004) point out that the majority of consolidation
attempts occur in the South, and that in terms of the representation of AfricanAmericans, and in part due to the Voting Rights Act, these cases “often act as
additional barriers that southern localities have to overcome” in order to consolidate
(p. 7). Despite recent successful consolidation attempts in majority–minority locales,
such as Augusta-Richmond County and Macon-Bibb County—both in Georgia—the
initial implementation plans were temporarily blocked by the Department of Justice
under Section 5, as the initial council structure and timing of elections were believed
to have potential effects on African American representation in both areas.
Augusta-Richmond County, Georgia is an example of governments that have
attempted to consolidate on several occasions, yet several times, federal courts have
struck-down the measure, noting that the consolidation would violate provisions
of the Voting Rights Act. In 1978, Campbell et al. (2004) point out that “black
plaintiffs sued the city and county for violation of the Voting Rights Act, alleging
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that at-large voting as practiced by the city and county governments unfairly diluted
black voter strength” (p. 196). In another instance, soon after residents elected the
first black member to the local school board, both the city and the school board
changed local election law so that members were elected at-large, as opposed to by
district (Campbell et al., 2004). After court cases and years of contention between
residents of Augusta and Richmond County, the Justice Department acknowledged
that “Augusta demonstrated polarized voting between races and concluded that
blacks in the city still suffered from the effects of past discrimination in education,
employment, income, health, and housing” (Campbell et al., 2004, p. 197). With
the history of discrimination and racial tension in the region, the focus on Southern
states is of particular interest with regard to the effect of consolidation on.
Southern cities and counties have overwhelmingly elected their local officials atlarge compared to the rest of the country, and it has been demonstrated that race
was a determining factor in many structural reforms (Davidson and Korbel, 1981).
While government structure varies from location to location, Murphy (2012) finds that
the structure of consolidated governments is typically “a mix of representatives from
districts throughout the area and at large members elected by the entire consolidated
area” (p. 4). The intent of electing both district and at-large representatives is to
provide representation for minority groups within the city limits, and also to ensure
that at-large members represent the interests of the entire county, and not just certain
districts (Murphy, 2012).
Another factor that influenced the shift to at-large elections in many areas was the
view that areas with declining populations—typically inner-cities and urban areas—
were over-represented, while the newer, sprawling suburbs were under-represented.
In the view of structural reformers, having city-wide commissions, as opposed to
wards or districts, would alleviate this disparity and prevent local officials from
having to redraw districts every few years to reflect population shifts (Hays, 1964).
However, as Davidson and Korbel (1981) point out, “[r]esearch in the post-Progressive
era demonstrates that at-large systems diminish minority representation,” and that
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members who are elected at-large are generally less responsive to constituents as
compared to those elected in wards or districts (p. 991). Browning et al. (1990)
also point to the influence of governmental structures in how city governments
“institutionalize and respond to emerging group demands” (p. 378). Cities that
underwent Progressive Era reforms and adopted nonpartisan, at-large elections tend
to have coalitions that are more “fluid and candidate-centered” where “communitybased organizations, often with an ethnic basis, are likely to play more important
roles” (Browning et al., 1990, p. 379). In short, ethnicity plays an even larger role
with regard to representation in cities with nonpartisan elections.
With regard to representation itself, Welch and Bledsoe (1988b) make an important distinction between two forms of representation—descriptive representation, and
substantive representation. Descriptive representation refers to the “policymaking
positions of individuals whose salient social characteristics reflect those in the
constituency as a whole,” while substantive representation “refers to whether the
policies of the representative are in the interests of the represented” (Welch and
Bledsoe, 1988b, p. xvii). Pitkin (1967) explains that the concept of descriptive
representation entails an accurate reflection of the electorate and that that substantive
representation “means acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive
to them” (p. 209). Beyond conceptual definitions, philosophers and scholars differ
as to how elected officials represent their constituents—be it their interests, their
characteristics, their actions, their backgrounds, or their beliefs. Pitkin (1967) also
explains that “[n]o institutional system can guarantee the essence, the substance
of representation;” and warns that we should not be too optimistic “about the
capacity of institutions to produce the desired conduct” (p. 239). According to
Pitkin (1967), “even the best of representative institutions cannot be expected to
produce representation magically, mechanically, without or even in spite of beliefs,
attitudes, and intentions of the people operating the system;” and that the concept of
representation is simply a “continuing tension between ideal and achievement” (pp.
239-240). While both aspects of representation are certainly important, descriptive
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representation has often been the most widely-used characteristic in analyzing and
evaluating minority representation, and will be used as the conceptual definition in
Chapter 3.

2.3

Campaigns and Consolidation Referenda

Compared to other forms of local government reorganization—such as establishing
special districts, interlocal agreements, and annexation—Scott (1968) classifies
consolidation as the “most radical” approach to government change (p.

254).

According to Scott (1968), this “radical” change impacts a great deal of people
and “threatens (or is perceived as threatening) the political-governmental world that
citizens, governmental employees and officials, and political leaders have learned to
live with and like” (p. 255). In most cases, voters are more likely to reject such
proposals, as reformers are either unable to make the case for consolidation, or
opposing forces—political, socioeconomic, geographic, or otherwise—are too great
to overcome. However, while consolidation and other infrequent reforms tended to be
less common in the mid-Twentieth Century, as these “radical” reforms (or, at least
attempted reforms) become more familiar to both government officials and to voters,
consolidation and other significant structural changes may seem more acceptable
(Scott, 1968). If this is correct, independent of other factors, we should expect to
see increased instances of approval on the part of voters. In this regard, as noted in
Chapter 4, reformers have been more successful as of late, with 41% of consolidation
referenda having been approved by voters since 2000 (Murphy, 2012).
As Leland and Johnson (2004) argue, “city-county consolidation is a reform idea
that does not die,” as attempts to create metropolitan governments have increased in
recent decades, and many local government reformers continually offer consolidation
as a solution to problems faced by city and county governments (p. 26). Those wishing
to pursue consolidation, or other types of structural reforms, must identify crucial
issues to be addressed, and demonstrate how their proposed type of government
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reorganization will remedy those problems.

Greer (1963) concluded that “it is

clear that transmitting to the electorate the complex issues of structural change in
government is a thankless and near-impossible task” (p. 199). As the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1965) found, attempts at government
reorganization often failed due to the absence of a critical situation, or the widespread
recognition of a situation which would be remedied by a proposed structural change.
Additionally, reorganization plans which are vague, difficult to understand, fail to
address the concerns of residents, or which face opposition—be it active, or covert—by
political elites or local media, often fail (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, 1965). On the contrary, when reformers allay voters’ fears of higher taxes
and unclear objectives, present clear reorganization plans, are conscious of potential
changes in representation, and have the support of elected officials—including state
lawmakers, in certain instances—changes to local government are often approved by
voters, as has been the case in many instances of consolidation and other structural
reforms (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1965).
Rusk (2003) classifies metropolitan areas across the United States based on their
perceived likelihood of adapting a consolidation plan, based on state laws governing
structural changes, the role and nature of counties and townships, as well as states
where recent consolidations have occurred. Of those metropolitan areas unlikely or
less likely to undergo consolidation, Rusk (2003) explains that these are designated
as such due the prominence of townships in many areas of New England and states
where cities are independent of counties, such as in Virginia. Metropolitan areas
where consolidation is at least feasible or even likely include states which have weak
or no townships, states that have statutes specifically addressing consolidation, and,
of course, states where consolidation has recently occurred (Rusk, 2003). Of these
metropolitan areas, 128 of the 327 (39%) designated metropolitan areas from the 2000
Census are considered as possible locations where consolidations could occur. All of
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these metropolitan areas are located in the South, West, and Midwest regions∗ , with
none of them occurring in the Northeast due to statutes regarding townships and
county governments (Rusk, 2003).
In many of the reorganization efforts taking place in the 1950s and early 1960s,
the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1965) concluded that
proponents seeking structural change typically relied on more formal means of
information dissemination, such as the mass media, while opponents to reorganization
often employed less formal means, such as slogans and rumors, as opposed to specific
argumentation against those efforts. In many attempts at consolidation, reformers
typically have the support of metropolitan (central city) newspapers and rely on their
favorable coverage. In addition to newspapers, proponents of consolidation often
employ traditional campaign methods by using radio and television, special meetings
and information forums, distributing informational and promotional materials, and
relying on organized groups who can help persuade voters and disseminate their
message, such as local party chapters, labor unions, churches, and social groups
(Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1965). Further, Rosenbaum
and Henderson (1973) found that supporters of consolidation viewed their efforts as
in “the interest of ‘the people’ and against the ‘politicians”’ (p. 264). These findings,
from consolidation campaigns in Jacksonville-Duval County, and unsuccessful TampaHillsborough County, are similar to those in many other cases, in which consolidation
is often an elite-driven issue, but framed in such as way that consolidation will be of
benefit to average citizens.
As Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) note, studies of voting in consolidation
campaigns typically focus on the vote itself as the crucial variable, and either
ignore or minimize potentially impactful political and socioeconomic variables that
would incorporate a broader perspective on these results. Thus, taking a more
∗

These states include: Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
and Washington, where state laws specifically address consolidation or where consolidations have
occurred since World War II (Rusk, 2003, p. 128).
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comprehensive view could better explain the conditions which ultimately impacted
the ultimate outcome of a consolidation referenda. From a more political perspective,
Banfield (1957) argues that attempts at local government integration would likely be
difficult in metropolitan areas with partisan elections due to the fact that Democrats,
who often control a majority of seats on municipal legislative bodies, would be ceding
power, or at least putting their control in jeopardy. While the partisan makeup
of many areas has changed in the last 60 years, this argument still holds true as
many consolidation efforts must consider the political consequences of combining
often disparate areas, how new districts will be drawn, and how the political—or
at least ideological—balance of power will be affected by these changes. Further,
Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) note the “frequently vocal, intense opposition to
[comprehensive] consolidation from many incumbent officials whose powers will be
diminished or eliminated by the measure” (p. 11). In the case of the NashvilleDavidson County consolidation, proponents faced strong opposition, leading to an
unsuccessful attempt in 1958, which included both firefighters and police officers,
who reportedly went so far as to disrupt pro-consolidation rallies. (Booth, 1963;
Rosenbaum and Kammerer, 1974)
Interestingly, Rosenbaum and Henderson (1973) found little evidence that the
intricacies of consolidation plans directly impacted elites’ support for, or opposition to,
those plans. Rather, many elites involved in Jacksonville-Duval County and TampaHillsborough County consolidation efforts framed the campaigns in terms of their
impact on broadly-defined groups: people who would benefit, or politicians who could
be negatively impacted (Rosenbaum and Henderson, 1973). In these two instances,
community leaders seemed to ignore, or not realize, the nuances of these consolidation
efforts, and the potential significance of structural changes among subgroups within
the community. One mistake that reformers often make involves the assumption that
consolidation will “sell itself,” relying primarily on general enthusiasm for change
and the belief in the “economy and efficiency” argument will permeate the electorate
rather than “awaiting a firm foundation of political support among the city’s major
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influentials” (Rosenbaum and Henderson, 1973; Rosenbaum and Kammerer, 1974, pp.
77-78). In essence, many reformers often have a pro-consolidation bias, and frame
problems with municipal (or county) governments in terms of the structural changes
that will bring about desired results. For these individuals, who are often enthralled
by the prospect of consolidation—either as a solution to perceived problems, or as an
alternate to the status quo—there is often a failure to recognize the challenges that
await such efforts, as well as the potential roadblocks or alternate solutions proposed
by opponents of these proposals (Rosenbaum and Kammerer, 1974). In some cases,
reformers may exclude influential community leaders for fear they will exert too much
influence in the process, or erect obstacles to structural changes in order to preserve
the status quo.
As Seroka (2005) explains, “consensus on consolidation becomes more difficult
when a large number of local interests view consolidation as a zero-sum game in which
any collective gain is made only at the expense of the group’s interests” (p. 73). Also,
“consolidation campaigns need to recognize that voters will only adopt major change
if they are convinced that the status quo is untenable or if consolidated government
carries little or no risk to their pocketbooks and the provision of public services”
(Seroka, 2005, p. 74). Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) argue that whether or not
“the consolidation plan was the most appropriate remedy for these governmental ills
is moot; the widespread recognition of grave community problems created a favorable
climate of opinion for the proposal because it promised to do something about the
problems” (pp. 78–79). This clearly shows, according to Rosenbaum and Kammerer
(1974), that “a consolidation proposal is difficult to pass at a public referendum on
its own merits” (p. 79). In the cases of Jacksonville-Duval County and TampaHillsborough County, Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) concluded that “the voting
public in both communities was probably unfamiliar with the details of consolidation
in any depth and tended, instead, to vote more on the basis of diffuse convictions
that reform was needed or was not” (p. 75). These examples demonstrate why
context is so important with regard to these types of local campaigns and elections.
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While voters may not be experts on the merits and intricacies of structural changes,
they are aware of systemic problems, corruption, economic problems, high taxes,
or other issues within their communities. For this reason, the climate surrounding
these referenda, presented as part of the Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) model is
especially important for assessing the merits of consolidation movements.

2.3.1

Voting Patterns and Turnout

It has long been held that areas with higher socioeconomic status tend to have higher
levels of political participation and voter turnout (e.g. Verba et al., 1995; Lowndes,
2009); however, whether or not turnout in these instances is of any benefit (or
detriment) for the chances of success for consolidation efforts is unclear (Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1965).

In many cases, reformers

often face an apathetic public, with voter turnout being incredibly low (Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1965). In such cases, we must examine
the circumstances surrounding these referenda, including when voters went to the
polls, and what other offices or issues—if any—were on the ballot. In some cases,
consolidation referenda were placed on the ballot during a regularly-scheduled primary
or general election; however, in other instances, local officials schedule special elections
specifically for these purposes (e.g. Table 4.1). Despite the fact that the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1965) did not find strong evidence
that voter turnout increased the electoral successes of reorganization campaigns,
the Commission argues, plausibly, that increased turnout gives reformers a better
opportunity for success. At minimum, the Committee suggests that higher turnout
in instances where a referendum is ultimately defeated, the issues raised during the
reorganization effort will have been voiced, and the potential for alternate solutions
could be explored. Additionally, in instances where a referendum is successful, higher
turnout will ultimately give credence to the outcome, and represent the “consent of
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the governed” rather than the outcome ultimately being decided by a small minority
of the electorate (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1965, p. 8).
Additionally, Greer (1963) notes the difficulties in not being able to rely on
traditional party labels when framing structural change for the electorate, as well
as a lack of support from party organizations in some cases involving structural
change. Further, voters tend to have little knowledge of how changes to government
structure or metropolitan charters will impact them, relying primarily on political and
civic elites for cues, and local media to “reinforce pre-existing norms and activate
the population to vote accordingly” (Greer, 1963, p. 194). Thus, Greer (1963)
concludes that “transmitting to the electorate the complex issues of structural change
in government is a thankless and near-impossible task,” even noting that some
campaigns have been described as using manipulation and brainwashing in order
to achieve a desired outcome (p. 199). While Hawley and Zimmer (1970) may not go
as far as Greer in terms of alluding to the use of unethical practices, they argue that
issues involving metropolitan governance are often “too technical or too inaccessible”
for average citizens, and that individuals unfamiliar with such issues tend to convey
attitudes towards metropolitan organization based primarily on ideology rather than
empiricism (p. 91).
Despite their importance to the ultimate success of consolidation efforts, advocates
for consolidation must look beyond political and business elites when pursuing
structural change as a means to address perceived problems with local government.
For one, residents have a particular attachment to their existing local government (e.g.
Wood, 1958; Greer, 1962; Williams et al., 1965; Rosenbaum and Kammerer, 1974);
particularly suburban residents, who often see their current government as superior to
that of the central city (Hawley and Zimmer, 1970). Additionally, residents identify
with their particular locale—particularly their rather homogeneous neighborhoods—
which tends to transcend citizens’ attachment to a larger, metropolitan-wide area
(Zimmerman, 1970). From a demographic perspective, Dye (1964) employs measures
of social distance such as education (the median educational attainment, in years, for
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adults 25 and older); occupation (the percentage of males in “white collar” jobs); and
median family income. In examining 198 urban areas, using 1960 Census data, Dye
(1964) finds that in metropolitan areas where the social distance favors the central
city over the suburbs—meaning, the measures were higher in cities—annexation is
more likely to occur. Thus, based on these cases, higher levels of socioeconomic
status correlate with higher instances of metropolitan integration, whereas areas
where those of higher socioeconomic status reside in suburban areas tend to disfavor
annexation. This is consistent with Scott (1968), who found that “voters who support
metropolitan reform are usually drawn from higher socio-economic categories,” as well
as subsequent studies (e.g. Rosenbaum and Kammerer 1974; Leland and Thurmaier
2004) which find that consolidation tends to be an elite-driven issue, with those voters
being more likely influence the outcome of a reform effort (p. 260).
In the case of suburbanites who oppose boundary changes, Dye (1964) argues that
many suburban residents attempt to isolate themselves from those of different (likely,
lower) socioeconomic status and are “unlikely to look with favor upon attempts to
remove identifiable boundaries between their communities and a socially dissimilar
central city” (pp. 245–246). Further, Dye (1964) argues that similar societies “are
more likely to share enough values and to enjoy sufficient facility of communication so
as to provide the necessary policy consensus for political integration,” while dissimilar
societies are less likely to achieve that consensus (p. 439). In these cases, individuals
and groups with dissimilar characteristics are less likely to share the same values
and attitudes towards political, social, and economic issues. However, in terms of
fragmentation, Hawkins and Dye (1970) argue that “the relationships between citysuburban social differences and fragmentation are generally so weak (the coefficients
so low), that this does not appear to be an explanation of fragmentation” (p. 20). As
noted earlier, racial and socioeconomic factors have been incorporated in assessing
the impact of consolidation in some cases; however, further analysis of these factors
will help us determine what, if any, factors relate to consolidation approval.

43

Voters in reorganization efforts, according to Scott (1968), tend to “exclude
themselves both from the pre-vote dialogue and from polls” (p. 256). In most cases,
consolidation votes tend to be low-salience, and, unless coupled with an existing
election (presidential, congressional, or primary), a fairly low-turnout affair as well.
Scott (1968) also argues that “there is every reason to anticipate that this vigorous
opposition will normally succeed in defeating the lukewarm fervor and activity of the
reorganization proponents” (p. 256). Thus, if the normal response to government
reorganization is failure, then successes for reformers is considered “abnormal,”
in which special or unusual circumstances will have eventually contributed to an
improbable outcome (Scott, 1968). It should be noted, however, that consolidation
plans seeking to address some problem or achieve some goal are “typically competing
not only against the status quo but potentially also against alternative ways of
dealing with the problems that give rise to the proposal” (Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations, 1965, p. 9). For this reason, it is important for
reformers to consider all alternatives before pursuing what they perceive to be as
the best solution. In many cases, this involves forming a commission, committee,
or other group that examines the perceived problems, conducts research, examines
alternatives, and typically proposes a particular course of action. Thus, if failure is
the standard, reformers must seriously consider their best course of action in making
their case to voters.
One consideration, of which reformers must be mindful involves the reliance on
outside advisors and consultants. In many instances, those exploring or advocating
for consolidation will rely on the expertise of consultants—including academics,
firms, or officials with knowledge and experience with government restructuring.
However, it is prudent for local reformers to be mindful of the “politics” and
current dynamics of their particular metropolitan area (Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, 1965).

In any area, local officials, organizations,

businesses, and constituencies all have their own interests, and, to varying degrees,
either benefit or are disadvantaged by the current arrangements. For locals, these
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arrangements may be known and understood; however, for an outside expert, these
may not be apparent. The impact of any structural and political changes must be
taken into account when pursuing consolidation if that effort is to be successful.
Similarly, Scott (1968) argues that opponents to reorganization view such efforts
as a threat to their “political-governmental lives” and are wiling to do whatever
is necessary in order to defeat such proposals (p. 255). Conversely, proponents
often focus on the vague promise of a “better day ahead” and “do little more than
reinforce each other through intellectual public debate and the editorial pages of the
city newspapers” (Scott, 1968, p. 256). To this end, the Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations (1965) suggests involving local politicians, who
are familiar with their constituents, information dissemination and messaging, and
getting out the vote.
As Carr (2004) points out, both proponents and opponents of consolidation efforts
will do anything to win, including exaggerating benefits, understating costs, or even
fabricating some claims completely. Although not ideal, it is easy to understand
that those who benefit from the current structure or those who would benefit from
a structural change will do whatever they can to achieve their desired outcome.
In pursuing a consolidation campaign, it is important for proponents to consider
both the formal and informal impacts that structural changes will have not just on
government, but also in terms of the community, and the existing power structures.
As Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) point out, comprehensive consolidation includes
not only changes to the official government structure—including elected offices,
boards, authorities, departments, and bureaus that make up local governments—
but also impacts the informal political, socioeconomic, and business climate that
exists within a certain locale. When districts are redrawn, private contracts are
potentially altered, and community interests are disrupted, considerations must be
made beyond simply the formal arrangements in order for consolidation efforts to
have a better chance for success. In some instances, preserving political power, for
instance, may be prudent, and the support of elected officials and community leaders
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is necessary for a successful referendum (Leland and Thurmaier, 2004). However,
as Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) note, in the instance of Jacksonville-Duval
County, the consolidation plan was put forward and vigorously promoted as one
that would undercut the current political establishment that had dominated city
and county politics for years. With that, it is clear that context matters, and the
uniqueness of each case presents both an interesting basis for further investigation,
and creates challenges in determining generalizable patters in what ultimately affects
their outcomes.

2.3.2

Assessing Successful Consolidation Efforts

What precipitates a successful consolidation attempt?

For that, we draw from

Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974), Leland and Thurmaier (2004, 2010), and others
who have focused on the events, circumstances, and sources of support (or lack
thereof) for successful (and unsuccessful) consolidation referenda. Rosenbaum and
Kammerer (1974) suggest a model for successful consolidation which includes three
major stages: a crisis climate, in which significant changes occur within a community
and demands for a government response are either unmet or ineffective; power
deflation, whereby not only citizens, but civic elites and the local media lose faith in
government personnel, powers, and resources; and an accelerator, where proponents
generate enough support within the community to facilitate change. Beginning with a
crisis climate, it is common for some problem or issue to appear, or to gradually persist
in government, which government officials are either ill-equipped, unable, or unwilling
to address. Eventually, an unsatisfactory response to this problem or issue will cause
citizens and civic groups to demand action from their elected and appointed officials,
or else some form of change will be made. In many cases, the natural reaction from
citizens in instances of inaction or ineffectiveness is a political change, via the ballot
box. However, sizable and significant crises or persistent and ineffectual leadership on
the part of public officials can lead to citizens and civic groups to seek more significant,
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structural change. Additionally, some crises may stem from problems or issues out of
officials’ control, such as changes in the population or significant economic shifts. In
these cases, reformers may seek structural changes when a governmental response—
or, more often, a series of responses—are unsatisfactory (Rosenbaum and Kammerer,
1974).
Following a crisis climate, where citizens and civil leaders perceive ineffective
or inadequate responses to challenges facing their communities, Rosenbaum and
Kammerer (1974) posit that a power deflation occurs, whereby traditional sources of
support—including community and business elites, media outlets, and the like—adopt
the position that the current structural arrangements are incapable of addressing that
which occurred in the crisis stage. This is predicated on elites adopting the belief—or,
at least, not opposing the belief—that consolidation is the appropriate solution. In
many communities, civic elites often have a vested interest the local government, be
it historical, financial, or philosophical. However, as discussed by Johnson and Carr
(2004), many structural reorganizations are the result of a power struggle between
the defenders of the status quo, and those who seek changes to the current structural
and political arrangements. Or, as Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) acknowledge,
changes in the community structure that bring about a changing of the “old guard,”
who has traditionally held the reigns of power, and the emerging “new guard” (p. 27).
As part of a power deflation, local media outlets regularly play a prominent role in the
public’s perception not only of the issues relating to a consolidation referendum, but
the events and circumstances leading up to the crisis climate. If stories of government
inefficiencies, ineptitude, or indifference towards matters of public concern dominate
local media coverage, it is more likely the public will take cues from dissatisfied
entrepreneurial elites and will be more likely to favor consolidation. Subsequently,
or, concurrently, citizen groups or exploratory committees will typically formulate
proposals and draft preliminary metropolitan charters in order to submit their findings
and recommendations at the appropriate time (Rosenbaum and Kammerer, 1974).
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Finally, in the third stage of successful consolidation attempts, Rosenbaum and
Kammerer (1974) argue that an “accelerator” facilitates the final push toward
consolidation and “provides the proponents of consolidation with the means to
generate the public support necessary get consolidation accepted at the polls” (p.
29). As the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1965) found,
many of the unsuccessful attempts at structural reform lacked specific problems to be
solved—or, at least, a collective public recognition of those problems—and the clarity
that the particular reform proponents were seeking as a remedy to those problems.
An accelerator could include, for instance: a scandal involving a government agency,
official, or personnel; an emergency which highlights the government’s inability to
adequately address; major criticisms of government leaders by elites and prestigious
sources; or, the loss of important community leaders, particularly those of symbolic
and material importance for the current system and structure (Rosenbaum and
Kammerer, 1974). Thus, Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) posit that the symptoms
of power deflation, predicated by a crisis climate, coupled with an accelerating factor
will ultimately lead to a successful public referendum in favor of consolidation.
However, Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) cede that if reformers cannot obtain
support from elites, or cannot gain their support without “paying a price too dear,”
then, regardless of the circumstances, “a community is not ready for consolidation no
matter how much it may need it” (p. 78).
From a campaign perspective, recent work by Leland and Thurmaier (2004, 2010)
and other contributors emphasize the importance of economic development in campaign messaging. Beyond a strong economic development message, the importance of
support from the sitting sheriff, the guarantee that minority representation and voting
strength will be preserved, and the mitigation of burdens associated with increased
taxes and/or the assumption of existing debt are also important factors leading to
a successful consolidation campaign (Leland and Thurmaier, 2004). However, the
strength of both pro-and anti-consolidation campaigns remains rather difficult to
measure from a quantitative perspective. Marando and Whitley (1972) conclude that
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a “well-organized campaign...may not be sufficient for consolidation success” (p. 196).
Additionally, “factors such as racial distrust and fear may be of such importance that
organization alone will have little effect upon mobilizing support for consolidation”
Marando and Whitley (1972, p. 196).
From these, as well as similar studies, we know that threats to both voters and
public officials’ livelihoods and representation, combined with the often lackadaisical
efforts made by reformers who simply try to make an appeal based on efficiency
or other technocratic argument can lead to unsuccessful results. However, similar
to previous work on how consolidation impacts racial and ethnic representation,
specific measures of campaign strength or other determinants of successful change
are somewhat sparse.

While the Leland and Thurmaier (2004) model builds

upon the work by Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974), and presents a strong case
for predicting the success (or failure) of specific consolidation referenda, gauging
the relative strength or weaknesses of charter provisions and both pro-and anticonsolidation campaigns remains a somewhat elusive task.

As Rosenbaum and

Kammerer (1974) themselves argue, useful theories of consolidation “should avoid,
if possible, idiosyncratic explanations of campaign outcomes applicable only to to the
peculiarities of a single campaign” in order to achieve more generalizable factors which
ultimately contribute to successful and unsuccessful campaigns (p. 18). With that,
Chapter 4 will attempt to untangle these various aspects of charter provisions and
consolidation campaigns to present a more comprehensive picture from a quantitative
perspective, in hopes of building a much stronger, mixed-methods approach to
assessing these attempts at structural reforms.
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Chapter 3
Race and Representation in
Consolidated Governments
3.1

Introduction

In order to test whether consolidation has a disparate impact on racial and ethnic
minority representation, this chapter explores how consolidation has impacted the
number of Black elected officials over the last 50 years. For this analysis, each
consolidated legislative body was used as the focus in this study in order to test
representational equity both cross-sectionally, following consolidation, as well as
temporally, in order to observe changes in minority representation over time. Similar
to previous comparative case studies on consolidation, demographic and economic
variables were used to match cases based on the year of consolidation, as the key
to this type of research design in “comparing the cases with respect to the point of
departure as a consolidated government structure” (Leland and Thurmaier, 2010,
p. 16). When analyzing many aspects of consolidation, Leland and Thurmaier
(2010) note that the most important demographic variable is population size, as
well as other factors, including median age, education, and income. Further, it is also
important to select cases from the same state, which allows for the control of “fiscal,
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legal (constitutional and statutory), and political constraints and influences on cities,
counties, and consolidated governments” (Leland and Thurmaier, 2010, p. 18).
With regard to case selection, Dluhy (2010) notes that in comparing cases with
Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida, similar city and county governments—such as
Tampa and Hillsborough County—have been used due to the fact that a within-state
case allows researchers to control for state laws, constitutional provisions, and policies.
Further, Dluhy (2010) also explains that it is important to match consolidated cases
with other governments based on socioeconomic factors, and also account for forms of
government and electoral structures. In the instance of a selected case also being an
existing consolidated government, the second most-similar case was selected (Swartz,
2010). Further, Swartz (2010) echoes King et al. (1994), as well as Yin (2003) in
emphasizing both the importance and the benefits of drawing on multiple sources and
methods of data collection and notes that multiple sources allow for triangulation,
which addresses the issue construct validity by providing “multiple measures of the
same phenomenon” (Yin, 2003, p. 99). For these reasons, testing representational
equity both before and after (similar to Davidson and Grofman, 1994), as well as over
time, are appropriate in order to establish better estimates of any potential effect
structural changes resulting from consolidation have on minority representation.
While a random sample is typically the preferred method in purely quantitative
research with large-N analyses so as to avoid selection bias, the most appropriate
selection method for a great deal of small-N studies is to select cases nonrandomly
(King et al., 1994; Brady and Collier, 2010). King et al. (1994) warn against selecting
cases based on the dependent variable, as well as avoiding cases that that have little to
no variation in the independent variables; however, limitations stemming from smallN analyses and problems with selection biases can be mitigated by paying careful
attention to internal validity and thoughtful case selection (Leland and Thurmaier,
2010). George and Bennett (2005) note that “The best known method is the method
of ‘controlled comparison’—i.e., the comparison of ‘most similar’ cases which, ideally,
are cases that are comparable in all respects except for the independent variable,
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whose variance may account for the cases having different outcomes on the dependent
variable” (p. 80). In order to accomplish this, a “controlled comparison can be
achieved by dividing a single longitudinal case into two—the ‘before’ case and an
‘after’ case that follows a discontinuous change in an important variable” (George
and Bennett, 2005, p. 80).
To the extent possible, data from 10 years pre-and post-consolidation were
collected in order to effectively evaluate the level of representation (similar to Leland
and Thurmaier, 2010). For the measure of representation pre-consolidation, the
legislative bodies of both city and county governments were combined to calculate
one ratio as to create a similar unit for comparison. The city-county governments
which consolidated after 1965 are listed in Table A.1 (sorted by state-year) was used
as the basis of initial inquiry; however, further refinement was in order to select those
cases which exhibit a large enough minority population that we would expect to see
enough variation in the dependent variable. As such, cases in which less than 5% of
the population was Black were dropped, based on the assumption that populations
with less than 5% will be unlikely to demonstrate representational equity, regardless
of the governmental or electoral structure (similar to Robinson and Dye, 1978; Welch,
1990).
Consolidation cases post-1965 were used in order to include those cases which
occurred after the passage of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), assuming that structural
barriers to the ballot box will have been minimized or removed. Unfortunately,
comprehensive data on Black elected officials (discussed below) in local governments
are only available through 2002, which limits the analysis to cases which consolidated
between the years 1965 and 2002. In cases where the best-matched county was
another consolidated government in that state, the next-best comparison case was
chosen. Further, when combining the at-large and district structures of comparison
cities and counties yielded the “mixed” structure that many consolidated city-county
governments have; however, in instances where a consolidated government did not
have a mixed council (either at-large or districts), an appropriate structural match
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was found from the next-best list of matched cases as calculated using the variables
of interest∗ . This yielded the cases listed in Table C.1, which are most similar to each
consolidated city-county government (shown in bold) in the year of consolidation.
For the purposes of comparison, the city and county legislative bodies for both
the pre-consolidation cases as well as the non-consolidated comparison cases were
combined in order to achieve a comparable ratio and basis for comparison both before
and after consolidation (similar to Swartz, 2010). In order to examine the impact
of consolidation on representational equity, the basic hypotheses to be tested as as
follows:
Hypothesis 3.1. Representational equity will decrease in the years
following consolidation.
Hypothesis 3.2. Representational equity will increase over time.
Hypothesis 3.3. Representational equity will decrease following consolidation in states not considered “preclearance” states under the Voting
Rights Act.

3.2

Data & Methods

In order to examine changes over time, an interrupted time-series design is used,
incorporating a non-equivalent control group in order to compare changes over time
in similar cases (Cook and Campbell, 1979; Leland and Thurmaier, 2010). The
confounding, or treatment variable, in these cases, is consolidation of the city and
county governments.

∗

Each matched pair resulted in a mixed electoral structure (officials elected both from districts
and at-large), with the exception of Suffolk City and King and Queen County, Virginia, as well as
Trousdale and Giles Counties in Georgia, and Jefferson and Franklin Counties in Kentucky, which
elect members only from districts.
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The basic model takes on the following form:

Experimental Group (consolidated):

Ot11

Ot12

Ot13

Comparison Group (unconsolidated):

Ot21

Ot22

Ot23

C3

Ot14

Ot15

Ot16

Ot24

Ot25

Ot26

Note: A 10-year period pre-and post-consolidation was used, when available.

The data used were collected from existing sources, including Davidson and
Grofman (1994), the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies’ National Roster
of Black Elected Officials (1970–2002), the United States Commission on Civil Rights
(1968), and the Southern Regional Council (1984) in order to build a comprehensive
dataset that effectively captures the makeup of the legislative bodies in question.
These rosters will be used to calculate the equity ratio, which will be used as the
dependent variable, following a similar method employed by Polinard et al. (1994).
Polinard et al. (1994) calculate a ratio of representational equity by “dividing the
percentage of Mexican Americans on the council by the percentage of Mexican
Americans in the community” where an “equity ratio of 1.00 would result if a city
with a Mexican American population percentage of 33 percent had a city council
whose composition were one-third Mexican American’ (p. 119). First developed
by Karnig (1976), a similar measure has been used previously when examining
electoral structures, including Robinson and Dye (1978); Karnig (1979); Heilig and
Mundt (1983).

As Karnig (1976) explains, a “ratio exceeding 1.00 designates

overrepresentation...while a ratio below 1.00 indicates underrepresentation” (p. 225).
While some government bodies may be more equitable than others, it would be
surprising to find an equity ratio that exemplified a “perfect parity” between the
council and the community.
It should be noted that while there is some criticism of this measure (e.g.
MacManus, 1978; Taebel, 1978; Karnig and Welch, 1982) stemming from the fact
that many cities and counties have historically not elected any Black officials, which
would result in a number of equity scores equaling zero, this truncation is less evident
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over such an extended time period. Further, as Karnig and Welch (1982) note, the
measures used by MacManus (1978) and Taebel (1978) have their own limitations,
and not only present a challenge by being bound at the lower and upper limits (as a
measure would be constrained to a range of ±100%), but also that a small minority
population would result in a slightly negative score, despite having no representation
on the legislative body. However, of the counties analyzed between 1965–2002, all of
the consolidated and control counties have elected African American officials† .
Based on previous studies (Welch & Bledsoe, 1988; Davidson & Grofman, 1994;
Leland & Thurmaier, 2004; 2010; Hanjal, 2010) which demonstrate the importance
of various structural, demographic, and socioeconomic factors with regard to local
governments and descriptive representation, control cases will be matched based on
the following attributes: total population; racial composition; median household
income; education; presidential vote; form of government; and council structure.
Population and household income are actual values for each county-year, while race,
education, and presidential vote are based on percentages for that year. Race is
calculated as the percentage of Black residents of each county; education represents
the percentage of residents holding a Bachelor’s degree or higher; presidential vote is
calculated as the Republican vote share in the previous presidential election; form of
government will be classified based on the executive and legislative arrangements for
that locale (e.g., mayor-council, council-manager, etc.); and council structure will be
classified based on whether officials are elected by district, at-large, or a combination
of the two (similar to Davidson & Grofman, 1994). Data for case selections was
collected from the U.S. Census Bureau’s decennial census and Current Population
Surveys, as well as from the Minnesota Population Center (2016), with missing values
imputed based on existing data. Additionally, three years (1983, 1992, and 1994)
were imputed from the National Roster of Black Elected Officials, as rosters were
†

Of all consolidated and control counties which consolidated after 1965, Currituck County, North
Carolina and Stewart and Webster Counties in Georgia have not elected an African American in
county or municipal legislative bodies; however, these occurred after 2002 and are beyond the scope
of this analysis.
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not produced in those years. Cases were selected based on the actual year that
consolidation took effect in order for that year to serve as the year of intervention.
In order to determine the impact of consolidation over time, a quasi-experimental
interrupted time-series (ITS) design was used in order to explore representational
equity over time, as well as both pre-and post-consolidation. Similar to Meier (1980)
and King (2002), a basic ITS design is appropriate in instances of significant political
or policy shifts, where “the investigator is interested in the effect of a relatively discrete
event on a phenomenon observed over time” (Lewis-Beck, 1986, p. 210). Drawing
from these analyses and recommendations (e.g. Meier, 1980; Lewis-Beck, 1986; King,
2002) the following linear models will be used in assessing the impact of consolidation
on the representational equity of African Americans in local government:

Model 1: Yit = β0 + β1 T1t + β2 Xt + β3 T2t + t
Model 2: Yit = β0 + β1 T1t + β2 Xt + β3 T2t + β4 X2 + t
Where Yit represents the representational equity for each government in each year;
T1t represents the linear trend for each year, beginning in 1965; Xt is a dummy
variable, indicating consolidation (1 = consolidation in that year and thereafter;
0 = no consolidation); T2t represents the years since consolidation (T2t = 0 preconsolidation, and numbered sequentially thereafter); X2 represents a dummy variable
for governments in states or counties covered under the preclearance formula and
provisions in Sections 4(b) and 5 of the Voting Rights Act (X2 = 1 for coverage;
0 for non-coverage); and t is the error term. The intervention—consolidation, in
this case—is the year a city-county government consolidated, not the year in which
consolidation was approved by referendum or a state legislature‡
‡

In some cases, the “year” may be different when comparing, for instance, Table C.1 (which shows
the matched cases, using year of consolidation) versus Table 1.1 (which shows the year consolidation
was approved).
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3.3

The Impact of Consolidation on Representational Equity

Results showing changes in representational equity both over time as well as preand post-consolidation are presented below. Overall, results are consistent with both
previous research, as well as the proposed hypotheses. The aggregate findings as well
as selected cases are presented in subsequent sections within this chapter, while the
remaining tables and figures for individual counties can be found in Appendix E.

3.3.1

African American Representation in Consolidated Counties

Overall Time-Series: 1965–2002
Results from the overall time-series (from 1965–2002) are presented in Table 3.1,
and include the year-to-year results for all cases, as well as consolidated and control
cases, separately. As the results indicate, there is a significant increase in all three
groups, with noticeable differences between the consolidated and control cases. The
average yearly increase across all cases is 2.1%, while the consolidated and control
cases increase by 1.4% and 3.0%, respectively, each year. Figure 3.1 shows the
overall time trend for all cases, indicating that representational equity for African
Americans did increase from 1965–2002, while Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 shows the
graphical results for the consolidated and control cases. Given the electoral successes
of Black candidates at levels of government following the Civil Rights Movement,
and particularly the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, this is somewhat
expected; however, with regard to the focus of this analysis, it is also important to
distinguish between differences in consolidated city-county governments compared to
their matched counterparts.
As shown in Models 1 and 2 (Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, respectively), year-to-year
increases in representational equity (Time) can be seen in all aggregated cases, as well
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Table 3.1: Aggregate Equity Ratios (1965–2002)
Dependent variable:
Equity Ratio
All Cases

Consolidated Cases

Control Cases

Time (Years)

0.021∗∗∗
(0.002)

0.014∗∗∗
(0.002)

0.030∗∗∗
(0.003)

Constant

0.240∗∗∗
(0.040)

0.352∗∗∗
(0.038)

0.121∗
(0.070)

1,178
0.111
0.110
0.669
(df = 1176)
146.265∗∗∗
(df = 1; 1176)

608
0.098
0.096
0.463
(df = 606)
65.540∗∗∗
(df = 1; 606)

570
0.135
0.133
0.824
(df = 568)
88.654∗∗∗
(df = 1; 568)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01

Note:

Equity Ratio

6

4

2

0
1970

1980

1990
Year

Figure 3.1: Equity Ratio, All Cases (1965–2002)
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2000

as both the subset of consolidated and the respective matched cases. These findings
indicate that, as stated in Hypothesis 2, representational equity does significantly
increase over time, although to a lesser extent in consolidated governments when
compared to the non-consolidated counties in Model 2. The overall yearly increase in
all cases, and those of the non-equivalent control group, is, on average, 1% per year;
however, Model 2 (Table 3.3) does show a 2% year-to-year increase in the control
cases.
2.0

Equity Ratio

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
1970

1980

1990

2000

Year

Figure 3.2: Equity Ratio, Consolidated Cases (1965–2002)
With regard to the time period post-consolidation (Post-Consolidation), as
well as the yearly change in representational equity post-consolidation (Time,
Post-Consolidation) both Model 1 and Model 2 highlight differences between the
consolidated cases and the control group in the post-consolidation period. In the time
period following consolidation, the equity ratio in control cases increased 44%, which is
to be expected in keeping with the overall increase over time; however, in consolidated
cases, equity was only 21%–24% higher, respectively, when comparing the results in
Models 1 and 2. Similarly, the year-to-year increase in representational equity in the
control group significantly increases by 2% each year following consolidation, while
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Equity Ratio
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Figure 3.3: Equity Ratio, Control Cases (1965–2002)
there is no significant change in the consolidated cases post-consolidation. When
considering the overall time trend, as well as the yearly and post-consolidation changes
to representational equity, it should be noted that the equity ratio in consolidated
cases began at a much higher level in 1965 compared to the control cases§ . Despite
this, the aggregate equity ratio failed to reach parity by 2002, while the control cases,
on average, met and then exceeded parity by the 1990s¶ .
Similar results can be found in Table 3.3 when examining the change over time,
as well as post-consolidation; however, a surprising and somewhat startling finding
emerges when considering the impact—or lack thereof—in counties covered under
the Department of Justice’s preclearance provisions. While the negative impact on
representational equity appears to be less in consolidated governments—all of which
presumably submitted plans for structural changes prior to enactment—the trend
across the board shows a sizable and significant drop in representational equity in
states and counties covered by the Voting Rights Act. In counties covered by the
§

The constant (intercept) for consolidated cases in Model 1 and 2, respectively, are 0.35 and 0.53,
while the equivalent for the control cases are 0.15 and 0.47, respectively.
¶
Coefficients and fitted values, by year, for Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2, and Figure 3.3 are presented
in Table 3.1 and Table D.1, respectively.
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VRA’s preclearance provisions, the equity ratio in consolidated cases was 29% lower
than those not covered; however, the equity ratio in control cases was 48% lower
for preclearance versus non-preclearance counties. While this finding may not be
surprising considering the history in many of these states and locales, it does call
into question the impact of preclearance reviews and potential recommendations by
the Department of Justice, considering a drop in racial and ethnic representation is
precisely what the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance provision was intended to prevent.
While it is too soon to give a sweeping indictment of the Justice Department’s ability
to propose equitable changes for local governments implementing consolidation, these
numbers certainly suggest that more analysis an in-depth study is needed in many
Southern counties and municipalities in order to untangle the potential impacts the
Voting Rights Act may or many not have had in these areas.
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Table 3.2: Equity Ratio – Time-Series (Model 1)
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
Time
Post-Consolidation
Time, Post-Consolidation
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

(All Cases)

(Consolidated Cases)

(Control Cases)

0.01∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.31∗∗∗
(0.06)
0.01∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.26∗∗∗
(0.04)

0.01∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.21∗∗∗
(0.06)
0.002
(0.004)
0.35∗∗∗
(0.04)

0.01∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.44∗∗∗
(0.10)
0.02∗∗∗
(0.01)
0.15∗∗
(0.07)

1,178
0.20
0.20
0.63 (df = 1174)
99.09∗∗∗ (df = 3; 1174)

608
0.14
0.13
0.45 (df = 604)
32.48∗∗∗ (df = 3; 604)

570
0.28
0.28
0.75 (df = 566)
73.30∗∗∗ (df = 3; 566)

∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 3.3: Equity Ratio – Time-Series, Voting Rights Act (Model 2)
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
Time
Post-Consolidation
Time, Post-Consolidation
VRA Preclearance
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

(All Cases)

(Consolidated Cases)

(Control Cases)

0.01∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.34∗∗∗
(0.05)
0.01∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.39∗∗∗
(0.04)
0.50∗∗∗
(0.04)

0.01∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.24∗∗∗
(0.05)
0.001
(0.003)
−0.29∗∗∗
(0.04)
0.53∗∗∗
(0.04)

0.02∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.44∗∗∗
(0.09)
0.02∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.48∗∗∗
(0.06)
0.47∗∗∗
(0.08)

1,178
0.27
0.27
0.61 (df = 1173)
108.30∗∗∗ (df = 4; 1173)

608
0.22
0.22
0.43 (df = 603)
43.44∗∗∗ (df = 4; 603)

570
0.34
0.34
0.72 (df = 565)
74.19∗∗∗ (df = 4; 565)

∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Pre & Post-Consolidation
As noted earlier, one of the significant criticisms of consolidation is its potential for
decreased descriptive representation—particularly among African Americans. Upon
visual inspection of Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5, when comparing the immediate impact
of consolidation on representational equity, there appears to be a clear downward
trend in the 10-year period following consolidation that is not present in the control
cases. However, when examining the results from from the simple linear model of
the time trend pre-and post-consolidation (shown in Table 3.4), it is evident that
the only significant trend occurs in consolidated cases, in the 10-year period prior
to consolidation, with the equity ratio increasing at approximately 3.1% each year.
While the aggregate results are not as clear for the immediate impact of consolidation,
individual county results do indicate significant and sizable decreases in a number
of counties following consolidation. Graphical results from individual counties and
are presented in chronological order, beginning with Duval County, Florida (1968)
and ending with Wyandotte County, Kansas (1998), are detailed below. Additional
results—including linear models for the overall time trend, as well as the 10-year
period before and after consolidation—are included in Appendix E, as well as the
time trend for consolidated cases after 1998.
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Figure 3.4: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – All Consolidated Cases
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Figure 3.5: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – All Control Cases
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Table 3.4: Coefficients – 10 Years Pre & Post-Consolidation
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity

Time (10-Year Period)
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

Consolidated (Pre-C3 )

Consolidated (Post-C3 )

Control (Pre-C3 )

Control (Post-C3 )

0.031∗
(0.017)
0.809∗∗∗
(0.106)

−0.017
(0.013)
0.818∗∗∗
(0.076)

0.022
(0.023)
0.864∗∗∗
(0.140)

0.032
(0.033)
0.924∗∗∗
(0.192)

130
0.024
0.017
0.549 (df = 128)
3.165∗ (df = 1; 128)

87
0.020
0.009
0.350 (df = 85)
1.739 (df = 1; 85)

129
0.007
−0.0005
0.724 (df = 127)
0.941 (df = 1; 127)

87
0.010
−0.001
0.883 (df = 85)
0.896 (df = 1; 85)

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01

Note:
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3.3.2

Individual County Results

Results for each matched pair of consolidated and control counties are presented in
the following section and include the overall statistical results (Table 3.5, utilizing
Time and Post-Consolidation from Model 1) and visualizations of both the overall
time trends as well as the 10 years pre-and post-consolidation for each case in order
to test both Hypothesis 3.1 and 3.2. In total, these county-by-county results show
similar patters as the aggregate models in the previous section, presented in Tables
3.2, 3.3, and 3.4.
Table 3.5: Matched County Results
County

Time

Post-Consolidation

Constant

Adj. R2

Duval

0.19∗∗∗

−0.19∗∗∗

−0.18

0.41

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.19)

Palm Beach

−0.02

0.06

0.05

(0.04)

(0.05)

(0.20)

Marion

−0.03∗

0.04∗∗

1.09∗∗∗

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.09)

0.05

−0.05

1.21∗∗∗

(0.05)

(0.06)

(0.32)

Muscogee

0.12∗∗∗

−0.11∗∗∗

−0.33∗∗∗

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.11)

Bibb

0.10∗∗

−0.03

−0.30

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.26)

0.02

−0.005

0.15

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.15)

0.00

0.02

−0.002

Allen

Suffolk
King & Queen
Fayette
Woodford

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.16)

0.06∗∗∗

−0.05∗∗

0.32∗∗

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.15)

0.01

0.10

1.50∗∗∗

(0.06)

(0.07)

(0.51)

Terrebonne

0.07∗∗∗

−0.11∗∗∗

−0.40∗∗∗

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.12)

Lafourche

0.02∗∗∗

−0.001

−0.13∗∗

(0.00)

(0.01)

(0.05)

Clarke

0.04∗∗∗

−0.11∗∗∗

0.04

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.09)

Ware

0.10∗∗∗

−0.17∗∗∗

−0.53∗∗∗

(0.01)

(0.03)

(0.13)

0.01

−0.19∗∗

0.27∗

(0.01)

(0.07)

(0.15)

Lafayette
∗p

< .1;

∗∗ p

< .05;

∗∗∗ p

< .01
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0.80
0.32
−0.03
0.76
0.83
0.43
0.20
0.29
0.56
0.68
0.70
0.61
0.85
0.12

Residual SE

F Statistic

0.20

13.80∗∗∗

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

0.21

72.97∗∗∗

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

0.13

9.52∗∗∗

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

0.42

0.44

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

0.15

58.25∗∗∗

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

0.37

91.28∗∗∗

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

0.25

15.22∗∗∗

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

0.27

5.57∗∗∗

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

0.25

8.38∗∗∗

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

0.86

24.87∗∗∗

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

0.28

40.75∗∗∗

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

0.13

44.42∗∗∗

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

0.24

30.39∗∗∗

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

0.34

109.61∗∗∗

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

0.42

3.48∗∗

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

Table 3.5 – Continued from previous page
Time

Post-Consolidation

Constant

Adj. R2

Residual Std. Error

F Statistic

Ouachita

0.05∗∗∗

−0.13∗∗∗

−0.23∗∗

0.81

0.26

80.77∗∗∗

(0.01)

(0.04)

(0.09)

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

Richmond

0.02∗∗∗

−0.12∗∗∗

0.59∗∗∗

0.22

17.27∗∗∗

(0.00)

(0.04)

(0.08)

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

Bibb

0.08∗∗∗

−0.12∗

−0.23∗

0.35

102.19∗∗∗

(0.01)

(0.06)

(0.12)

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

Wyandotte

0.01∗∗∗

−0.11∗∗

0.45∗∗∗

0.14

16.86∗∗∗

(0.00)

(0.04)

(0.05)

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

Geary

0.02∗∗

−0.28∗

0.30∗

0.45

3.30∗∗

(0.01)

(0.14)

(df = 35)

(df = 2; 35)

Trousdale

0.03∗∗∗

−0.08

0.20

98.93∗∗∗

(0.00)

(0.07)

(df = 36)

(df = 1; 36)

Giles

0.01∗∗∗

−0.01

0.12

32.12∗∗∗

(0.00)

(0.04)

(df = 36)

(df = 1; 36)

Jefferson

0.04∗∗∗

0.55∗∗∗

0.35

68.17∗∗∗

(0.01)

(0.12)

(df = 36)

(df = 1; 36)

Franklin

0.03∗∗∗

−0.35∗∗∗

0.30

54.80∗∗∗

(0.00)

(0.10)

(df = 36)

(df = 1; 36)

−0.005

0.52∗∗∗

(0.01)

(0.17)

0.02∗∗

0.23

(0.01)

(0.17)

0.01

0.12

(0.01)

(0.12)

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

(df = 36)

0.003∗

0.06

(0.00)
0.00

County

Chattahoochee
Glynn
Camden
Currituck
Quitman
Stewart
Webster
Screven
∗p

< .1;

∗∗ p

< .05;

0.47
0.85
0.46
0.11

(0.15)
0.73
0.46
0.64
0.59
−0.02
0.14
0.04

0.53

0.35

(df = 36)

(df = 1; 36)

0.51

7.04∗∗

(df = 36)

(df = 1; 36)
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151.62∗∗∗

(df = 36)

(df = 1; 36)

Duval and Palm Beach Counties, Florida (1968)
Prior to consolidation, African Americans in Jacksonville were severely disadvantaged
by an at-large electoral system, despite constituting 40% of the city’s population
(Carver, 1973; Swanson, 1996). The first African Americans first assumed office in
Jacksonville beginning in 1967 and maintained the same roles with the transition to
the consolidated Jacksonville-Duval County government the following year. These
initial gains in representational equity continued for the first years following consolidation in Jacksonville and represented a significant milestone in a city with—like
many Southern municipalities—a history of racial tensions and underrepresentation.
However, Carver (1973) notes that prior to the 1971 election, districts were redrawn
so as to decrease the number of majority Black districts from four to three, which
had a noticeable impact not only on the equity ratio for nearly a decade (as shown
in Figure 3.8), but also, as Carver argues, the responsiveness of the council to the
Black community. Additionally, as shown in Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7, both Duval
and Palm Beach Counties show a clear liner increase in the equity ratio over time;
however, as shown in Table 3.5, both the increase over time and the post-consolidation
impact are both statistically insignificant. While results from Palm Beach result in
failing to reject the null, in terms of the anticipated impacts of consolidation both
over time and post-consolidation for Duval county, both trends are consistent with
the expected results with a significant increase over time (19% per year), as well as a
significant decrease (−19%) in the years following consolidation.

69

Equity Ratio

1.0

0.5

0.0
1970

1980

1990

2000

Year

Figure 3.6: Equity Ratio – Douval County, Florida (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.7: Equity Ratio – Palm Beach County, Florida (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.8: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Duval County, Florida (1968)
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Figure 3.9: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Palm Beach County, Florida
(1968)
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Marion and Allen Counties, Indiana (1970)
Similar to the results from Duval and Palm Beach Counties, Marion County—the
consolidated case—shows significant results while the control case—Allen County—
does not. However, contrary to the results from Duval County, Marion County shows
a slight decrease over time in Table 3.5, as the equity ratio decreases, on average 3%
per year, but increases by approximately 4% in the years post-consolidation. These
general trends are also shown in Figures 3.10 and 3.11, as well as Figures 3.12 and
3.13. This is consistent with observations made by Owen and Willbern (1985), that
while the initial impact of consolidation led to dilution of Black voters, within the first
few years after Unigov’s implementation, “the black percentage of the council [was]
almost identical to its percentage of the population” (p. 181). Despite mixed results
when considering the overall time trend and the years post-consolidation for Marion
County, Figures 3.10 and 3.12 both show that the equity ratio for nearly every year
falls between 0.8 and 1.2. When averaging the entire time trend for the years 1965–
2002, the equity ratio in Marion County is 1.04, which is consistent with findings from
Owen and Willbern (1985), and exemplifies, as the authors note, the organization
within the African American community and leadership of Unigov’s Black officials
who work hard to increase voter turnout in their districts and focus on substantive
representation in their communities.
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Figure 3.10: Equity Ratio – Marion County, Indiana (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.11: Equity Ratio – Allen County, Indiana (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.12: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Marion County, Indiana
(1970)
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Figure 3.13: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Allen County, Indiana (1970)
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Muscogee and Bibb Counties, Georgia (1971)
As Fleischmann and Custer (2004) note, similar to other cases, Black voters in
Columbus-Muscogee were strongly opposed to consolidation in its earlier attempt at
consolidation in 1962; however, appointing Black members to the charter commission
and ensuring that at least some (four, of the ten, total) of the proposed council
members were elected from districts. As shown in Figure 3.16, the equity ratio in
Muscogee County was zero for the years prior to consolidation, indicating that in
this case, structural changes did have an immediate and positive impact (while it
took Bibb County four additional years to elect its first African American, as shown
in Figure 3.17). It should be noted, as well, that Columbus-Muscogee did have to
submit the proposed charter to the Department of Justice for preclearance review,
prior to being overwhelmingly adopted (81.5%, county-wide) by voters in a special
election (Fleischmann and Custer, 2004). In all, the results in Table 3.5 show a
statistically significant yearly increase in the equity ratio for both Muscogee and
Bibb Counties (12% and 10%, respectively), while the only significant change postconsolidation occurred in Muscogee County, with an 11% decrease in that time period.
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Figure 3.14: Equity Ratio – Muscogee County, Georgia (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.15: Equity Ratio – Bibb County, Georgia (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.16: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Muscogee County, Georgia
(1971)
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Figure 3.17: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Bibb County, Georgia (1971)
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Fayette and Woodford Counties, Kentucky (1974)
As Lyons (1977) points out, a majority of both pro-and (to a lesser extent) anticonsolidation respondents favored district-based representation in an August 1972
survey, which would likely benefit Black voters; however, African Americans only
made up a small proportion of the electorate at that time (∼12.6% in 1972).
Despite this, Lyons (1977) notes that African Americans were given considerable
attention during the process, as reformers believed that a close vote could hinge
on African Americans’ views of consolidation. Further, for many Black residents,
future prospects involved a choice between improving “their representation in local
government under merger or face the continued dilution of their voting strength
under existing at-large systems of representation” (Lyons, 1977, p. 149). As shown
in Figure 3.20, representational equity in Fayette County has increased over time
(approximately 6% per year); however, this case also demonstrates a decrease of 5%
in the period post-consolidation, as shown in Table 3.5. Similarly, Figure 3.19 shows
an upward trend over time, while the pre-and post-consolidation period in Woodford
County (Figure 3.21) maintains the same trend, contrary to Fayette County. While
we do see a significant increase in the equity ratio over time, as well as an expected
decrease post-consolidation in Fayette County, neither the time trend nor the postconsolidation period were significantly different in Woodford County. However, it
should be noted that despite no significant trend, Woodford County did have an
equity ratio over 1.0 for the entire time period.
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Figure 3.18: Equity Ratio – Fayette County, Kentucky (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.19: Equity Ratio – Woodford County, Kentucky (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.20: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Fayette County, Kentucky
(1974)
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Figure 3.21: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Woodford County, Kentucky
(1974)
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Suffolk and King & Queen Counties, Virginia (1974)
The City of Suffolk, Virginia presents a unique case, as it involves the consolidation
of the Towns of Holland and Whaleyville, which merged with the former Nansemond
County, and became the City of Nansemond in 1971, followed by the successful
consolidation referendum in the Cities of Nansemond and Suffolk a year later. In this
instance, the second consolidation was chosen as it was the final “comprehensive”
consolidation of these city-county governments. From a visual perspective, it appears
that both Suffolk and King and Queen Counties saw an increase in representational
equity over this time period (Figure 3.22 and Figure 3.23, respectively); however,
results in Table 3.5 show that none of the results for either county was statistically
significant. Though, of note, while Suffolk did see a four-year dropoff in representation
following consolidation (Figure 3.24), King and Queen County did not have a single
African American member in the ten years pre-or post-consolidation (Figure 3.25).
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Figure 3.22: Equity Ratio – Suffolk County, Virginia (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.23: Equity Ratio – King & Queen County, Virginia (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.24: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Suffolk County, Virginia
(1974)
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Figure 3.25: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – King & Queen County,
Virginia (1974)
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Terrebonne and Lafourche Parishes, Louisiana (1984)
As shown in Figure 3.26 and Figure 3.27, representational equity eventually increased
in both Terrebonne and Lafourche Parishes between the late 1970s and early 1980s,
respectively. In Terrebonne Parish, results from Table 3.5 do show a significant
increase of 7% per year, while Lafourche Parish only experienced a 2% year-to-year
increase. However, while Terrebonne Parish was, on average, at parity (with several
years just above, and several just below, as shown in Figure 3.28), Lafourche Parish
only came as close as 50% parity during this time period (Figure 3.29). Additionally,
results in Table 3.5 do show that Terrebonne’s decrease in the 10-year period postconsolidation (11%) is significant, while Lafourche is not.
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Figure 3.26: Equity Ratio – Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.27: Equity Ratio – Lafourche Parish, Louisiana (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.28: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana
(1984)
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Figure 3.29: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Lafourche Parish, Louisiana
(1984)
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Clarke and Ware Counties, Georgia (1991)
Durning et al. (2004) explain that during the unification process, the commission
“tried to make sure that blacks would have at least the same percentage representation
in the new consolidated government as they did with the current city council and
county commission” (p.

118).

Figure 3.32 shows that following consolidation,

representational equity did significantly decrease in Athens-Clarke County (11%, as
demonstrated in Table 3.5). Likewise, in Ware County a similar trend can be seen in
Figure 3.33, as well as Table 3.5, with a 17% decrease in the years post-consolidation.
While there is an increase in the time trend overall (Figure 3.30 and Figure 3.31), the
loss or gain of two African American representatives on the Athens-Clarke County
Commission in the 4-year period following consolidation is apparent. In both the
cases of Clarke and Ware Counties, statistical results highlight a significant increase
over time, as well as a decrease in representational equity in the post-consolidation
period. Interestingly, this impact occurred to a greater extent with both measures
in Ware County (with a 10% increase in equity over time, and a 17% decrease postconsolidation) compared to Clarke County (which only showed a 4% increase over
time, and a 11% decrease post-consolidation).
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Figure 3.30: Equity Ratio – Clarke County, Georgia (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.31: Equity Ratio – Ware County, Georgia (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.32: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Clarke County, Georgia (1991)
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Figure 3.33: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Ware County, Georgia (1991)
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Lafayette and Ouachita Parishes, Louisiana (1996)
Lafayette is, unfortunately, one of the cases where a significant drop-off is clear
following consolidation (to zero, as shown in Figure 3.36). As Bacot (2004) notes,
Lafayette Parish underwent a previous change to its form of government in 1984,
when it switched to a seven-member council elected by districts. As shown in Figure
3.34 this period, from the 1980s through the mid-1990s, was when the equity ratio in
Lafayette Parish was near parity before dropping off the year prior to consolidation.
Ouachita Parish, on the other hand, shows a clear increase over the entire timeseries, as demonstrated in Figure 3.35, as well as representational equity above 1.0
in each of the ten years before and six years after consolidation, despite the slightly
decreasing slopes for both time periods. As shown in Table 3.5, Ouachita does have
a statistically significant dropoff following consolidation despite an average increase
in representational equity of 5% each year, while the consolidated case, Lafayette
County, shows no significant increase over time, but a sizable and significant decrease
of 19% in the years following consolidation.
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Figure 3.34: Equity Ratio – Lafayette Parish, Georgia (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.35: Equity Ratio – Ouachita Parish, Louisiana (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.36: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Lafayette Parish, Louisiana
(1996)
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Figure 3.37: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Ouachita Parish, Louisiana
(1996)
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Richmond and Bibb Counties, Georgia (1996)
Richmond is a unique case in that the city (Augusta) and county governments
attempted to consolidate four previous times (1971, 1974, 1976, and 1988) before
ultimately becoming successful in 1995 (Leland and Thurmaier, 2004). In the three
earliest attempts that occurred in the 1970s, a majority of voters in either the city
and/or the county failed to approve of consolidation; however, both city and county
voters approved the consolidation referendum in 1998, but the plan was rejected by the
Department of Justice because of the potential negative impact on African Americans
(Campbell et al., 2004; Murphy, 2012). Further, as Campbell et al. (2004) explain,
Augusta experienced decades of racial tension following the Civil Rights Era, and even
had several changes (and other challenges) to its form of government throughout the
1970s and 1980s, including several proposed changed that were ultimately blocked by
the Department of Justice.
As shown in Figure 3.38 and Figure 3.39 Richmond and Bibb Counties did see
significant increases in representational equity between 1965 and 2002; though, Bibb
to a much larger degree, with the equity ratio hovering around 2.0, or twice the level
considered parity. Despite the fact that careful considerations were made with regard
to the drawing of new council districts, Figure 3.40 does show a slight decrease in the
equity ratio in the years following consolidation; however, despite the decline, the ratio
was still near parity for those years. Alternately, Figure 3.41 shows that the equity
ratio in Bibb County stayed relatively stable for the same pre-and post-consolidation
period. From the results in Model 1 (Table 3.5), Bibb County, on average, does
have a greater annual increase in the equity ratio when compared to the consolidated
Richmond county (8% compared to 2%, respectively); however, both demonstrate a
similar decrease (12%) in the years following 1996.
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Figure 3.38: Equity Ratio – Richmond County, Georgia (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.39: Equity Ratio – Bibb County, Georgia (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.40: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Richmond County, Georgia
(1996)
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Figure 3.41: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Bibb County, Georgia (1996)
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Wyandotte and Geary Counties, Kansas (1998)
As Leland and Thurmaier (2000) point out, the Kansas City and Wyandotte County
Consolidation Study Commission was composed of members who represented a
diverse cross-section of the community, including race and ethnicity, as well as partisan
balance. Additionally, representational equity was a concern throughout the process
as the study commission and consolidation advocates recognized the importance of
recognizing minority interests in the process (Leland and Thurmaier, 2000). To
that end, Leland and Thurmaier (2000) note that the proposed districts for the
Unified Board of Commissioners was drawn “so that minority representation was
highly probable for 20 percent of the council seats and would likely increase to 30
percent or more in the near future given the changing racial demographics of other
districts within the county” (p. 209). Not surprisingly, it should be noted that the
percentage of African Americans on the newly-formed council was 20% in the years
following consolidation (1998–2002), with the exception of 1999, when the percentage
increased to 30%, with the addition of an additional African American member on
the board. As shown in both of these cases (Figure 3.42 and Figure 3.43), the average
year-to-year increase is similar, at 1% and 2% for Wyandotte and Geary Counties,
respectively; however, as Table 3.5 indicates, Geary County experienced a much more
drastic decline (28%) in the period after Wyandotte’s consolidation with the loss of
all African American members from its legislative bodies in 2002, compared to the
11% decline in Wyandotte, as demonstrated in Figure 3.44 and Figure 3.45).
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Figure 3.42: Equity Ratio – Wyandotte County, Kansas (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.43: Equity Ratio – Geary County, Kansas (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.44: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Wyandotte County, Kansas
(1998)
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Figure 3.45: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Geary County, Kansas (1998)
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Trousdale and Giles Counties, Tennessee (2001)
Despite only having data for one year post-consolidation, Figure 3.48 and Figure 3.49
do show a level of representational equity above the level in pre-consolidation years
for Trousdale and Giles Counties. Although, while Trousdale County moved closer to
parity in the year before and after consolidation, the ratio in Giles County was still
staggeringly low, at or around 30%. Despite this, increases are apparent overall, as
demonstrated in Figure 3.46 and Figure 3.47, which does point to progress in the level
of representation in these counties as the equity ratio in Trousdale County shows a
yearly increase of 3% compared to a 1% increase in Giles County, as shown in Table
3.5.
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Figure 3.46: Equity Ratio – Trousdale County, Tennessee (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.47: Equity Ratio – Giles County, Tennessee (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.48: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Trousdale County, Tennessee
(2001)
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Figure 3.49: Equity Ratio, Pre/Post-Consolidation – Giles County, Tennessee
(2001)
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Other County Results
Individual results for remaining counties which consolidated after 2002 are listed in
Appendix E. These include: Jefferson County, Kentucky; Chattahoochee County,
Georgia, Camden County, North Carolina; Quitman County, Georgia; and Wester
County, Georgia. Results that show the overall time series (1965–2002) for these
counties are listed in chronological order with their respective matched cases. While
the data limitations do not allow for post-consolidation analysis, the trends in these
counties reflect the overall pattern in which representational equity increases over
time, with two exceptions. Chattahoochee County, Georgia shows a slight, but
statistically insignificant decline over the entire time period from 1965–2002, due to
no Black elected officials holding office between 1995–2002. Additionally, Currituck
County, North Carolina did not elect a single African American in either the municipal
or county governing body between 1965–2002.

3.3.3

Consolidation in Preclearnace States

Findings presented in Table 3.6 and demonstrate that the equity ratio is higher in
consolidated preclearance cases compared to their matched counterparts, and higher
than consolidated city-county governments not in preclearance states, which does
point to evidence that, on average, preclearance provisions are working to some extent.
In preclearance states, both consolidated cases and matched cases saw an average
yearly increase in representational equity; though, to a greater extent in matched
cases (2% per year) compared to their consolidated counterparts (0.5% per year).
Conversely, compared to the pre-consolidation period, the equity ratio in consolidated
cases was higher in the post-consolidation period than in the control group, at 27&
and 23%, respectively. And, although there was an aggregate yearly increase of 1% in
the time after consolidation for all cases, neither the consolidated or non-consolidated
groups had a significant change when calculated alone.
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Additionally, Table 3.7 shows a similar trend in the overall yearly increase, at
1% per year for all (combined) cases. And, while the yearly increase in the equity
ratio is higher for consolidated cases in non-preclearance states compared to those in
preclearance states (2% compared to 0.5%, respectively), the matched cases in nonpreclearance states showed no significant change. However, the largest difference in
preclearance states can be seen in the time period after consolidation in consolidated
versus control cases. In consolidated cases, representational equity was, on average,
21% higher in the period ofter consolidation, while the equity ratio in the matched
cases was 88% higher compared to the years prior to consolidation. Similarly, while
the matched cases experienced a 5% year-to-year increase in the post-consolidation
period, the consolidated cases saw no significant change.
Similar results are also presented graphically, with Figures 3.50 and 3.51 showing
pre-and post-consolidation equity ratios in counties covered and those not covered by
the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance provisions. Further, like the findings presented
in Table 3.4, Figures 3.52 through 3.55 show the only significant change in each of
these groups is a 3.1% yearly increase in the 10 years pre-consolidation in consolidated
cases. Finally, Figures 3.56 through 3.60 demonstrate the aggregate increase for the
entire time period (1965–2002) for all cases in preclearance and non-preclearance
cases, as well as the consolidated and non-consolidated cases within those respective
states.
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Table 3.6: Model 1 – VRA Preclearance States
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
Time (Years)
Post-Consolidation
Time (Years), Post-Consolidation
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

(All)

(Consolidated)

(Matched)

0.01∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.24∗∗∗
(0.05)
0.01∗
(0.003)
0.13∗∗∗
(0.04)

0.005∗∗
(0.002)
0.27∗∗∗
(0.06)
0.004
(0.004)
0.31∗∗∗
(0.04)

0.02∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.23∗∗
(0.09)
0.01
(0.01)
−0.05
(0.06)

760
0.22
0.21
0.51 (df = 756)
69.46∗∗∗ (df = 3; 756)

380
0.17
0.16
0.41 (df = 376)
25.75∗∗∗ (df = 3; 376)

380
0.29
0.28
0.57 (df = 376)
51.07∗∗∗ (df = 3; 376)

∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 3.7: Model 1 – Non-Preclearance States
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
Time (Years)
Post-Consolidation
Time (Years), Post-Consolidation
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

(All)

(Consolidated)

(Matched)

0.01∗∗
(0.004)
0.52∗∗∗
(0.11)
0.02∗∗∗
(0.01)
0.47∗∗∗
(0.08)

0.02∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.21∗∗
(0.10)
−0.004
(0.01)
0.42∗∗∗
(0.06)

−0.002
(0.01)
0.88∗∗∗
(0.19)
0.05∗∗∗
(0.01)
0.52∗∗∗
(0.13)

418
0.27
0.27
0.73 (df = 414)
51.79∗∗∗ (df = 3; 414)

228
0.18
0.17
0.46 (df = 224)
16.71∗∗∗ (df = 3; 224)

190
0.46
0.45
0.84 (df = 186)
53.13∗∗∗ (df = 3; 186)

∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01
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Figure 3.50: Equity Ratio Pre/Post-Consolidation in Preclearance States (All
Cases)
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Figure 3.51: Equity Ratio Pre/Post-Consolidation in Non-Preclearance States (All
Cases)
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Figure 3.52:
Equity Ratio Pre/Post-Consolidation in Preclearance States
(Consolidated Cases)
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Figure 3.53: Equity Ratio Pre/Post-Consolidation in Non-Preclearance States
(Consolidated Cases)
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Figure 3.54: Equity Ratio Pre/Post-Consolidation in Preclearance States (Matched
Cases)
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Figure 3.55: Equity Ratio – Pre/Post-Consolidation in Non-Preclearance States
(Matched Cases)
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VRA Preclearance States (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.56: Equity Ratio in Preclearance States, All Cases (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.57: Equity Ratio in Non-Preclearance States, All Cases (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.58: Equity Ratio in Preclearance States, Consolidated Cases (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.59: Equity Ratio in Non-Preclearance States, Consolidated Cases (1965–
2002)
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Figure 3.60: Equity Ratio in Preclearance States, Matched Cases (1965–2002)
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Figure 3.61: Equity Ratio in Non-Preclearance States, Matched Cases (1965–2002)
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3.4

Summary & Conclusions

Overall, the “conventional wisdom” relating to the impact of consolidation on
minority representation holds true in most cases. As expected, representational equity
has increased over time since the passage of the Voting Rights Act, as evidenced by
the clear linear trend in Figure 3.50, as well as individual county coefficients in Table
3.5. Additionally, representational equity clearly decreased in these governments
during the 10-year period following consolidation when examining figures highlighting
the basic bivariate trend in representation, even in counties covered by the VRA’s
preclearance provisions (Figure 3.58). And, while the equity ratio does not decrease
to the extent of those with preclearance coverage (Figure 3.51), there is a clear
delineation between the trend in the 10 years prior to the consolidation year (C 3 )
and those years after consolidation. Further, the lower representational equity in
preclearance counties is indicative of the need for the Voting Rights Act in the first
place, and could simply be related to the fact that significant structural barriers
already existed in these counties.
While representational equity has increased since the passage of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, a number of cities and counties are still well below parity, with many
having no African American officials at all, despite relatively sizable ethnic and
racial minority populations. Additionally, while the results in preclearance states is
somewhat troubling, considering the intent of the law, a careful review of structural
changes remains pertinent in order to determine the ongoing threat of consolidation to
representation and the potential for dilution. Further, with the effective dismantling
of the Voting Rights Act following the decision in Shelby County v. Holder (2013),
continued empirical analyses will be more important than ever as many cities and
counties across the country regularly consider consolidation as a viable option to
problems facing their communities. While additional analyses will be necessary in
order to better ascertain the impact of consolidation on other minority groups—
including Latinos and Native Americans, considering the number of consolidated
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Alaskan boroughs—these results have presented more generalizable findings beyond
the few existing case studies, and can serve as a basis for continued exploration of
consolidation’s impact on racial and ethnic representation going forward.
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Chapter 4
Consolidation Referenda Since
2000
Consolidated governments encompass a wide range of geographic, demographic, and
political characteristics, ranging from urban to rural, traditionally conservative to
traditionally liberal, and extremely diverse populations in terms of race, ethnicity, and
socioeconomic status. Yet, despite a wide range of characteristics, scholars have found
that consolidating governments can have a disparate impact on certain populations—
particularly racial and ethnic minorities, and those of lower socioeconomic status (e.g.
Swanson, 2000; Bollens, 2003; Clarke, 2006; Martin and Schiff, 2011). In general,
voters within the city limits typically favor consolidation, while voters who reside
outside of the city typically oppose the referenda; however, analyses of consolidation
votes typically stop at comparing the votes between the city and county, or differences
between broad subgroups in the community as a whole (e.g. Carr and Feiock, 2004;
Leland and Thurmaier, 2004, 2010).
Despite the abundance of research on campaigns and elections (particularly at
the national-and state-levels) local campaigns are typically more difficult to examine
due to the intricacies involved in what often amount to small-scale, low-turnout
elections. For decades, political science has established the importance of party
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identification, partisan cues, elite attitudes, socialization, and individual attributes
such as education, race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status that ultimately contribute
to vote choice and electoral successes on the part of candidates. Aside from the
administrative and economic issues involved, consolidation referenda still take on
attributes of typical political campaigns, with various groups and interests advocating
for or against passage. However, simply comparing groups of voters in their respective
cities and counties, or urban to suburban areas, ignores a great deal of variation
between different sub-city and sub-county groups. For this reason, much can be
gleaned from exploring factors at the precinct-level that contribute to the ultimate
approval or rejection of consolidation.

4.1

Consolidation Referenda In Perspective

While the rate of successful referenda adoptions has increased as of late, the number
of cities and counties choosing to consolidate governments is still somewhat rare.
Marando (1979) examined consolidation attempts between 1945 and 1976 and found
a successful adoption rate of 25%. Since 1976, there was an increase in consolidation
attempts, but a decrease in the success rate of those attempts. From 1977–2012, only
21% of the consolidation referenda passed. However, more recent efforts have been
comparatively more fruitful, with the success rate of consolidation campaigns since
the year 2000 at 41% (Murphy, 2012).
With regard to consolidation campaigns, Johnson and Carr (2004) explain that,
in general, advocates for and against these referenda involve two separate groups:
entrepreneurs, who have a stake in the governing rules and governance structure,
and actively seek to change the status quo to their benefit; and defenders of the
status quo, who “benefit from the current governance structure or fear that change
will do them irreparable harm [and] find it in their best interest to have the present
structure remain in place” (p. 170). Carr and Sneed (2004) further expand on
these two groups, and identify eight key stakeholder groups that are influential in
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local politics, and particularly important to consolidation campaigns: citizens and
advocacy groups, business interests, civic groups, religious organizations, educational
organizations, government officials, public employees, and media organizations (pp.
189-190). In the early stages of consolidation efforts, the authors find that government
officials, business interests, and media organizations play the most important role in
setting the stage for the subsequent campaign by framing the issues of interest to the
public. Further, Leland and Thurmaier (2010) argue that successful consolidation
campaigns hinge on civic elites successfully making the case to average voters that
structural changes will foster economic growth, which will, in turn, benefit the entire
community.
Johnson and Carr (2004) also note that in some failed consolidation attempts, such
as Athens-Clarke County’s 1984 referendum, there is a perception of consolidation as
an “elite” issue, where many voters perceived the proposed commission structure as
too powerful, against the “everyday people,” and as a hostile takeover of the county on
the part of the city (p. 177). In this regard, it is apparent that successful consolidation
campaigns must make the case to both city and county residents—particularly in
those states where separate votes are required—that consolidation is not only in
their best interest, but also that changing the current governmental structure is not
just for the benefit of certain politicians, government employees, or business leaders.
While addressing residents’ concerns over the intent and effects consolidation will
have on them, it is important not to discount the importance of elite cues and issueframing with regard to how consolidation is first presented to the public and the
effort that goes into educating the electorate on the issues involving these changes.
As Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) argue, many voters and community leaders do
not respond to the “administrative intricacies” of consolidation plans; rather, they
respond to more traditional campaign messaging, such as slogans, or their mood (p.
77). In short, reformers should not focus on the “administrative or organizational
merits” of their plans, as “such subtleties are apparently unpersuasive, uninteresting
or uncomprehended by many in this audience” (p. 77).
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As Johnson and Carr (2004) explain, the majority of citizens know little about
consolidating city and county governments—the pros, cons, and potential impacts
that a metropolitan government can have. The authors point out that many citizens
understand the basics of economic development, financial issues, and other aspects
of local governance; however, elite attitudes are important, as “opponents and
proponents alike have the opportunity to define the issue for the public” (Johnson
and Carr, 2004, p. 247). Similarly, based on interviews with elites in Georgia,
Durning and Edwards (1992) found that pro-consolidation campaigns often attempt
to “educate” the public about the benefits of consolidation, while anti-consolidation
campaigns often focus on potential threats by “raising emotional issues to help stave
off the perceived attack on their pocketbooks, power, positions, or beliefs” (p. 373).
For these reasons, campaign effects, although extremely difficult to model in local
elections, likely play a large role in how information is presented to the electorate,
and how issues are framed in each case.
As noted earlier, Marando (1979) argues that “the race issue—specifically dilution
of Black voting power—has been considered by many observers to be a hidden
objective of consolidation” (p. 414). Despite significant progress that has been made
across the United States in terms of racial and ethnic representation, the impact
of dilution is still a real concern for for voters. As seen in the previous chapter,
consolidation does, on average, have a disparate impact on African American voters
in particular, even in cases where the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act
were established to prevent, or at least mitigate, those impacts. In cities and counties
with large minority populations, many organizations and community groups which are
focused on racial and ethnic minority issues, such as the NAACP, as well as minority
elected officials, make known their opposition to city-county consolidation. With
voters’ own perceptions, combined with minority leaders’ opposition of consolidation,
the question remains as to how much this opposition ultimately affects the outcomes of
these referenda. While many cities are more diverse, in terms of race and ethnicity, it
is also known that city residents also vote in favor of consolidation in higher numbers.
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This raises the question over how competing factors—city residence versus minority
populations—will ultimately affect the outcome of these elections.

4.2

Data & Methods

In order to determine the effects of demographic, political, and geographic factors
within each precinct, as well as each city and county, a number of models are
employed in order to determine the effects at the precinct-level. Logistic models are
estimated in order to determine the factors contributing to approval of consolidation
at the precinct-level. However, these models often lack the complexity to capture
potential effects beyond the “individual” (precinct) level. Hox et al. (2010) explains
the general concepts related to multilevel (hierarchical) modeling, noting that the
“general concept is that individuals interact within the social contexts to which
they belong, meaning that individual persons are influenced by the social groups
or contexts to which they belong, and that the properties of these groups are in turn
influenced by the individuals who make up that group” (p. 1). For this reason,
a multilevel model is justified, as modeling at the precinct-level will not capture a
significant amount of variation. For the second part of this analysis, hierarchical
(multilevel) logistic models will be used in order to determine the random-effects
at the city-and county-levels, and the fixed-effects within each precinct. Despite
analyzing voting precincts, and not “individuals,” from a conceptual standpoint, it
is clear that voters within precincts are impacted by the context of each political
campaign, proposed referenda, and current issues within their community beyond
the “individual” traits that they possess. Additionally, from a statistical standpoint,
the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) of the precinct-level variables is ∼0.274,
indicating that over 27% of the residual variation is attributable to unobserved countylevel characteristics.
For both the logistic and hierarchical models, the dependent variable is approval of
the referendum (Consolidation Approval ), coded as “1” for precincts voting in favor
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of a referendum, “0” for non-approval. Independent variables include demographic
factors, such as race and ethnicity(measured as the percentage of Black and Hispanic
populations in each precinct); the percentage of the adult population (25+) with
a college degree; and median household income, as well as average home value—
assuming that taxes and property values are a key factor in how many people vote
in local elections (e.g. Lyons (1977) noted that residents who perceive higher tax
rates under consolidation are more likely to oppose it). Political variables include
the political leanings of each precinct by calculating the Republican vote share in
the previous presidential election, as well as turnout in each consolidation election
considering the importance of turnout and election timing in municipal elections (e.g.
Hajnal and Lewis, 2003; Hajnal, 2010). Finally, in order to determine differences
between city and county precincts, each model include whether a precinct lies inside
or outside city limits (coded as “1” or “0,” respectively).

4.2.1

Data

Precinct-Level Variables
Block data from the U.S. Census Bureau were converted to respective voting precincts
for each county using ArcGIS, and merged with election data (similar to (e.g. Chen
and Rodden, 2013; McDonald, 2014)∗ . Demographic data were obtained from the U.S.
Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS) for the years 2005-2013 due to
several variables (particularly income and housing) being unavailable for the 2010
Census. For consolidation referenda that took place before 2005 (Bernalillo, Coffee,
Hall, Jefferson, and Polk Counties) data from the 2000 Census were used. Election
data were collected from state election commissions, county election commissions,
and secretaries of states’ websites. Additionally, geographic shapefiles were obtained
from the Census Bureau, as well as state and local sources.
∗

A visualization of Census block to voting precinct conversion is shown in Figures G.1 and G.2
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County-Level Variables
As Leland and Thurmaier (2004) have found, the most important aspects of a
proposed charter that contribute its eventual passage are: 1. maintaining the status
of the sheriff (who is usually elected); 2. reducing the immediate impact on public
employee layoffs or reductions in pay or benefits; 3.

keeping the existing debt

within that jurisdiction (often through urban/general service or special districts); 4.
ensuring parity in racial and ethnic minority representation; and, 5. allowing minor
municipalities to opt-in (rather than being forced in) to the unified government (p.
321). For the hierarchical analysis, variables relating to charter provisions and the
relative strength of each campaign were obtained by examining each proposed charter,
as well as any other supplemental information provided by subsequent studies of these
consolidated (and non-consolidated) governments, and news reports documenting
campaign activities in these various locales. The county-level variables are adapted
from Part 2 of the Leland and Thurmaier (2004) C3 Model (Consolidation Referendum
Patterns, Contribution to the Likelihood of Adopting a Charter ) and include the most
significant factors leading to a successful referendum, based on numerous case studies.
Each variable ranges from 0-1, with each subcomponent weighted equally. A list of
variables, as well as the coding for each county and descriptive statistics (Table G.4)
are listed in Appendix G.

4.2.2

Cities & Counties

For the purposes of this analysis, six city and county governments will be used in
order to help determine the factors that correlate with approving (or rejecting) a citycounty consolidation referenda. The six cases include those listed in Table 4.1, and
vary in terms of size (both population and area), demographics, and political factors.
Since 2000, a total of 22 city and county governments have held elections to determine
whether to consolidate (some more than once, in the cases of Ketchikan City/Borough,
Alaska, Hawkinsville/Pulaski County, Georgia, and Albuquerque/Bernalillo County,
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New Mexico); however, data were not available for all counties at the precinct-level,
or the elections were conducted my mail, and not tabulated based on voting precinct.
For other counties, the number of precincts—some between one and three, in the
case of Statenville/Echols County, Georgia and Tribune/Greeley County, Kansas,
respectively—simply did not lend itself to substantive analysis.
Table 4.1: City & County Governments
City

County

State

Precincts

Year

Result

Election Type

Gainesville
Macon
Louisville
Des Moines
Albuquerque
Memphis

Hall
Bibb
Jefferson
Polk
Bernalillo
Shelby

Georgia
Georgia
Kentucky
Iowa
New Mexico
Tennessee

29
43
474
166
400
236

2001
2012
2000
2004
2004
2010

Fail
Pass
Pass
Fail
Fail
Fail

Special
Primary
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Midterm

Table 4.2 includes the total number of precincts voting for and against consolidation, tabulated by city and county, as well as the percentage of votes for and
against consolidation for each referenda. As is evident, and consistent with previous
studies on city-county consolidation attempts, county voters are generally opposed to
consolidation, while city residents generally have a more optimistic view. However,
as noted earlier, aggregate returns leave much to be desired in terms of analyzing
the determinants of a successful or unsuccessful consolidation attempt. Thus, the
question becomes what separates successful and unsuccessful consolidation attempts,
and are there any underlying factors that are consistent though these more recent
referenda votes? The following results indicate that there are some generalizable
trends which could have implications for further research in this area.
Louisville/Jefferson County, Kentucky (2000)
Like many other successful (and unsuccessful) referenda, Louisville and Jefferson
County had a history of consolidation efforts—attempting to merge three times in the
two decades prior to their eventual success in 2000 (Leland and Thurmaier, 2004). As
121

Table 4.2: City & County Precinct Results

Macon
Bibb Co.

Precincts
For
12
8

Precincts
Against
18
5

% For
57.8%
56.7%

% Against
42.2%
43.3%

Des Moines
Polk Co.

7
2

92
65

35.3%
34.6%

64.7%
65.4%

Louisville
Jefferson Co.

111
152

75
136

53.5%
54.1%

46.5%
45.9%

Memphis
Shelby Co.

55
0

122
59

50.8%
15%

49.2%
85%

Gainesville
Hall Co.

7
2

4
16

51.5%
46.4%

48.5%
53.6%

Albuquerque
Bernalillo Co.

33
1

336
30

32.6%
43%

67.4%
57%

Savitch and Vogel (2004a) point out, the referendum in Louisville/Jefferson County
was rather unique, in that there was—by design—no formal charter presented to
voters prior to the November 2000 election. This strategy, as Leland and Thurmaier
(2004) note, avoids the “poison pills” that often energize groups and individuals who
are opposed to specific provisions in a proposed charter. It was proponents’ feeling
that by focusing the campaign on larger concepts of economic development and a
metropolitan-wide interest in growth by maintaining Louisville’s status as Kentucky’s
largest city, rather than allowing opponents to criticize specific provisions of the
proposed charter, would strategically allow the merger to be framed in terms of the
“big picture,” rather than arguing over less popular details such as debt or district
lines (McDonough, 2000; Savitch and Vogel, 2004a; Savitch et al., 2010).
Additionally, this case is rather unique in that the typical “dual-majority” was
not required in both the city and county for the merger to be approved; rather,
a single county-wide majority was needed to approve of consolidation (Savitch and
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Vogel, 2004a). As Pierce (2000) noted in Louisville’s Courier-Journal, opponents to
consolidation “ranged from the usual suburbanites fearful of losing autonomy to innercity black groups worried about diminished clout in an expanded city,” as well as one
gay rights group opposed to the merger “because a suburban-influenced metro council
might repeal city legislation protecting homosexuals from workplace discrimination.”
However, while the anti-consolidation campaign had strong grassroots support, they
were arguably outmatched by a pro-consolidation campaign armed with economic
development and pro-growth message, as well as by overwhelming political support
from current and former elected officials. Pierce (2000) points out that “every living
person” who has held office as the Mayor of Louisville or Judge-Executive of Jefferson
County endorsed consolidation, including Senator Mitch McConnell and one of his
“prime political operatives,” who was the pro-consolidation campaign co-chair.
Gainesville/Hall County, Georgia (2001)
Compared to Louisville/Jefferson County, the referendum in Gainesville/Hall County
was an even more “extreme” case of consolidation proponents not wishing to put
any specifics on the ballot. In this case, the referendum, which failed, did not
lay out any specific features of a new government, and no charter was presented.
Likewise, there were no specific (or sizable) campaign activities which took place.
Still, Gainesville and Hall County represent an area where, as Leland and Johnson
(2004) argue, “city-county consolidation is a reform idea that does not die” (p. 26).
In 1992, voters supported an exploratory commission to study the feasibility and
fiscal impact of consolidation; however, despite 65% of voters supporting the study,
the issue failed to gain any traction following its completion in 1995 (Hale, 2012b,a).
In 2001, voters were again asked whether they supported consolidation, with 52%
opposing the referendum.
Yet, the issue continues to persist, with local officials in both the city and county
asking voters whether they would support another consolidation study in November
2016 (Silavent, 2016). This advisory referendum was narrowly defeated, with 52% of
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voters choosing not to further explore consolidation in the near future. Gainesville and
Hall County have had some level of functional consolidation over the years through
interlocal agreements, including “social services, planning, building inspections, and
code enforcement;” however, some local officials see full consolidation as a bridge
too far (Crist, 2012; Durning and Sanford, 2010, p. 225). Contrary to many cases,
one sticking point between Gainesville and Hall County seems to be the financial
situation of the county, not the city, which is often a contentious point with suburban
county voters who do not wish to “bail out” their city counterparts. In this case, Hall
County officials have been more interested in “shoring up” the tax base, largely due
to annexations by the cities and towns within the county, which have left officials with
decreased revenues (Hale, 2012a). County officials are so worried about their tax base
that they have entertained the idea of forming a new “Hall City,” which would include
all of the unincorporated area of Hall County, then merging the newly-incorporated
city with the county (Silavent, 2016). But, for now, consolidation appears to be a
settled issue; however, if history is any indication, the issue will likely reemerge in
Gainesville and Hall County in the near future.
Albuquerque/Bernalillo County, New Mexico (2004)
Albuquerque/Bernalillo County presents a unique case in that voters resoundingly
defeated a proposed merger in 2003, with 61.5% of residents voting against the
referendum in a mail-in election—the third failed attempt in 45 years (Asher, 2004b;
Johnson, 2004b; McKay, 2004a). Prior to the 2003 vote, the City of Albuquerque
and Bernalillo County formed a Unification Exploratory Group, made up of former
state and local officials, community leaders, and academics, with the assistance
of former Albuquerque mayor, David Rusk, and presented its initial findings and
recommendations in 2002 (Rusk, 2002; McKay, 2004b). In this case, Lucero (2004)
points to several factors which contributed to the eventual defeat of the 2003 charter.
The switch from an elected sheriff and county clerk to appointed positions, the “failure
to provide a fiscal analysis of the proposed merger,” a lack of representativeness and
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access to officials on the part of rural residents, and the perception that rural quality
of life would be negatively impacted by urban sprawl were all contributing factors
to the consolidation referendum’s defeat in 2003 (Lucero, 2004, p. 4). Interestingly,
prior to the attempted unification in 2003, state legislators stipulated that a failed
consolidation on the first referendum would automatically trigger a second election
within twelve months (Rusk, 2002).
Following the defeat of the unification in 2003, the commission added new
members, made changes to the proposed charter based on citizens’ feedback, and
looked better poised to make the case for consolidation (Asher, 2004a; McKay,
2004a,b). However, with the 2004 election, Lucero (2004) notes very little support
from proponents for consolidation in public meetings, while the “same few vocal
opponents from the rural unincorporated areas of the county consistently raise their
concerns and fears” (p. 4). Despite a tremendous amount of time and resources
that went into research, drafting of a preliminary charter, and voter outreach,
the second iteration (at least on the surface) seemed to be a lost cause for the
parties involved. Additionally, as McKay (2004a) notes, a local referendum with
little interest from both sides was likely overshadowed by the 2004 presidential
election. Additionally, proponents of consolidation focused on what Leland and
Thurmaier (2004) equate with “weak arguments” from pro-consolidation campaigns,
which are focused primarily on the government reform perspective of efficiency
and “good government” (Asher, 2004a; McKay, 2004c). In all, the reformers in
Albuquerque/Bernalillo County seemed to approach unification as a solution in search
of a problem, with most citizens seemingly satisfied with the structural arrangements,
which fails to satisfy the necessity of a “crisis climate,” as suggested by Rosenbaum
and Kammerer (1974), and does not present a “strong” economic argument, as
suggested by Leland and Thurmaier (2004).
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Des Moines/Polk County, Iowa (2004)
Like in the case of Albuquerque, the Des Moines/Polk County consolidation
referendum was focused primarily, or, as much on efficiency, as the linchpin issue of
economic development. From the public’s perspective, in the form of editorials and
articles in the Des Moines Register, pro-consolidation advocates mention efficiency as
much—or more—than other arguments, including economic development or broader,
regional approaches to governance and planning (e.g. Clayworth, 2004b; Eckhoff and
Gartner, 2004; Hatch and Oman, 2004). Additionally, in the last few weeks prior to
the November 2nd referendum, both the Polk County Board of Supervisors and the Des
Moines City Council passed resolutions in opposition to the merger (Higgins, 2004).
For voters, this could have been seen as “defenders of the status quo” (e.g. Carr and
Sneed, 2004) simply trying to protect their position; or, a signal that consolidation
may not be in the interests of their constituents. In either case, Leland and Thurmaier
(2004) note that “[o]verwhelming support of elected officials is essential; they must
be an integral part of the proconsolidation campaign” (p. 318). The vote of the
42-member commission was 32-10 in favor of the charter, indicating strong support
for the charter; however, at least one member of the commission publicly opposed
the charter and joined the anti-consolidation No Merger Committee (Clayworth,
2004a). Despite the underlying motivations for the council and board of supervisors,
even moderate opposition to the referendum does not send the signal to voters that
consolidation is in their best interests. While other essential elements of a potentially
successful referendum were in place—including an elected sheriff, independent minor
municipalities, and a relatively strong pro-consolidation campaign—the clear divide
in among civic elites was reflected in an even more lopsided defeat at the polls.
Memphis/Shelby County, Tennessee (2010)
For many residents of Shelby County—especially suburban residents—the benefits of
consolidation were unclear, and many officials from smaller municipalities in Shelby

126

County had concerns over their city’s relationship with merged entities such as courts,
transportation, and public works (Ward, 2010a,b). For other groups, such as the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and the local chapter of the NAACP,
consolidation presented a clear threat to their livelihoods and representation within
the community (International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1288, 2010;
Ross, 2010). Further, from a political standpoint, many in the city and county felt
that Mayor A.C. Wharton—who was adamantly pro-consolidation—wielded too much
influence in the process, and did not allow other voices to be represented (Anthony,
2009). In the initial stages of the process, Wharton—then mayor of Shelby County—
later won election as the mayor of Memphis; and, in the process, was able to appoint
(with approval) all 15 members of the Metro Government Charter Commission. While
this may not have been a deciding factor for many residents, it did not set a good
tone for what was certain to be a contentious process.
With regard to the typical strengths of a consolidation effort, Memphis/Shelby
County did have an economic development component; however, this was not the
primary focus, or, at the least, the message was muddled by other arguments involving
taxation, debt, schools, and the role of smaller municipalities in the metropolitan
government (Risher, 2010). To proponents’ credit, several business leaders in the
community came out in support of consolidation, such as FedEx CEO, Fred Smith,
the Black Business Association of Memphis, and Memphis Tomorrow, which consists
of top business executives in the city (Doniach, 2009; Branston, 2010; Ross, 2010).
However, the Shelby County Chambers of Commerce Alliance (made up of the
municipal chambers in Shelby County, excluding the Greater Memphis Chamber) did
not take a public position on the referendum, which is rather unusual as businesses and
business organizations—such as the local Chamber of Commerce—are typically proconsolidation (Shelby County Chambers of Commerce Alliance, 2010). This overall
hesitancy was reflected in the political community, as many state and local officials
were hesitant to wade into the consolidation issue when no clear path forward was
apparent.
127

Despite the division between elected officials and residents of smaller municipalities, the charter commission did include several provisions addressing many concerns
of those outside of the City of Memphis. For instance, the proposed charter would
have created two separate taxing districts, and imposed a moratorium on property
tax increases for three years.

However, many concerns remained, including the

future of the school system, which was a sticking point for many county voters who
did not wish to merge with the city. Further, while several business and political
elites took public stances on both sides of the proposed consolidation, there did not
seem to be an organized pro-consolidation campaign. Additionally, from a political
standpoint, the proposed charter only cut one legislative seat (from 26 to 25, total),
which several residents felt was still too many. Overall, it was clear that proponents
faced an uphill battle, as a poll conducted in September 2010 found that 72% of
voters in Shelby County were against consolidation (Ross, 2010). Given this, and the
lackluster support the proposal received within the community, it is no surprise that
consolidation ultimately failed.
Macon/Bibb County, Georgia (2013)
Like many other cases, Macon and Bibb County voters are no strangers to
consolidation attempts, with the most recent (successful) attempt being the fifth
such referendum since 1933† (National Association of Counties, 2011; Gaines, 2015).
Beginning in 2009, elected officials began expressing their support for consolidation;
however, leaders were willing to start small—focusing on more immediate aspects
of proposed and existing functional arrangements—and working towards achieving
consolidation within ten years (Stucka, 2009). Early on in the process, community
leaders identified two major issues with consolidation: “the skepticism of people in the
unincorporated area” towards taxation and debt, and “suspicions of the people about
the black voting factor” with regard to representation in a newly-formed government
(Gaines and Stucka, 2011). Additionally, an early proposal called for an appointed
†

Earlier attempts in Macon/Bibb County took place in 1933, 1960, 1972, and 1976.
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chief of law enforcement; however, this was later changed to an elected sheriff who is
in charge of all aspects of law enforcement for Macon-Bibb County (Lee, 2011).
Early on the process it seemed apparent to local officials that many residents
favored consolidation, in theory, but the challenge for consolidation proponents was
balancing competing interests in Macon and Bibb County so that the ultimate charter
was palatable for a majority of voters (Ramati, 2011). A major pro-consolidation
group, Macon-Bibb Wins Again, received major donations from several civic and
business leaders, signaling a high degree of professionalism in the campaign, in
addition to the strong support from many business and community leaders (Stucka,
2012). In terms of taxation, debt, and spending, reformers in Macon/Bibb County
were cognizant of the financial aspects of the proposed charter, which included a
provision that existing debt would be carried over to a new special district that
encompassed the former Macon city limits. Additionally, the charter included a
stipulation that spending must be reduced by 20% within the first five years, compared
to the previous expenditure totals of the combined city and county budgets (MaconBibb County, 2014; Dunlap, 2016).
One factor complicating the Macon/Bibb County case involved the Voting Rights
Act’s preclearance provisions, and the Department of Justice initially blocking the
election scheduled for July 2013. The Justice Department indicated that further
review was needed in order to assess the potential impact that changing election
dates would have on African American voters. As it stood, there were concerns
that new government would switch to nonpartisan elections, and schedule the initial
special election in an off-year (Lee, 2013). Interestingly, the Supreme Court indirectly
intervened following its ruling in Shelby County v. Holder, which struck down the
preclearance formula used by the Justice Department, which, in effect, nullified the
pending review and cleared the way for an election on September 17th (Ramati,
2013). Early in the consolidation effort, several African American officials vocally
opposed the charter, which, like many cases involving consolidation, raised questions
for many minorities about the threat that a new electoral structure could have on
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representation of their communities (Stucka, 2012). However, through the process of
citizen feedback, public hearings, and community meetings, many of these fears were
allayed.

4.3

Findings

Results demonstrating the factors related to consolidation approval are presented
in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, and include results from both the precinct-level logistic
models and the hierarchical model, respectively.

4.3.1

Precinct-Level Logistic Models

Results from precinct-level logistic models are shown in Table 4.3 and demonstrate the
relationship between precinct-level factors and approval for consolidation, presented
as odds ratios, with corresponding 95% confidence intervals‡ . Overall, precinct-level
results (shown in Table 4.3) indicate that larger Black and Hispanic populations lead
to a significantly lower odds of consolidation approval in these precincts. For each
percentage point increase in the African American population, the odds of approval
decrease by approximately 95%–98%. Similarly, for each 1% increase in the Hispanic
population, odds of approval decrease by over 99%. Further, higher Republican vote
shares also significantly decrease the odds of consolidation approval in these models,
between 71% and 78% for each percentage point increase in the Republican vote share
within a precinct. This is somewhat expected, as county precincts tend to be both
more conservative and more prone to disfavor consolidation compared to those in the
city.
Alternately, clear relationships emerge with regard to precincts within city limits,
as well as elections in which there was higher voter turnout. Precincts in cities
are approximately 3.5–4 times more likely to approve of consolidation compared
‡

Models presented as log-odds are shown in Table G.5
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to precincts in the county. Likewise, and even more impactful, it appears, is the
relationship between turnout and consolidation approval. With each percentage point
increase in turnout, the odds of approval increase by a factor of five. This is contrary to
previous findings from Marando and Whitley (1972) on earlier consolidation attempts,
which found no significant relationship between increased turnout and support for
consolidation. For government reformers and those working in advisory capacities,
the timing of elections in these cases is certainly an aspect to consider when placing
a consolidation referendum on the ballot.
Somewhat mixed results emerge when examining the relationships between
education, income, and home values. These results are interesting, due to the number
of previous studies (e.g. Filer and Kenny, 1980; Savitch et al., 2010) that demonstrate
the significance of income, property values, taxes, and other economic concerns in local
campaigns and, ultimately, the votes for or against consolidation. When examining
the bivariate relationship between income and education (discussed in Section 4.3.2),
results indicate that higher percentages of adults with a college degree and precincts
with higher median incomes correlate with higher vote shares for consolidation. In
Models 1–3 (Table 4.3), we see mixed results for these variables, as higher educational
attainment in precincts significantly decreases the odds of approval (between 89%–
98%) with each percent increase in adults with a college degree. Higher median home
values have a strong correlation to median income, but appear to have a slightly
opposite effect in this analysis. In Models 1 and 2, the odds of a precinct approving
a consolidation referendum slightly increases by 3.2% and 3.5%, respectively, with
each $1,000 increase in median income. However, with the addition of median home
values in Model 3, an increase in median income actually decreases the odds of
approval by 2.4%, while each $10,000 increase in median home values for each precinct
increases the odds of approval by 2.7%. As noted earlier, taxation is often a core issue
with voters in consolidation referenda, and those with higher home values would be
saddled with a larger tax obligation were property taxes to increase in a newlyconsolidated government, and are likely less in need of increased government services
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Table 4.3: Precinct-Level Models: Vote to Approve Consolidaiton (Odds Ratios)
Dependent variable:
Consolidation Approval
(Model 1)

(Model 2)

(Model 3)

0.046∗∗∗

0.025∗∗∗

[0.149, 0.395]

[0.011, 0.053]

0.017∗∗∗
[0.007, 0.040]

Hispanic

0.002∗∗∗
[0.0005, 0.006]

0.005∗∗∗
[0.001, 0.015]

0.002∗∗∗
[0.0004, 0.006]

College Degree

0.071∗∗∗
[0.027, 0.180]

0.108∗∗∗
[0.041, 0.280]

0.015∗∗∗
[0.005, 0.049]

Median Income

1.032∗∗∗
[1.023, 1.041]

1.035∗∗∗
[1.025, 1.046]

0.976∗∗∗
[0.961, 0.992]

City Precinct

3.580∗∗∗
[2.516, 5.140]

3.606∗∗∗
[2.502, 5.249]

4.250∗∗∗
[2.865, 6.387]

GOP Vote

0.217∗∗
[0.063, 0.741]

0.284∗
[0.079, 1.010]

Voter Turnout

4.863∗∗∗
[0.063, 0.741]

5.212∗∗∗
[2.232, 12.323]

Black

1.027∗∗∗
[1.021, 1.032]

Median Home Value

Constant

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.

0.244∗∗∗
[0.149, 0.395]

0.165∗∗∗
[0.079, 0.338]

0.149∗∗∗
[0.068, 0.320]

1,348
−641.983
1,295.966

1,348
−630.199
1,276.398

1,348
−573.157
1,164.313

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01

Note:

95% confidence intervals shown in brackets.
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or other economic incentives. Like income, precincts with higher home values could
be classified as more “elite” areas, and may have complex motives for approving of
consolidation. When examining the precincts with the highest median home values in
these cases, between 35%–40% were within city limits. Additionally, county residents
in precincts with higher median home values also approved of consolidation in higher
rates compared to areas with lower home values. Factors related to socioeconomic
status are discussed in more detail later in the chapter; however, it is clear that more
research should be done with regard to untangling these relationships and support
(or opposition) to consolidation.

4.3.2

Hierarchical Model

While there is both a theoretical and a statistical basis indicating that hierarchical
models are appropriate in examining the relationships among these factors which
relate to approval of consolidation referenda, upon analyzing the data, several
problems emerge. First, as shown in Table G.3, there are collinearity issues with
several variables—namely, those representing the strength of the pro and anticonsolidation campaigns, as well as the new council structure.

The similarity

of these variables representing the charter provisions and campaigns makes them
almost indistinguishable from a statistical standpoint, and result in models failing
to converge. Additionally, drawing from Leland and Thurmaier (2004) and other
previous works, we know that aside from a campaign focused on a strong economic
development argument, issues of taxation, the importance of the sheriff in the process,
and the potential impact on minority voters are often the prominent issues in these
referenda. For these reasons, the following county-level variables were selected and
included in the hierarchical models for further analysis: Taxes, Law Enforcement, and
Minority Districts.
While the county-level variables do not have a significant relationship with
approval, the results from Table 4.4 include the full model (Model 3) from Table
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Table 4.4: Hierarchical Model: Vote to Approve Consolidation
Dependent variable:
Consolidation Approval
Coefficient
(Std. Err.)

Odds Ratio

t-test

p-value

95% CI

−5.309∗∗∗
(0.745)

0.005

−7.128

<0.001

[0.001, 0.021]

Hispanic

2.022∗∗
(0.823)

7.554

2.456

0.014

[1.502, 37.986]

College Degree

4.678∗∗∗
(0.932)

107.587

5.017

<0.001

[17.268, 670.315]

Median Income

−0.016∗∗∗
(0.009)

0.984

−1.734

<0.001

[0.966, 1.002]

City Precinct

2.781∗∗∗
(0.291)

16.135

9.571

<0.001

[9.124, 28.534]

GOP Vote

1.292
(0.833)

3.641

1.552

0.121

[0.711, 18.658]

Voter Turnout

0.257
(0.530)

1.294

0.486

0.627

[0.458, 3.657]

Median Home Value

0.015∗∗∗
(0.003)

1.015

4.601

<0.001

[1.008, 1.021]

Constant

−4.747
(3.644)

0.009

−1.303

0.322

[0, 55859.57]

Taxes

17.678
(13.098)

47,575,230.366

1.35

0.31

[0, 1.43E+32]

Law Enforcement

−16.388
(12.085)

0.000

−1.356

0.308

[0, 2.9E+15]

Minority Districts

−0.159
(4.379)

0.853

−0.036

0.974

[0, 1.3E+08]

Precinct-Level
Black

County-Level

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01

Note:
Approximate d.f.:

Level 1: 1,134; Level 2: 2
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4.3 and show similar results in terms of increased or decreased odds of consolidation,
with notable exceptions. Similar to the precinct-level results presented above, the
percentage of African Americans, median household income, city precincts, higher
turnout, and median home values all demonstrate the same directionality and similar
odds of voting for or against consolidation. However, precinct-level variables in
this case show different relationships between the percentage of Hispanic residents,
education, and Republican vote shares in these precincts. All of these variables
show the opposite effect in relationship to approving consolidation referenda, and
all significantly increase the odds of adoption.
Despite the importance of charter and campaign factors in the Leland and
Thurmaier (2004) model, none of the county-level variables had a significant impact
on the approval of consolidation referenda in these six cases. While these instances
are a limited subset of the total referenda since 2000, it is clear from Tables G.1 and
G.2 that from a numerical perspective, we could have expected a different outcome
in Shelby County, for instance, which satisfied many of the necessary conditions for
consolidation, while Jefferson County—which did not meet those conditions with
regard to taxation, law enforcement, or council structure—was successful. While it
is too early to abandon the C3 Model presented by Leland and Thurmaier (2004),
it is still somewhat unclear as to what campaign effects, charter provisions, or
other necessary factors lead to the eventual success or defeat in these more recent
consolidation referenda.

Johnson and Carr (2004) offer an alternate method—

qualitative comparative analysis (QCA)—by assessing the necessary and sufficient
conditions present which lead (or could lead) to consolidation. Though they find
no sufficient conditions which lead to consolidation, there are several necessary
conditions which have been identified, including: racial and socioeconomic factors;
substantial problems in the city and/or county governments; and issues related to
taxation. Going forward, employing a similar approach with more recent cases may
help us better understand the complexities inherent in these consolidation campaigns.
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From a campaign perspective, consolidation proponents and opponents were
essentially evenly matched in Hall, Jefferson, Polk, and Shelby Counties, which
seems to be a more common trend, at least in more recent cases. Bernalillo and
Bibb Counties, in which the pro-consolidation campaigns had a clear edge in terms
of professionalism and the presence of entrepreneurs, only one of the two (Bibb)
successfully adopted the referendum. With a higher success rate in consolidation
referenda since 2000, compared to earlier outcomes in previous decades, it appears
that proponents of consolidation are becoming more skilled, and perhaps more
selective, in their attempts to reform local government. Given the amount of research
on city-county consolidations, as well as the fact that consolidation commissions often
seek out the advice of experts who have both practical and academic experience with
these reforms, it should be no surprise that both charter provisions and campaign
messaging are focused on what has been successful in the past, such as economic and
regional development.
Elite Votes for Consolidation
In addition to the likelihood of approval, the data reveal other interesting patterns
when analyzing the basic bivariate relationships between the percentage of votes in
favor of consolidation with regard to income and education. As shown in Figure 4.1,
as well as Figure 4.2 and 4.3, most of the votes for consolidation show a clear intracounty clustering pattern in precincts with median household incomes over $100,000
and more than 50% of adults with bachelor’s degrees, respectively. However, there is
a clear split between precincts with higher levels of income and education in Shelby
County.
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Figure 4.1: Median Household Income (All Cases, Income Over $100,000)
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Figure 4.2: Percent of Adults With College Degrees (All Cases, Over 50%)
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Figure 4.3: Adults With College Degrees (Bernalillo Removed, Over 50%)
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Interestingly—or, perhaps, predictably—all of the precincts above these thresholds in which a majority of voters approved of consolidation were within Memphis
city limits, while all of those voting against the referendum were in the surrounding
communities of Brunswick, Collierville, Cordova, Forrest Hills, and Germantown
(Figure 4.4 and 4.5). In precincts with higher median incomes, voters in city precincts
approved of consolidation at rates between 73%–80%, while those outside the city
limits approved of consolidation at rates between 10%–18%. Similarly, city precincts
with higher percentages of adults with bachelor’s degrees approved of consolidation
with votes between 51%–83%, with county voters only supporting the referendum with
percentages between 10%–28%. In this case, Shelby County is unique in displaying a
clear city-county divide, especially among precincts where voters could be considered
“elites.” In other cases, such as Jefferson County, there is a clear trend between
higher levels of income and education and a precinct’s vote for consolidation (Figure
4.6 and 4.7). Aside from Bernalillo County (Figure H.7 and H.8), all other cases show
a similar pattern. In the remaining counties, more ”elite” precincts demonstrate a
clear pattern in favor consolidation at higher levels than those in areas with lower
socioeconomic status. Both outcomes point to the need for further exploration of
voting patterns for and against these local referenda, as elite support is rather clear
in the successful cases of Jefferson and Bibb Counties, and was either split, in the
case of Shelby County, or did not have the same levels of support in Bernalillo, Hall,
and Polk Counties.
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Figure 4.4: Shelby County: Median Household Income
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Figure 4.5: Shelby County: Adults With College Degree
140

0.8

Vote for Consolidation (%)

1.00

0.75

0.50

0.25

25

50
75
Median Income ($ Thousands)

100

125

Figure 4.6: Jefferson County: Median Household Income
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Figure 4.7: Jefferson County: Adults With College Degree
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4.4

Summary & Discussion

Despite a better understanding of the demographic, geographic, economic, and
political factors that affect the ultimate success or failure of a consolidation
referendum, more work remains in order to untangle the intricacies of consolidation
campaigns. Undoubtedly, elite cues, economic considerations relating to both city and
county governments, employment and economic factors in the communities, as well
as other nuanced issues relating to these locales all contribute to citizens’ attitudes
towards consolidation. While certain patters do emerge in the results presented,
further analyses will certainly add to our understanding of these relatively rare
and generally unexplored campaigns to restructure local governments. Analysis of
consolidation votes from a larger time period will likely be necessary in order to
determine the overall factors in recent consolidation efforts; however, these findings
serve as an important baseline in establishing more generalizable trends in this
particular subset of elections.
As is evident in these findings, political, demographic, and socioeconomic factors
all play a significant role in the ultimate approval or rejection of city-county
consolidation referenda. In particular, and similar to other aspects of election and
voting behavior, race, education, income, and party identification play a significant
role in voters’ decision-making.

Existing research on consolidations present a

complicated picture of what factors come into play when pursuing a consolidation
campaign; however, these findings support many existing theories and previous
research in this area. For instance, it is clear that voters in city precincts are much
more likely to favor consolidation, and despite attempts to mitigate the negative
impacts, racial and ethnic minority voters are much less likely to favor consolidation.
In addition to the theoretical implications, officials exploring the possibility of
consolidation, or actively engaging in a consolidation campaign should find more
generalizable trends—beyond individual or comparative case studies—useful in the
development of future electoral strategies and drafting of consolidation charters.
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While the ultimate goal of this study is to establish a baseline for generalizable
results in more recent consolidation elections, it should be noted that the best
conclusions in the literature can be drawn from studies which have utilized a mixedmethods approach. From this perspective, it is possible to untangle the individual
consolidation campaign effects and nuanced trends that are difficult or impossible
to quantify.

In terms of political factors, more data and better measures on

endorsements, editorials, and campaigns will need to be developed in order to bolster
these findings. With that in mind, the ultimate goal is to paint a clearer picture for
politicians and practitioners who wish to consider consolidation as a viable option
for their communities, as well as academics and researchers who continue to build a
body of knowledge which analyzes these campaigns and their substantive impacts.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) conclude that “comprehensive consolidation should
be considered the last, most forbidding choice in urban governmental reform,
regardless of whatever theoretical merits may indisputably attend such a plan” (p.
73).

Similar to Carr and Feiock (2004), as well as others who have suggested

alternatives to consolidation, it would behoove local government officials seeking
change to explore other options before attempting a substantive structural change,
such as consolidation. As noted in Chapter 2, more recent perspectives on improving
governance involve interlocal agreements and more informal collaborative networks,
which are decidedly less drastic than formal, structural changes. In some cases,
consolidation may be the “silver bullet” to solve problems plaguing local government;
however, as existing evidence shows, outcomes do not always match the promises
made by proponents of structural reform (Leland and Thurmaier, 2010). For this
reason, it may be inauspicious to consider consolidation in terms of the claims made
by proponents. Rather, as Brierly (2004b), it wold perhaps be more realistic to think
of consolidation in terms or transactions. He notes that successful consolidation
attempts “have generally occurred in situations where the mayor and council of a
major city campaign for expanding central core city services into unincorporated
county territory in places where county residents are eager to receive them” (Brierly,
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2004b, p. 73). From this perspective, city residents must also see a benefit, such as
“an opportunity to lower their tax burden by merging the tax base” (Brierly, 2004b,
p. 73). This is not to discount the importance that Leland and Thurmaier (2004,
2010) place on economic development. In fact, one could consider consolidation as a
conscious, collective action to enter into a new form of government that is beneficial
to all (or most) parties involved.
In some cases, however, it has been shown that consolidation does not always
lead to equitable outcomes in terms of representation or results. As demonstrated
in Chapter 3, representation of African Americans tends to be significantly lower in
most consolidated governments. And while representational equity has increased over
the years, it is still below parity in many metropolitan areas. For this reason, it is
critically important that African Americans have a strong voice in the process. Leland
and Thurmaier (2004) point out that preserving (or converting to) districts or a mixed
structure is critical to ensuring minority representation, and a necessary condition for
consolidation approval. To this point, Lyons and Scheb (1998) note the [importance]
“adequately involving black community leaders in the drafting of consolidation
proposals and by designing a governmental structure that assures African American
representation” (p. 94). Similarly, other scholars have noted the importance of
minority group organization and involvement in achieving desired policy goals and
increasing representation in their communities (Burns, 2012; Reckhow, 2009). As
Horan (2002) notes, governing coalitions—“the informal alliance of political and
private elites who control key resources and hence dominate governance”—are also
of critical importance. Taken together, it is crucial for underrepresented groups to
organize and become involved in the process in order to help design a new government
which will be more responsive, more representative, and more equitable. As Hawkins
(1966) explains, with regard to earlier failed attempts in Nashville, proponents treated
their efforts more as a “community project” rather than a traditionally “political”
campaign (p. 80). Thus, in every campaign, there is an enemy—be it the status quo,
inefficiencies or ineffectiveness, corruption, or simply unwanted development from
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the perspective of those who preserve change as a threat to their cultural identity.
Thus, it is important to remember, as Johnson and Carr (2004) point out, that
“consolidation is a war of words” and “a struggle among community members over
power in the community” (p. 247). While many the goals reformers may be based
on good intentions, it is impossible to discount the implications of power and politics
at play in any consolidation effort.
Additionally, an important caveat by Bish and Ostrom (1973) in trying to
determine cost and efficiency of “different size governmental units for different
functions” is that a great number of “goods and services are not easily measurable,
and thus, outputs of different size units are not easily compared” (p. 73). Further, it is
important to note, as Ostrom and Ostrom (1971) point out, that “political economists
in the public choice tradition would anticipate that no single form of organization is
good for all circumstances. Different forms of organization will give rise to some
capabilities and will be subject to other limitations” (p. 211). These scholars offer
good reminders that part of the complexities in dealing with various individuals,
groups, or structures—particularly units of analysis as complex and unique as local
governments—relates to the fact that every city, county, constituency, and context is
different. The structural and political arrangements that lead to positive outcomes in
one locale may not lead to the same results elsewhere. However, through the process
of research and refinement, scholars can gain a better understanding of the impacts
related to various changes in government, policy, or political systems. Finally, it is
important to remember that consolidation and other changes to local government are
not necessarily deterministic—specific charter provisions do not ensure or endanger
the chances of a successful referendum, and the number of districts or nature of
elections do not necessarily equate to a specific rise or fall in representational equity.
Rather, as with many studies, the goal is to uncover measurable, substantive trends
in order to advance our understanding of political and governmental phenomena.
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5.1

Summary & Contributions

As noted earlier, the goal of the preceding chapters was to further our understanding
of two aspects related to city county consolidation that have been somewhat neglected,
particularly from a quantitative perspective. In Chapter 3, it is clear that, for the
most part, the “conventional wisdom” regarding city-county consolidation and the
impact of racial and ethnic representation holds true. This may be an unwelcome
finding, particularly in Southern states with histories of discrimination, and under the
jurisdiction of the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance provisions. Yet, it is important
to remember that several of these consolidated cases occurred decades ago, and that
with each year, the level of descriptive representation moves closer to parity. Although
many of the findings presented may not be a surprise to many, this study presents
the first attempts to analyze the impact of every consolidation over a nearly 40year period. Further, it is important to note that the focus on racial and ethnic
minority representation in these studies often focuses on the relative voting strength
of a particular minority community has (or had) in the city compared to the existing
or projected levels of representation following a government merger (e.g. Swanson,
2000). With the measure employed here, the goal was to hold the “dilution” of
the city into the county (relatively) constant by combining the makeup of both
legislative bodies pre-consolidation. And while more work remains to be done, these
results demonstrate a quantifiable impact rather than simply relying on anecdotes
and a small number of analyses. Yet, there are some surprising results, including
the fact that there is no significant change among consolidated cases in the yearto-year average following consolidation, in either Models 1 or 2 (Table 3.2 and
3.3, respectively). Further, it will likely surprise some that even some of the most
recent cases demonstrate a disparate impact, even in states subject to preclearance
provisions. Overall, these findings help bolster more generalizable theories regarding
the impact of consolidation on racial and ethnic representation.
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In Chapter 4, findings indicate that—similar to existing theories of voting behavior
and the motivations for supporting or opposing consolidation—there are clear
differences in these cases based on factors relating to demographics, socioeconomic
status, geographic factors, and political affiliation.

In precincts with higher

percentages of African American and Latino residents, the odds of voting in favor of a
consolidation referendum dramatically decrease, along with higher levels of education,
Republican vote shares, and, to a lesser extent, income. Like with Chapter 3, the
“conventional wisdom” surrounding the votes among city precincts held true. The
odds of a city precinct voting in favor of a consolidation referendum are roughly
3.5–4 times higher compared to their county counterparts. Additionally, the odds
of approval are much higher in precincts with increased turnout, which presents not
only theoretic implications for further exploration, but also practical applications
for reformers who are considering the timing of a referendum vote and how much
effort to expend when trying to increase interest among residents. However, like the
results in Chapter 3, these findings contribute to our understanding by going beyond
the conventional wisdom and our aggregate understanding of city versus county and
intergroup dynamics. To date, existing research tends to focus more on the macro
factors related to consolidation, in terms of the economic, political, and socioeconomic
determinants of success in these campaigns. This study attempts to incorporate a
more micro approach by going beyond the traditional qualitative perspective and
incorporating attributes of voting behavior. And while precincts are still not an
exact proxy for individuals, disaggregating results that occurred in the cities and
counties gets us closer to understanding voters in these cases.

5.2

Limitations and Future Research

Several considerations must be taken into account when examining results presented
in both studies.

In Chapter 3, while the findings are generally what would be

expected, more recent data should be collected in order to extend the analysis
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beyond 2002 and capture more recent cases. As we have seen across the country,
representational equity, though still not close to parity in most cases, has generally
increased since the Civil Rights Movement and the passage of the Voting Rights
Act. With this in mind, it would not be a stretch to hypothesize that levels of
representation have gotten better in the last fifteen years. Unfortunately, the Joint
Center for Political and Economic Studies has not extended the dataset beyond
2002 for local elected officials, and retroactive collection would likely be difficult,
though, not impossible. As council and commission terms last several years, and
many incumbents are reelected for multiple terms, it is likely that many officials
who have served since 2002 could be contacted, which could yield the data necessary
without an insurmountable amount of effort.
In addition to the impact on African Americans, one aspect that has essentially
gone unexplored is the impact of consolidation on Latino Americans. To date, only
Kansas City-Wyandotte County has elected one or more Latino elected officials, based
on an examination of data collected by the National Organization of Latino Elected
and Appointed Officials (NALEO). With the increase of Latino populations in recent
years, the chance of electing officials from those traditionally undeserved communities
also increases, including those elected to serve consolidated city-county governments.
Table C.2 includes a list of potential city-county governments (and their matched
cases) which could be used as a basis for future analyses using a similar research design
with data from the NALEO. Further, another aspect of representation that has been
completely ignored in the consolidation literature is that of Native American voters.
Four of the 43 existing consolidated governments are located in Alaska, all of whose
boroughs have sizable Native populations, as well as several other boroughs which
have held recent referenda since 2000. Thus, further exploration to determine whether
structural changes have the same impact on other minority groups as that of African
Americans would substantially improve the consolidation literature, specifically, as
well as research focusing on local government and urban politics as a whole.
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Additionally, with regard to representation, one aspect that Martin and Schiff
(2011) identify as a potential topic for exploration relates to the impact of consolidation not just on descriptive representation, but also on substantive representation
for racial and ethnic minorities and those of lower socioeconomic status. The latter
aspect being particularly important for further investigation with the increased focus
on economic development in more recent cases, combined with the growing income
disparities often seen in metropolitan areas. Measuring the number of elected officials
that represent a particular area or constituency is an important first step; however, it
is important to know how descriptive representation translates to policy, particularly
in governments which share a unique regional identity.
From a broader perspective, the question of whether to consolidate could continue
to be somewhat of a conflict, particularly for many African American voters, given
the knowledge that consolidation tends to decrease levels of representation. In most
cases, city residents tend to favor consolidation in higher percentages compared to
their county counterparts. However, for many African Americans, consolidation could
create a circumstance where voters are forced to choose between their economic and
electoral interests. While research on the impacts of consolidation and economic
development are still somewhat mixed, these factors are the strongest arguments for
consolidation from both an academic as well as a campaign perspective. Assuming
for a moment that the promises of pro-consolidation advocates are accurate, how do
voters reconcile the potential economic benefit with the knowledge that this positive
impact could come at a representative cost for minority communities? Results from
Chapter 4 provide us with some evidence that precincts with higher percentages
of Black and Latino residents decrease the odds of a successful consolidation
referendum; however, further analyses of both quantitative and qualitative data will
need to be explored in order to further understand this question. Further, this
notion of supporting or opposing based on one’s interest or political and electoral
predispositions extends to other subgroups as well. For instance, more rural county
voters are more likely to be Republican in most areas, and results from Chapter 4
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point to a decrease in the odds of support in more heavily Republican precincts.
However, the economic development argument, coupled with the fact that typically
more conservative groups, such as the Chamber of Commerce, support consolidation,
leads one to question the influences of endorsements as well as the framing of
consolidation campaigns. Further untangling the aspects of these unique campaigns,
charter provisions, and elections is a difficult but necessary and ongoing step in the
evolution of our understanding.
There are also unanswered questions relating to size and spatial considerations
that could have implications not just for our understanding of successful consolidation
referenda, but also factors related to consolidation outcomes as well. Durning (1995)
argues that the existing literature has focused primarily on larger metropolitan areas,
ignoring smaller and mid-sized governments, which leads to a lack of generalizability
and inhibits us from drawing strong conslusions on consolidation’s overall impact. In
terms of population size, Lyons (1977) notes the considerable variation in size of cities
and counties that attempt, and those that succeed in consolidation efforts. Among
earlier consolidation attempts (those occurring before 1977), Lyons (1977) points out
that roughly half of the communities with under 100,000 residents were successful,
whereas less than 15 percent (four of the 27) of those with over 100,000 residents
succeeded. Additionally, Durning (1995) notes similar trends in occurences through
the 1980s and early-1990s, in that the majority of successful consolidation attempts
were in counties whose populations were under 100,000. Further, he notes that
the “trend over the past few decades has been to initiate consolidation referenda in
smaller counties, not those in major metropolitan areas” (Durning, 1995, p. 275). In
recent years (since 2000), with the exception of Louisville-Jefferson County, successful
consolidations have included counties which all have fewer than 16,000 residents
(Table 1.1), indicating that this trend has continued among smaller areas. This
begs the question as to whether there is a relationship between the relative size of a
city or county and the success of a consolidation referendum.
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In previous attempts which occurred between 1945–1970, Marando (1973) tested
the “population dominance” of the major municipality by computing the ratio of
the population in cities compared to the overall counties. He argued that as a city’s
dominance over the county increased, the fringe would anticipate less representation or
influence; and their support for consolidation would decrease” (Marando, 1973, p. 92).
The results did show a fairly strong, negative correlation (−0.60) between population
dominance of the city and the fringe vote in favor of consolidation; however, there was
not a strong relationship in the city, indicating that county voters are more sensitive to
concerns over city dominance (Marando, 1973). Additionally, there are factors related
not just to population size, but also of a city or county’s geographic area. Inherent in
factors related to service delivery in local governments is a spatial component—be it
infrastructure needs, garbage collection, or even policing. Further, there is a great deal
of discussion regarding the nature of fragmentation, annexation by municipalities, and
interlocal cooperation which was mentioned in Chapter 2. This raises questions as to
whether there is a spatial factor related to consolidation similar to that of population
size. Brierly (2004a) notes the “Rusk hypothesis,” which explains the importance of
territorial control and boundary expansion for metropolitan areas—without which,
“a central city withers, leading a metropolitan area to decline” Rusk (1993); Brierly
(2004a, p. 105). Thus, service provision, population density, boundary change,
annexation, and other factors raise questions for future research in the areas related
to both size and spatial characteristics of local governments considering consolidation.
Finally, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, despite increased successes as of late,
the majority of consolidation referenda are still ultimately unsuccessful. However,
recent cases have been more successful than has traditionally been the case as 41%
of referenda put before the voters since 2000 have been approved. The increased
success of these referenda is an additional factor that requires further exploration.
Anecdotally, several explanations could be offered, including: reformers being more
selective about attempting consolidation; better utilization of public opinion polling
and data; a better understanding of what factors correlate with success; and, certainly
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not least, more resources in the form of consultants and institutes who can help
guide a campaign. Previously, Feiock and Carr (2000) found that the presence of a
public administration program located in a major research university within counties
significantly increased the chances of a proposed referendum. Thus, there is some
indirect evidence to suggest that reformers seek out those who specialize in topics
related to local governance; or, that members of the university community take
on the role of entrepreneurs themselves. Additionally, or, perhaps optimistically,
it is possible that the negative connotations surrounding the racial animus of more
integrated communities has faded, with residents being able to unite behind a common
goal, such as economic development. That is not to say that racial or socioeconomic
challenges no longer exist; rather, it is possible that they no longer play a major factor
in the determinants of a successful consolidation.
To date, the model first presented by Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) and
further refined by Leland and Thurmaier (2004, 2010) are the best predictors of
successful consolidation referenda to date. That being said, given the fluidity and
uniqueness of each charter and consolidation campaign, further development of
the necessary conditions for a successful consolidation vote would help bolster our
knowledge of these attempts. In order to understand what truly sets successful
and unsuccessful consolidation referenda apart—particularly in these most recent
attempts—an updated approach, similar to that of Leland and Thurmaier (2004)
is likely needed. As noted eariler, with these six cases, there does not appear to be
substantial variation, and while cities and counties which met the necessary conditions
did consolidate (Macon-Bibb County, for instance), Louisville-Jefferson County did
not meet the condition of having the sheriff’s support—a critical variable in the Leland
and Thurmaier (2004) model. Additionally, as mentioned in Chapter 4, Johnson and
Carr (2004) offer an alternate method using QCA, which could yield further insight
going forward, as more cases could be included in the analysis due to fewer instances
of unavailable precinct-level results. However, Johnson and Carr (2004) also note,
that “[g]iven the complexity of this issue,” the expectation “a single claim–or group
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of claims–would be shown to be sufficient for a particular outcome” is unlikely (p.
274). As Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974), Leland and Thurmaier (2004, 2010),
and others have found, successful consolidation efforts are a confluence of events built
upon the special circumstances surrounding each individual locale. Despite more
generalizable trends, the fact remains that determining the specific set or sequence of
events that create the conditions necessary for voters to support consolidation remains
elusive.
If early consolidation movements were driven by government reforms relating to
efficiency, equity, and effectiveness, is seems natural that more recent consolidation
efforts would focus on one particular issue, or a set of issues. In more recent years, the
primary issue promoted by reformers has been economic development. In this regard,
the benefits of consolidation in terms of measurable economic development outcomes
are mixed (e.g. Savitch et al., 2010); however, from an electoral standpoint, the
benefits of focusing consolidation efforts on a strong economic development argument
are much more clear (Leland and Thurmaier, 2004, 2010). What, then, will happen if
evince of economic development outcomes continues to be mixed, or even proves not
to have a positive impact? Will the economic development focus of recent campaign
efforts become less successful? Perhaps. Although, it is certainly too soon to tell. As
it stands, those wishing to alter their form of local government must make a clear,
comprehensive appeal to voters as to why the current structure must be changed.
The purposes for government reform, and the results of those reforms may change,
but as systems and societies evolve, so do their forms of government. It may be
that the reasons for and against consolidation are evolving, and with that change,
communities must assess whether the structural changes they seek will be effective.
However, looking forward, what it is clear is the fact that as cities and populations
grow, and America, in particular, becomes more urbanized, the challenges facing local
government will only become increasingly complex.
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Table A.1: All Consolidated City-County Governments After 1965
Year

City

County

State

1969
1971
1975
2002

Juneau
Sitka
Anchorage
Haines City

Greater Juneau Borough
Greater Sitka Borough
Greater Anchorage Area Borough
Haines Borough

AK
AK
AK
AK

1998

Broomfield

Broomfield County

CO

1967

Jacksonville

Duval County

FL

1970
1990
1995
2003
2006
2008
2008
2012

Columbus
Athens
Augusta
Cusseta City
Georgetown
Statenville
Preston
Macon

Muscogee County
Clarke County
Richmond County
Chattahoochee County
Quitman County
Echols County
Webster County
Bibb County

GA
GA
GA
GA
GA
GA
GA
GA

1969

Indianapolis

Marion County

IN

1997
2007

Kansas City
Tribune

Wyandotte County
Greeley County

KS
KS

1972
2000

Lexington
Louisville

Fayette County
Jefferson County

KY
KY

1981
1992

Houma
Lafayette

Terrebonne Parish
Lafayette Parish

LA
LA

1976
1976

Anaconda
Butte

Deer Lodge County
Silver Bow County

MT
MT

2006

Camden

Camden County

NC

1969

Carson City

Ormsby County

NV

1987
2000

Lynchburg
Hartsville

Moore County
Trousdale County

TN
TN

1971
1972

Holland
Suffolk

Nansemond County
Nansemond County

VA
VA

*Note: Year indicates successful referenda or legislative action.

179

Appendix B
Major City-County Consolidation
Studies, to Date
The following summaries are intended to highlight the major contributions to our
understanding of city-county consolidation referenda and the impact of consolidation
on African Americans. Table B.1 lists the major factors contributing to successful
consolidation efforts, while Table B.2 describes those efforts which were unsuccessful. In each table, city-counties that were consolidated by their respective state
legislatures, as well as those which did not ultimately result in a comprehensive
city-county consolidation (e.g. St. Louis), or were a city-city consolidation (e.g.
Branch/North Branch, Minnesota) are excluded (Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000;
Rusk, 2003; Honadle, 2004). Several sources of information were used in compiling
these tables, including Carr and Feiock (2004); Leland and Thurmaier (2004, 2010);
National Association of Counties (2011), as well as Rosenbaum and Henderson
(1972), and individual studies. Finally, Table B.3 includes references to the impact
of consolidation on African Americans. As noted in Chapter 1, this literature is
extremely limited from an empirical perspective, and demonstrates the need for more
comprehensive research, similar to that of Chapter 3.
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Table B.1: Major City-County Consolidation Studies: Successful Referenda
City-County
Author(s)

(Year*)

Hawkins
(1966)

NashvilleDavidson, TN
(1962)

Summary Findings
• Hawkins points to several factors contributing to the
desire for change, including: increased taxation, the
city’s continued expansion through annexation, and
requiring county drivers to pay for a special sticker in
order to drive on city streets
• Based on voter interviews, Hawkins summarizes the
key issues favoring consolidation:
– Dissatisfaction with public services
– No expectation of higher taxes
– Higher levels of education (above a HS diploma)
– An understanding of “metropolitan problems”
(p. 137)

Rosenbaum
and
Kammerer
(1974)

JacksonvilleDuval, FL
(1967)

• In keeping with the model Rosenbaum and Kammerer
(R&K) put forth, much can be attributed to the
“crisis climate” in Jacksonville that culminated
in residents seeking dramatic changes. Problems
included:
– Inadequate government response to problems
stemming from population growth and changes:
racial sorting and conflict (e.g. “white flight”),
housing, infrastructure & environmental (particularly water pollution)
– Failing schools (which were disaccredited in
1964), and a 350% increase in property
assessments imposed in 1965
• Additionally, the “accelerator event” included grand
jury indictments of councilmembers and public officials just as the consolidation study commission was
organized to address the aforementioned problems
– Commissioners, councilmembers, and administrators were charged with over 100 counts of
criminal activity

*Note: City-county year indicates the year a consolidation referendum took place.
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Table B.1 – Continued from previous page
City-County
Author(s)

(Year)

Swanson
(2004)

JacksonvilleDuval, FL
(1967)

Summary Findings
• In addition to the circumstances described by Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974), Swanson notes that
the following factors were relevant to Jacksonville’s
successful referendum:
– Opponents to consolidation (organized as
Better Government for Duval) failed to mount
a strong campaign
– Civic elites were prompted to change the
perception of the community following the
problems and scandals which occurred during
the 1960s, and “manufactured consent” for
consolidation in order to improve Jacksonville’s
image and economic development efforts (p. 43)

Fleischmann
and Custer
(2004)

ColumbusMuscogee, GA
(1970)

• The authors find that the R&K model fails to predict
the successful outcome in this case due to the lack of
a crisis climate or an accelerator event. Instead, the
following reasons for success were determined:
– Substantial involvement and outreach by elites
and the steering committee which garnered
community support
– A strong, professional pro-consolidation campaign, with virtually no organized opposition
– Boosterism based on Columbus-Muscogee’s
status as an “up-and-coming” (post-WWII)
area, aimed at improving its economic and
political status

*Note: City-county year indicates the year a consolidation referendum took place.
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Table B.1 – Continued from previous page
City-County
Author(s)

(Year)

Durning et al.
(2004)

AthensClarke, GA
(1990)

Summary Findings
• Durning et al. classify A-CC’s attempt not as an
individual event, but as a succession of events and
(three) earlier defeats beginning in the 1960s
• Overall, the coalitions, messaging, and relative
strength of the pro-and anti-consolidation groups
remained relatively constant through each successive
campaign
• With regard to the R&K model, most of the crisis
climate events occurred in the 1960s; however, two
key issues emerged:
– The city-owned water system’s policy of
charging county residents substantially more for
water than city residents
– Inequities with taxation and service provision
(e.g. city residents were paying county taxes
for services they didn’t receive—e.g.
law
enforcement and public works)

Bacot (2004)

LafayetteLafayette, LA
(1992)

• Like Columbus, there was no particular crisis climate
in Lafayette-Lafayette Parish, or an accelerator event
• Here, civic elites were united in their support for
consolidation, and faced little opposition in the form
of an anti-consolidation campaign
• Bacot notes that this case presents an instance of
consolidation being approved on its merits, absent a
scandal; although, it is noted that voters essentially
received one-sided, positive information due to the
absence of unified opposition

*Note: City-county year indicates the year a consolidation referendum took place.
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Table B.1 – Continued from previous page
City-County
Author(s)

(Year)

Campbell
et al. (2004)

AugustaRichmond,
GA (1995)

Summary Findings
• Augusta-Richmond, like many cases, underwent
several attempts at consolidation; however, unique to
this case, voters had to approve two referenda after
the DOJ blocked the 1988 proposal
– This unique history, argue Campbell et al.,
shaped the eventual approval in 1995
– Though the events following the 1988 approval (and subjection rejection) essentially
contributed to a crisis climate, there was no
accelerator event in the 1988 approval
• Of crucial importance were Black elites’ support for
the charter, after the DOJ’s blockage, and subsequent
charges that consolidation was racially motivated
– Though the 1988 referendum passed, majorityBlack precincts overwhelmingly voted against
it, whereas the 1995 referendum won a majority
in the same precincts

Leland (2004)

Kansas CityWyandotte,
KS (1997)

• The pro-consolidation campaign in KansasCity/Wyandotte County was well-organized and
outspent opponents by more than two to one
• Additionally, the size of the proposed council was
increased, and districts were drawn so as to be
favorable to the Black community in Kansas City
– David Haley—a sitting city councilman, who
was African American—helped in the creation
of the new districts
– Haley later came out against consolidation,
but many African American leaders endorsed
the plan, and many in the Black community
knew Haley had drawn districts to ensure fair
representation
– Despite minority voters opposing consolidation,
it was not by a large enough margin to defeat
the referendum

*Note: City-county year indicates the year a consolidation referendum took place.

184

Table B.1 – Continued from previous page
City-County
Author(s)

(Year)

Savitch and
Vogel (2004a)

LouisvilleJefferson, KY
(2000)

Summary Findings
• Savitch and Vogel make an important distinction
between a “real” crisis climate, and perceived crises,
and conclude that subjective, rather than objective
perceptions shaped the outcome
– In this case, the authors argue that there
was no imminent threat or crisis to the
community; rather, businesses elites, with the
help of elected officials and the local newspaper
successfully capitalized on Louisville’s slow
population decline since the 1960s, and the
threat of Lexington (which consolidated with
Fayette County in 1974) overtaking Louisville
as Kentucky’s largest city
• The proposed charter in this case was purposefully
left vague, so that opponents could not object to
specific provisions
• Additionally, the referendum occurred during the
high-turnout November election, and only required
a single-majority vote (as opposed to a dual-majority
vote in the city and county which is often required)
• At the end of the day, the drumbeat of economic
development was too much to overcome for opponents, as consolidation proponents overwhelmingly
dominated the messaging in this case

*Note: City-county year indicates the year a consolidation referendum took place.
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Table B.2: Major City-County Consolidation Studies: Unsuccessful Referenda
City-County
Author(s)

(Year*)

Rosenbaum
and
Kammerer
(1974)

TampaHillsborough,
FL (1967)

Summary Findings
• Rosenbaum and Kammerer’s model explains the
failure in Tampa, based on the following factors:
– No scandals or sizable community problems (no
crisis climate or power deflation)
– No clear “sides” to the issue (no conflict
between “good vs. bad,” which meant no media
framing/attention)
– Civic elites (entrepreneurs) did not initiate the
reform (initially led by county legislators, who
left the campaign)
– Elites and community groups mostly abstained
or were against the proposal throughout the
process (though, some endorsed very late)

Sparrow
(2004)

SacramentoSacramento,
CA (1974)

• From the perspective of the R&K model, Sacramento
did not experience a crisis climate or power deflation,
as Sparrow notes that both the city and the county
were “operating in a relatively efficient manner,” and
leaders were generally responsive to citizen concerns
(pp. 96–97)
• Further, there was no accelerator event, as the two
stages predicating this stage were non-existent
• Additionally, civic elites proposing changes were
doing so with only moderate enthusiasm, and the
pro-consolidation campaign lacked organization and
a clear message
– Conversely, opponents rallied around a personable leader, and had much more enthusiasm
about defeating the measure
• Sparrow also notes overwhelming opposition to the
proposed charter in the minor municipalities and
rural areas, both of whom perceived consolidation as
a “takeover of the county by downtown interests” (p.
93)
– In the three smaller municipalities, roughly 90%
of the voters cast ballots in against the referendum, while 83% of those in unincorporated
areas voted in opposition

*Note: City-county year indicates the year a consolidation referendum took place.
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Table B.2 – Continued from previous page
City-County
Author(s)

(Year)

Johnson and
Feiock (1999);
Johnson
(2004c)

TallahasseeLeon, FL
(1992)

Summary Findings
• Utilizing the R&K model, the authors conclude that:
– Despite a crisis climate (population changes,
service problems, and an indictment of law
enforcement officials), and power deflation (via
civic leaders and elites calling for investigations
and change), the 1992 attempt lacked an
accelerator event
– Additionally, many in the African American
community withdrew their support due to fears
of underrepresentation, which was the same
reason cited by many rural residents as well
– Finally, the sheriff, a key player in the
C3 model, openly opposed the consolidation,
contributing to yet another that led to its
eventual demise

*Note: City-county year indicates the year a consolidation referendum took place.
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Table B.2 – Continued from previous page
City-County
Author(s)

(Year)

Coates and Ho
(2004)

Des
Moines-Polk,
IA (1994)

Summary Findings
• Coates and Ho cite several problems leading up to
the decision to pursue consolidation, including: a
diminishing tax base in the city, due to suburbanization; a high property tax rate, and equally high
expenditures; and a number of nontaxable properties
in the city
– Consolidation was pitched as a means of providing increased services for unincorporated areas
in exchange for (from the city’s perspective),
more equitable taxation county-wide
• In addition to the issue of taxation, proponents
advocated for more professional management in the
county
– When it came time for city and county leaders
to craft a proposal, city officials emphasized
taxation while county officials focused on
improving county government
• Despite some issues related to taxation and fiscal
stress, like other cases, Des Moines and Polk County
did not experience a significant crisis climate or
subsequent power deflation
• Ultimately, elected officials and members of the
charter commission could not agree on provisions in
the charter or how to structure the new government,
resulting in a limited amount of institutional support
for the measure and a lackluster pro-consolidation
campaign. Thus, despite some problems in both
the city and county, none of them rose to the level
warranting a dramatic structural change in the new
of voters.

*Note: City-county year indicates the year a consolidation referendum took place.

188

Table B.2 – Continued from previous page
City-County
Author(s)

(Year)

Johnson
(2004a)

WilmingtonNew Hanover,
NC (1995)

Summary Findings
• Johnson notes that both Wilmington and New
Hanover County experienced steady economic growth
in the years leading up to the consolidation attempt
• Like many other failed attempts, this case lacked a
significant crisis, incidence of power deflation, or an
accelerator event
• Interestingly, county officials—as opposed to city
officials—were the primary proponents behind consolidation
– According to Johnson, county officials “believed
that consolidation would clarify government
responsibilities for citizens and simplify the
government process itself” (p. 233)
– Further, county residents believed Wilmington
would eventually annex many of the unincorporated areas, and saw consolidation as the “lesser
of two evils” (p. 234)
• While many factors influenced voters’ reasons to vote
against the referendum; ultimately, there was not
a strong reason to vote for the measure, as many
residents—particularly Wilmington residents—were
content with the status quo

*Note: City-county year indicates the year a consolidation referendum took place.
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Table B.2 – Continued from previous page
City-County
Author(s)

(Year)

Lyons and
Scheb (1998)

KnoxvilleKnox, TN
(1996)

Summary Findings
• Based on surveys conducted by Lyons and Scheb from
January 1995 through October 1996, the following
findings emerged:
– Initial support for consolidation in January
1995 was relatively high in the City of
Knoxville, with 62% favoring it, while only
49% of voters outside the city favored the
referendum
– By October 1996, the last poll conducted before
the November vote, support had slipped to 47&
in the city, and 37% in the county
– In each of the eight surveys conducted, voters
who “strongly opposed” consistently outnumbered those who were “strongly favorable” to
consolidation
• From polling, focus groups, and individual feedback,
it was apparent that: 1. citizens did not fully understand the differences in separate (urban and general
services) taxing districts; and 2. county residents
believed their taxes would be raised to reflect the
existing city tax rates (or would dramatically increase
after the imposed tax moratorium included in the
charter)
• Despite a well-organized, well-funded campaign in
favor of consolidation, opponents countered their
efforts with effective use of grassroots tools, such as
lawn signs, and were led by the sitting sheriff, city
employees (particularly the Knoxville Fire Fighters
Association), and many who opposed the Knoxville
mayor and his annexation policies
• The authors conclude that a combination of factors
associated with a fear of higher taxes, a “distrust
of downtown business elites, contentment with the
status quo...antipathy to a more urbanized lifestyle,”
and intangible benefits of consolidation for many
voters ultimately led to its defeat (p. 103).

*Note: City-county year indicates the year a consolidation referendum took place.
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Table B.2 – Continued from previous page
City-County
Author(s)

(Year)

Nownes and
Houston
(2004)

KnoxvilleKnox, TN
(1996)

Summary Findings
• Nownes and Houston note several impediments to
previously unsuccessful consolidation attempts which
had been mitigated prior to the 1996 vote, including:
– The merger of the city and county school
systems, which can be in impediment to
consolidation;
– Support by both city and county officials, where
there had been some division in past attempts;
and,
– The elimination of much of Knoxville’s debt,
which is often a factor for county voters who
do not wish to assume a city’s debt (or vice
versa), and a moratorium on property tax
increases. Both of which contribute to favorable
conditions in consolidation referenda (Leland
and Thurmaier, 2004).
• Similar to Nashville-Davidson County, the Knox
County sheriff under the proposed charter would only
be responsible for the jails and other duties related
to the court system. This led the sitting sheriff to
vocally oppose the consolidation referendum.
• Opponents emphasized consolidation as an elitedriven issue, and made appeals to democracy,
responsiveness, and smaller government
• In addition to the reasons cited by Lyons and Scheb
(1998), the overarching factors contributing to failure
in this case are categorized as either agenda-setting
facotrs or cmapaign factors. These include:
– Agenda-setting factors: No crisis climate,
power deflation, or accelerator event; thus, no
citizen demands for change. Rather, This was
simply an elite-driven issue
– Campaign factors: Despite a well-funded, wellorganized campaign, proponents did not craft a
message which resonated with voters.

*Note: City-county year indicates the year a consolidation referendum took place.
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In this section: Altshculer (Governnace blue book), , Clarke (2006)

Table B.3: Works Referencing the Impact of Consolidation on African Americans
City-County
Author(s)

(Year*)

Sloan and
French (1971)

Nashville
Davidson, TN
&
JacksonvilleDuval, FL
(1962 & 1967)

Summary Findings
• Sloan and French argue that consolidation, generally,
and also specifically in Nashville and Jacksonville, has
been used as a means to dilute the Black vote
• The authors note that annexation was a common
dilution tactic in areas with growing African
American populations, particularly in Nashville and
Jacksonville, and that consolidation is a continuation
of the same approach
• They also hypothesize that consolidation will be
more likely in metropolitan areas with an increase
in the proportion of African Americans within the
city limits, especially as that percentage approaches
40%–50%
– Banfield (1957) offered a similar hypothesis,
noting that as “the Negro tide rises in the
central cities, many white Democrats will
begin to think of annexation and consolidation
as ways to maintain a white (but, alas,
Republican!) majority” (p. 89)
• Further, Sloan and French point to the use of coded
language in consolidation cases helps White elites
signal their intentions while avoiding the “nastiness
of racial conflict” (p.
34).
This tactic, they
argue, lessens the apparent racial factors surrounding
campaigns to those who later review public records
on these events.
– They note that while the “former city represents approximately 40% of metro Louisville’s
population yet holds only a third of council
seats (8 of 26)” (p.
781).
This shift
has eroded the traditional Democratic power
base in Louisville, to which many African
Americans were members, and which formed
a majority coalition that could substantively
impact minority communities.
– With the merger, Black representation dropped
from 33% to 23%

*Note: City-county year indicates the year a consolidation referendum took place.
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City-County
Author(s)

(Year)

Swanson
(2000)

JacksonvilleDuval, FL
(1967)

Summary Findings
• Swanson points out that while representation in consolidated governments typically favor city residents,
he notes that prior to consolidation, Jacksonville’s
population was approximately 40% Black, while the
post-merger percentage dropped to 25%
• Additionally, through an “equalization” in service
provision and a combination of lowering property tax
rates in favor of more user fees, Swanson argues that
the policy impacts of consolidation disproportionately
affected African Americans and residents of lower
socioeconomic status who resided in the urban core

Blomquist and
Parks (1995)

IndianapolisMarion, IN
(1967)

• In the case of Unigov, the authors note that
“the Republican-dominated county took over the
marginally Democratic city,” which had a direct
impact on African American representation due to
the high number of Black elected officials who were
Democrats (p. 50)
– Following Unigov’s adoption by the state
legislature, the Marion County Republican
Party chairman “exclaimed, ’It’s my greatest
coup of all time, moving out there and taking
in 85,000 Republicans” (p. 50).
• Blomquist & Parks also note that the largest gains for
African Americans in 1991 followed a VRA lawsuit
which prompted the purposeful drawing of majorityminority districts

Savitch and
Vogel (2004b)

LouisvilleJefferson, FL
(2000)

• Savitch and Vogel note that the power within
Louisville-Jefferson County shifted from the city to
the suburbs following consolidation.
– They note that while the “former city represents approximately 40% of metro Louisville’s
population yet holds only a third of council
seats (8 of 26)” (p.
781).
This shift
has eroded the traditional Democratic power
base in Louisville, to which many African
Americans were members, and which formed
a majority coalition that could substantively
impact minority communities.
– With the merger, Black representation dropped
from 33% to 23%

*Note: City-county year indicates the year a consolidation referendum took place.
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City-County
Author(s)
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Clarke (2006)

LouisvilleJefferson, FL
(2000)

Summary Findings
• Clarke argues that while “not impossible, consolidation of local governments can rarely be undertaken
without consequences that are evident along racial
lines” (p. 639)
• With Louisville’s consolidation, Clarke argues that
while many of the numerous minor municipalities in
Jefferson County were allowed to retain at least some
level of autonomy in their local legislative bodies,
Louisville—with a comparatively higher percentage
of African American residents—dissolved its Board
of Aldermen; thus, diluting the Black vote into the
predominately White county
• Further, Clarke argues that prior to consolidation,
representation on the Board of Aldermen was
close parity given the Black population made up
approximately 33% of the population, and held 25%
(four of the 12) seats; however, she notes that
under the new system, a challenge under Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act is possible, citing the
reorganization of the existing political system (e.g.
eliminating the city government and its electoral
bodies) and its potential impact on African American
representation

Martin and
Schiff (2011)

Multiple cases

• Martin and Schiff, citing a Pennsylvania Economy
League study, point out that consolidation proponents often fall back on the federal government’s
role in enduring equitable representation, such was
the case under the Voting Rights Act preclearance
provisions
• Further, the authors cite the need for more indepth analysis on the precise impact of city-county
consolidation on minority representation

*Note: City-county year indicates the year a consolidation referendum took place.
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Appendix C
Demographic Data: City & County
Case Comparisons
C.1

Black Elected Officials

195

Table C.1: City & County Case Comparisons (Black Elected Officials)

Year

County

Population

Percent
Black*

Median
Income

Education

GOP
Vote

1968
1968

Duval, FL
Palm Beach,FL

515,320
328,421

22.9%
18.3%

$7,611
$7,771

9.4%
12.8%

50.5%
53.1%

1970
1970

Marion, IN
Allen, IN

794,197
281,344

17%
6.9%

$9,615
$9,911

12%
10.8%

52.3%
54.3%

1971
1971

Muscogee, GA
Bibb, GA

170,658
145,839

26.6%
34.8%

$7,722
$7,790

10.7%
10%

32.4%
32.6%

1974
1974

Suffolk, VA
King & Queen, VA

textbf38,807
5,805

51.9%
48.3%

$7,822
$8,285

7.9%
6.6%

57.9%
58.3%

1974
1974

Fayette, KY
Woodford, KY

193,937
16,195

12.6%
9.1%

$11,424
$11,452

21.4%
12.3%

66.5%
70.3%

1984
1984

Terrebonne, LA
Lafourche, LA

100,925
88,606

15.8%
11.6%

$20,212
$19,301

9.6%
9.8%

69.5%
65.4%

1991
1991

Clarke, GA
Ware, GA

87,997
35,521

26.7%
26.3%

$21,566
$21,219

37.7%
10.4%

49.7%
52.6%

1996
1996

Lafayette, LA
Ouachita, LA

181,402
146,693

23.9%
32.7%

$31,646
$27,680

24.2%
21.1%

48.9%
49.6%

1996
1996

Richmond, GA
Bibb, GA

192,397
155,061

44.7%
45.1%

$29,958
$31,044

18.1%
19.6%

41.6%
41.6%

1998
1998

Wyandotte, KS
Geary, KS

152,521
25,226

27.8%
21.9%

$31,783
$29,915

11.7%
16.6%

28.2%
54.3%

2001
2001

Trousdale, TN
Giles, TN

7,350
29,613

10.9%
11.7%

$32,573
$34,888

9.2%
10.8%

32.3%
43.5%

2003
2003

Jefferson, KY
Franklin, KY

703,970
48,246

19.6%
9.5%

$40,380
$41,905

26.3%
24.9%

48%
47.1%

2004
2004

Chattahoochee, GA
Glynn, GA

15,515
71,475

27.8%
26.3%

$40,780
$40,456

26.2%
24.5%

53.6%
67.1%

2006
2006

Camden, NC
Currituck, NC

9,321
22,923

14.8%
6.6%

$51,510
$48,692

18.1%
15.7%

64.8%
67%

2007
2007

Quitman, GA
Stewart, GA

2,529
5,691

50.2%
54.1%

$27,434
$26,098

5.7%
8.6%

42.4%
39.2%

2008
2008

Webster, GA
Screven, GA

2,710
14,843

45.3%
44%

$30,571
$30,602

11.3%
11.4%

52.9%
52.8%

*Note: Data from Florida in 1968 is percentage of Non–Whites.
Consolidated governments shown in bold.
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Latino Elected Officials
As mentioned in Chapter 5, Table C.2 includes a list of potential city-county
governments (and their matched cases) which could be used as a basis for further
analyses going forward.

Table C.2: Potential City & County Case Comparisons (Latino Elected Officials)

Year

County

Population

Percent
Hispanic

1998
1998

Wyandotte, KS
Shawnee, KS

152,521
170,349

9.6%
7%

$31,783
$38,766

11.7%
25.3%

28.2%
46.1%

2001
2001

Broomfield, CO
Eagle, CO

41,055
43,238

9.5%
24.4%

$65,155
$59,682

46.9%
47.5%

51.7%
46.1%

2004
2004

Chattahoochee, GA
Peach, GA

15,515
24,818

11.6%
5.5%

$40,780
$35,881

26.2%
17.4%

53.6%
53.2%

2008
2008

Echols, GA
Atkinson, GA

3,954
8,366

29%
23.6%

$31,309
$28,157

7.6%
8.3%

82.6%
66.8%

2009
2009

Greeley, KS
Meade, KS

1,210
4,502

12.9%
15.3%

$46,323
$47,447

18.1%
23.1%

79.3%
79.8%

*Note: Consolidated governments shown in bold
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Median
Income

Education

GOP
Vote

Appendix D
Change in Equity Ratios
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Table D.1: Aggregate Equity Ratios, by Year (1965–2002)
Year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

All Cases
0.240
0.262
0.283
0.305
0.326
0.348
0.369
0.391
0.412
0.434
0.455
0.477
0.498
0.520
0.541
0.563
0.584
0.606
0.627
0.649
0.670
0.692
0.713
0.735
0.756
0.778
0.799
0.821
0.842
0.864
0.885
0.907
0.928
0.950
0.971
0.993
1.014
1.036

Consolidated Cases
0.352
0.366
0.380
0.394
0.407
0.421
0.435
0.449
0.463
0.477
0.491
0.504
0.518
0.532
0.546
0.560
0.574
0.588
0.601
0.615
0.629
0.643
0.657
0.671
0.685
0.698
0.712
0.726
0.740
0.754
0.768
0.782
0.795
0.809
0.823
0.837
0.851
0.865
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Control Cases
0.121
0.151
0.180
0.210
0.240
0.269
0.299
0.328
0.358
0.388
0.417
0.447
0.477
0.506
0.536
0.566
0.595
0.625
0.654
0.684
0.714
0.743
0.773
0.803
0.832
0.862
0.892
0.921
0.951
0.981
1.010
1.040
1.069
1.099
1.129
1.158
1.188
1.218

Table D.2: Black Population Change (1965–2002)
Consolidation
Year

County

Black Population
(%∆ 1965–2002)

1968
1968

Duval, FL
Palm Beach, FL

33.2%
-21.6%

1970
1970

Marion, IN
Allen, IN

62.2%
96.1%

1971
1971

Muscogee, GA
Bibb, GA

105.0%
48.1%

1974
1974

Fayette, KY
Woodford, KY

16.2%
-55.5%

1974
1974

Suffolk, VA
King & Queen, VA

15.2%
-35.7%

1984
1984

Terrebonne, LA
Lafourche, LA

19.0%
13.5%

1991
1991

Clarke, GA
Ware, GA

50.1%
25.2%

1996
1996

Richmond, GA
Bibb, GA

95.7%
48.1%

1996
1996

Lafayette, LA
Ouachita, LA

10.4%
27.6%

1998
1998

Wyandotte, KS
Geary, KS

67.7%
136.0%

2001
2001

Trousdale, TN
Giles, TN

-44.6%
-29.6%

2003
2003

Jefferson, KY
Franklin, KY

52.8%
24.0%

2004
2004

Chattahoochee, GA
Glynn, GA

220.0%
10.7%

2006
2006

Camden, NC
Currituck, NC

-57.4%
-77.1%

2007
2007

Quitman, GA
Stewart, GA

-22.7%
-7.4%

2008
2008

Webster, GA
Screven, GA

-25.0%
-4.7%

Note: Consolidated governments shown in bold.
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Appendix E
Representation in Consolidated
Governments: County-by-County
Results
Additional tables and graphs for consolidated and matched counties are listed below,
in chronological order of consolidation.

E.1
E.1.1

County Results
Duval and Palm Beach Counties, Florida (1968)
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Table E.1: Duval and Palm Beach Counties, Florida (1968)
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
(Duval)

(Palm Beach)

0.19∗∗∗
(0.04)

−0.02
(0.04)

−0.19∗∗∗
(0.04)

0.06
(0.05)

−0.18
(0.19)

0.05
(0.20)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 35)
F Statistic (df = 2; 35)

38
0.44
0.41
0.20
13.80∗∗∗

38
0.81
0.80
0.21
72.97∗∗∗

Note:

∗

Time

Post-Consolidation

Constant
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

E.1.2

Marion and Allen Counties, Indiana (1970)
Table E.2: Marion and Allen Counties, Indiana (1970)
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
(Marion)

(Allen)

Time

∗

−0.03
(0.01)

0.05
(0.05)

Post-Consolidation

0.04∗∗
(0.02)

−0.05
(0.06)

Constant

1.09∗∗∗
(0.09)

1.21∗∗∗
(0.32)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 35)
F Statistic (df = 2; 35)

38
0.35
0.32
0.13
9.52∗∗∗

38
0.02
−0.03
0.42
0.44

∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

E.1.3

Muscogee and Bibb Counties, Georgia (1971)
Table E.3: Muscogee and Bibb Counties, Georgia (1971)
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
(Muscogee)

(Bibb)

∗∗∗

0.12
(0.02)

0.10∗∗
(0.04)

Post-Consolidation

−0.11∗∗∗
(0.02)

−0.03
(0.04)

Constant

−0.33∗∗∗
(0.11)

−0.30
(0.26)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 35)
F Statistic (df = 2; 35)

38
0.77
0.76
0.15
58.25∗∗∗

38
0.84
0.83
0.37
91.28∗∗∗

Time

∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

E.1.4

Suffolk and King & Queen Counties, Virginia (1974)
Table E.4: Suffolk and King & Queen Counties, Virginia (1974)
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
(Suffolk)

(King & Queen)

Time

0.02
(0.02)

0.0004
(0.02)

Post-Consolidation

−0.005
(0.02)

0.02
(0.02)

Constant

0.15
(0.15)

−0.002
(0.16)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 35)
F Statistic (df = 2; 35)

38
0.47
0.43
0.25
15.22∗∗∗

38
0.24
0.20
0.27
5.57∗∗∗

Note:

∗
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

E.1.5

Fayette and Woodford Counties, Kentucky (1974)
Table E.5: Fayette and Woodford Counties, Kentucky (1974)
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
(Fayette)
∗∗∗

(Woodford)

Time

0.06
(0.02)

0.01
(0.06)

Post-Consolidation

−0.05∗∗
(0.02)

0.10
(0.07)

Constant

0.32∗∗
(0.15)

1.50∗∗∗
(0.51)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 35)
F Statistic (df = 2; 35)

38
0.32
0.29
0.25
8.38∗∗∗

38
0.59
0.56
0.86
24.87∗∗∗

∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

E.1.6

Terrebonne and Lafourche Parishes, Louisiana (1984)
Table E.6: Terrebonne and Lafourche Parishes, Louisiana (1984)
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
(Terrebonne)

(Lafourche)

∗∗∗

0.07
(0.01)

0.02∗∗∗
(0.004)

Post-Consolidation

−0.11∗∗∗
(0.02)

−0.001
(0.01)

Constant

−0.40∗∗∗
(0.12)

−0.13∗∗
(0.05)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 35)
F Statistic (df = 2; 35)

38
0.70
0.68
0.28
40.75∗∗∗

38
0.72
0.70
0.13
44.42∗∗∗

Time

∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

E.1.7

Clarke and Ware Counties, Georgia (1991)
Table E.7: Clarke and Ware Counties, Georgia (1991)
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
(Clarke)
∗∗∗

(Ware)

0.04
(0.01)

0.10∗∗∗
(0.01)

−0.11∗∗∗
(0.02)

−0.17∗∗∗
(0.03)

0.04
(0.09)

−0.53∗∗∗
(0.13)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 35)
F Statistic (df = 2; 35)

38
0.63
0.61
0.24
30.39∗∗∗

38
0.86
0.85
0.34
109.61∗∗∗

Note:

∗

Time

Post-Consolidation

Constant
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

E.1.8

Lafayette and Ouachita Parishes, Louisiana (1996)
Table E.8: Lafayette and Ouachita Parishes, Louisiana (1996)
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
(Lafayette)

(Ouachita)

0.01
(0.01)

0.05∗∗∗
(0.005)

−0.19∗∗
(0.07)

−0.13∗∗∗
(0.04)

Constant

0.27∗
(0.15)

−0.23∗∗
(0.09)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 35)
F Statistic (df = 2; 35)

38
0.17
0.12
0.42
3.48∗∗

38
0.82
0.81
0.26
80.77∗∗∗

Time

Post-Consolidation

∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

E.1.9

Richmond and Bibb Counties, Georgia (1996)
Table E.9: Richmond and Bibb Counties, Georgia (1996)
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
(Richmond)

(Bibb)

∗∗∗

0.02
(0.004)

0.08∗∗∗
(0.01)

−0.12∗∗∗
(0.04)

−0.12∗
(0.06)

Constant

0.59∗∗∗
(0.08)

−0.23∗
(0.12)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 35)
F Statistic (df = 2; 35)

38
0.50
0.47
0.22
17.27∗∗∗

38
0.85
0.85
0.35
102.19∗∗∗

Time

Post-Consolidation

∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

E.1.10

Wyandotte and Geary Counties, Kansas (1998)
Table E.10: Wyandotte and Geary Counties, Kansas (1998)
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
(Wyandotte)
∗∗∗

(Geary)

Time

0.01
(0.002)

0.02∗∗
(0.01)

Post-Consolidation

−0.11∗∗
(0.04)

−0.28∗
(0.14)

Constant

0.45∗∗∗
(0.05)

0.30∗
(0.15)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 35)
F Statistic (df = 2; 35)

38
0.49
0.46
0.14
16.86∗∗∗

38
0.16
0.11
0.45
3.30∗∗

∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

E.1.11

Trousdale and Giles Counties, Tennessee (2001)
Table E.11: Trousdale and Giles Counties, Tennessee (2001)
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
(Trousdale)

(Giles)

∗∗∗

Time

0.03
(0.003)

0.01∗∗∗
(0.002)

−0.08
(0.07)

−0.01
(0.04)

38
0.73
0.73
0.20
98.93∗∗∗

38
0.47
0.46
0.12
32.12∗∗∗

Post-Consolidation

Constant

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 36)
F Statistic (df = 1; 36)
∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

E.1.12

Jefferson and Franklin Counties, Kentucky (2003)

As shown in Table E.12 as well as Figures E.1 and E.2, both Jefferson and Franklin
Counties saw a yearly increase of 4% and 3%, respectfully, in representational equity
between 1965 and 2002.

Table E.12: Jefferson and Franklin Counties, Kentucky (2003)
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
(Jefferson)

(Franklin)

0.04∗∗∗
(0.01)

0.03∗∗∗
(0.004)

Constant

0.55∗∗∗
(0.12)

−0.35∗∗∗
(0.10)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 36)
F Statistic (df = 1; 36)

38
0.65
0.64
0.35
68.17∗∗∗

38
0.60
0.59
0.30
54.80∗∗∗

Time

Post-Consolidation

∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Equity Ratio

2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
1970

1980

1990

2000

Year

Figure E.1: Equity Ratio – Jefferson County, Kentucky (1965–2002)

Equity Ratio

0.8

0.4

0.0

1970

1980

1990

2000

Year

Figure E.2: Equity Ratio – Franklin County, Kentucky (1965–2002)
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E.1.13

Chattahoochee and Glynn Counties, Georgia (2004)

Table E.13 and Figure E.4 shows a significant increase of 2% per year in the
equity ratio from 1965–2002 in Glynn County; however, Chattahoochee County (the
consolidated case) saw no significant yearly change over the same period.

Table E.13: Chattahoochee and Glynn Counties, Georgia (2004)
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
(Chattahoochee)

(Glynn)

−0.005
(0.01)

0.02∗∗
(0.01)

Constant

0.52∗∗∗
(0.17)

0.23
(0.17)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 36)
F Statistic (df = 1; 36)

38
0.01
−0.02
0.53
0.35

38
0.16
0.14
0.51
7.04∗∗

Time

Post-Consolidation

∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Equity Ratio

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
1970

1980

1990

2000

Year

Figure E.3: Equity Ratio – Chattahoochee County, Georgia (1965–2002)
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Figure E.4: Equity Ratio – Glynn County, Georgia (1965–2002)
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E.1.14

Camden and Currituck Counties, North Carolina
(2006)

In consolidated Camden County, Figure E.5 appears to show an increase in equity;
however, in examining Table E.14 as well as Figure E.6, it is clear that there was no
significant increase in Camden, while Currituck did not have a single black elected
official over this time period.

Table E.14: Camden and Currituck Counties, North Carolina (2006)
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
(Camden)

(Currituck)

0.01
(0.01)

0.00
(0.00)

0.12
(0.12)

0.00
(0.00)

38
0.07
0.04
0.35
2.64

38

Time

Post-Consolidation

Constant

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 36)
F Statistic (df = 1; 36)
∗

Note:

217

p<0.1;

0.00
∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

0.8

Equity Ratio

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0
1970

1980

1990

2000

Year

Figure E.5: Equity Ratio – Camden County, North Carolina (1965–2002)
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Figure E.6: Equity Ratio – Currituck County, North Carolina (1965–2002)
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E.1.15

Quitman and Stewart Counties, Georgia (2007)

Similar to the matched case above, Stewart County did not elected an African
American to office in the years between 1965 and 2002 (as shown in Figure E.8).
However, the consolidated case of Quitman did show a small but significant average
increase of 0.3% per year as shown in Figure E.7 and Table E.15.

Table E.15: Quitman and Stewart Counties, Georgia (2007)
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
(Quitman)

(Stewart)

0.003∗
(0.002)

0.00
(0.00)

Constant

0.06
(0.04)

0.00
(0.00)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 36)
F Statistic (df = 1; 36)

38
0.10
0.07
0.12
3.96∗

38

Time

Post-Consolidation

∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

0.00
∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Equity Ratio
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Figure E.7: Equity Ratio – Quitman County, Georgia (1965–2002)
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Figure E.8: Equity Ratio – Stewart County, Georgia (1965–2002)

220

E.1.16

Webster and Screven Counties, Georgia (2008)

Contrary to the two previous findings, the consolidated case in this instance, Webster
County, did not elect a Black representative to either the city or the county legislative
body during this period (shown in Figure E.9). However, the control case, Screven
County, did have a significant year-to-year increase which averaged 3% between 1965
and 2002, as Table E.16 and Figure E.10 demonstrate.

Table E.16: Webster and Screven Counties, Georgia (2008)
Dependent variable:
Representational Equity
(Webster)

(Screven)

0.00
(0.00)

0.03∗∗∗
(0.002)

0.00
(0.00)

0.05
(0.05)

38

38
0.81
0.80
0.15
151.62∗∗∗

Time

Post-Consolidation

Constant

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 36)
F Statistic (df = 1; 36)

0.00
∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01
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Figure E.9: Equity Ratio – Webster County, Georgia (1965–2002)
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Figure E.10: Equity Ratio – Screven County, Georgia (1965–2002)
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Appendix F
The C3 Model
Elements of the Leland and Thurmaier (2004) C3 Model are presented below.

F.1

Part 1: Elite Agenda–Setting Patterns, Contribution to the Liklihood of Creating a Charter Proposal

• Institutional Context:
– Legal framework (favorably disposed to consolidation process?) including
Voting Rights Act issues (Southern cases) for minority representation in
new jurisdiction
– Community characteristics (economic, political, and social)
– Diversified or homogeneous (racial, economic)
– Urban-suburban-rural composition of county, number of governmental
units
– Tax administration: major city and county sources (property, sales, fees)
– Home rule
– Important interlocal agreements (functionally consolidated services?)
– Municipal utilities governance (especially electric power)
– School districts and how funded (county, city, or independent)
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– Consolidation history
• Crisis Climate:
– Environmental changing events
– Population changes and shifts
– Racial composition shifts
– Economic resource shifts
• Demands for Government Response:
– Annexation (include voting rules and political history)
– Tax changes
– Reapportionment
– Increased or reallocated government services
• Appropriate or Effective Governmental Response:
– Local government successfully handles crisis, so no power deflation (case
ends)
– Annexation
– Tax changes
– Reapportionment
– Increased or reallocated government services
– Limited functional consolidation
• Inappropriate or Ineffective Governmental Response:
– Intransigence
– Conservatism
– Impotence
– Alienation of voters from government
• Power Deflation:
– Emergence of consolidation entrepreneurs
– Academics
Leagues of women voters
Metropolitan newspapers
Chambers of commerce
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• Civic leadership elites divided in problem perceptions
• Civic leadership elites united in view
– Government structure perceived as the problem
– Local mass media elites united in view
– Active (favorable) editorial policy
– Formation of groups advocating reform
– Formation of official consolidation study commissions
• Accelerator Event:
– Presence of scandal involving incumbent officials
– Community emergency that accentuates government ineffectiveness
– Distinguished source of external criticism of incumbent structure
– Sudden loss of influential leader
– External crisis accentuates government ineffectiveness

F.2

Part 2: Consolidation Referendum Patterns,
Contribution to the Likelihood of Adopting a
Charter

Specific Charter Provisions Presented to the Public for Debate:
• Taxes
– Separate taxing districts (city and county)
– Tax moratorium? Or tax cut?
– Assumption of debt by new entity?
• Law Enforcement
– Sheriff: jail only?
– Sheriff: elected or appointed?
– Police chief: appointed by?
• Council Structure
– Change in number of elected officials
– Term limits for new officials?
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• Executive
– Executive: elected at-large or appointed?
– Departments: how many consolidated?
– Civil Service results in salary equalization?
• Status of Minority Voters and Districts
– Minor municipality status? Independent?
– Effect of specific provisions on elite consolidation attitudes
– Effect of specific provisions on attitudes of specific interest groups (minority interests, neighborhood interests, business interests, suburban, or rural
community interests)
Campaign:
• Proconsolidation Campaign
– Presence of consolidation entrepreneurs
– Degree of campaign professionalism
– Degree of elite activity in campaign
– Level of resource commitments relative to opposition
• Anticonsolidatlon Campaign
– Degree of campaign professionalism
– Degree of elite activity in campaign
– Role of “grassroots” organizations
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F.3

The C3 Model
Institutional Context (V1 )

Civic Elites Divided in View (V2 ):
• Opposition to merger
forms

Emergence of Unified Civic Elites
with Economic Development
Vision for Community (V2 )

• “Old guard” protects
power
Creation of Study
Commission and Charter for
Consolidation (V3 − V8 ):
Weak Premerger
Referendum Campaign (V9 ):

• Taxes (V3 )
• Law Enforcement (V4 )

• Efficiency

• Council (V5 )

• Economy

• Executive (V6 )

• Equity–Fiscal Disparities

• Minorities (V7 )
• Minor towns (V8 )

Antimerger Referendum
Campaign (V10 ):
• Disenfranchised sheriff
• No efficiencies or
economies

Strong Premerger
Referendum Campaign (V9 ):
• Current structure unable
to support economic
development vision

• New urban–rural
inequities

• Consolidaiton is required
to restructure community
governance

• Substantial funding

• Professional organization

• Professional organization

• Substantial funding

No Consolidation

Consolidation

Figure F.1: C3 Model (Leland & Thurmaier, 2004)
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Appendix G
Consolidation Referenda: Data,
Additional Tables & Figures
Included are the methods used to convert data, the county-level variables and coding
for the six cases presented in Chapter 4, as well as descriptive statistics and additional
results from these referenda.

G.1

Block to Precinct Data Conversion

As an example, Figures G.1 and G.2 demonstrate a visual representation of the
conversion of Census block data to respective voting precincts in Shelby County,
Tennessee.
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Figure G.1: Shelby County Census Blocks

Figure G.2: Shelby County Census Blocks, With Precint Overlay (Shown in Blue)
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G.2

Independent Variables

Precinct-Level
Demographics:
Black – Percent of the population identifying as Black
Hispanic – Percent of the population identifying as Hispanic
College Degree – Percent of the adult population (25+) with a Bachelor’s degree or
higher
Housing & Income:
Median Income – Median household income within each precinct (in $1,000)
Median Home Value – Median home value within each precinct (in $10,000)
Political:
GOP Vote – Republican vote share in previous presidential election∗
Voter Turnout – Voter turnout in each precinct for each consolidation referendum
election
City Precinct – Dummy variable, precinct lies within the city limits

County-Level
Specific Charter Provisions Presented to the Public for Debate:
• Taxes
– Separate taxing districts (city and county) (0 = no, 1 = yes)
– Tax moratorium or tax cut (0 = no, 1 = yes)
– Assumption of debt by new entity (0 = yes, 1 = no)
• Law Enforcement
– Sheriff: jail only (0 = yes, 1 = no)
– Sheriff: elected or appointed (0 = no, 1 = yes)
• Council Structure
– Change in number of elected officials (0 = higher/same, 1 = lower)
– Term limits for new officials (0 = no, 1 = yes)
• Executive
∗

2004 results were used for Hall County, Georgia, as precinct–level results were unavailable for
2000.
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– Executive: elected at-large or appointed (0 = appointed, 1 = elected)
• Status of Minority Voters and Districts (0 = at-large elections, 1 =
districts/mized structure)
• Independent Minor Municipality Status (0 = minor municipalities must
join, 1 = minor municipalities are given option)
Campaign:
• Proconsolidation Campaign
– Presence of consolidation entrepreneurs (0 = no, 1 = yes)
– Degree of campaign professionalism (0 = no, 1 = yes)
– Degree of elite activity in campaign (0 = no, 1 = yes)
• Anticonsolidatlon Campaign
– Degree of campaign professionalism (0 = no, 1 = yes)
– Degree of elite activity in campaign (0 = no, 1 = yes)
– Role of “grassroots” organizations (0 = no, 1 = yes)
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G.3

Coding for County-Level Variables
Table G.1: County-Level Variables (Bernalillo, Bibb, Hall)
County:
Bernalillo

Bibb

Hall

0
1
1

1
1
1

0
0
0

Sheriff: Jail only
Sheriff: Elected

1
1

1
1

0
0

Council Structure
Change in number of elected officials
Term limits for new officials

1
1

1
1

0
0

Executive elected at-large
Departments: How many consolidated
Civil service results in salary equalization

1
0
0

1
0
1

0
0
0

Status of Minority Voters
Districts or mixed structure

1

1

0

Minor Municipality Status
Minor municipalities allowed to opt-in

0

1

0

Proconsolidation Campaign
Presence of consolidation entrepreneurs
Degree of campaign professionalism
Degree of elite activity in campaign

1
1
0

1
1
1

0
0
0

Anticonsolidation Campaign
Degree of campaign professionalism
Degree of elite activity in campaign
Role of “grassroots” organizations

0
0
0

0
1
0

0
0
0

Taxes
Separate taxing districts
Tax moratorium or cut
Assumption of debt by new entity
Law Enforcement

Executive
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Table G.2: County-Level Variables (Jefferson, Polk, Shelby)
County:
Jefferson

Polk

Shelby

0
0
0

0
0
0

1
1
1

Sheriff: Jail only
Sheriff: Elected

0
0

0
0

0
1

Council Structure
Change in number of elected officials
Term limits for new officials

0
0

0
0

1
1

Executive elected at-large
Departments: How many consolidated
Civil service results in salary equalization

1
0
0

1
0
0

1
0
0

Status of Minority Voters
Districts or mixed structure

1

1

1

Minor Municipality Status
Minor municipalities allowed to opt-in

1

1

1

Proconsolidation Campaign
Presence of consolidation entrepreneurs
Degree of campaign professionalism
Degree of elite activity in campaign

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
0
1

Anticonsolidation Campaign
Degree of campaign professionalism
Degree of elite activity in campaign
Role of “grassroots” organizations

1
1
1

1
1
1

0
1
1

Taxes
Separate taxing districts
Tax moratorium or cut
Assumption of debt by new entity
Law Enforcement

Executive
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Table G.3: Correlation Matrix (County-Level Variables)

Taxes
Law Enforcement
Council Structure
Executive
Minority Districts
Minor Municipality
Pro Campaign
Anti Campaign

Taxes

Sheriff

Structure

Executive

Minorities

Minor Municipality

Pro Campaign

Anti Campaign

1
0.961
0.961
0.287
0.143
-0.354
-0.606
-0.632

0.961
1
1
0.231
0.149
-0.586
-0.656
-0.800

0.961
1
1
0.231
0.149
-0.586
-0.656
-0.800

0.287
0.231
0.231
1
0.649
0.231
0.494
0.043

0.143
0.149
0.149
0.649
1
0.217
0.594
0.203

-0.354
-0.586
-0.586
0.231
0.217
1
0.666
0.935

-0.606
-0.656
-0.656
0.494
0.594
0.666
1
0.763

-0.632
-0.800
-0.800
0.043
0.203
0.935
0.763
1
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G.3.1

Descriptive Statistics
Table G.4: Summary Statistics (Precinct & County Variables)

†

Approve
Black
Hispanic
College Degree
Median Income
City Precinct
GOP Vote
Turnout
Home Value
Population Ratio
Taxes
Law Enforcement
Council Structure
Executive
Minority Districts
Minor Municipality
Pro Campaign
Anti Campaign

Min.

Max.

Median

Mean

Std. Dev.

N

0
0
0
0
0.85
0
0
0
0
0.25
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1.00
0.96
0.79
160.90
1
0.87
0.97
457.82
4.67
1
1
1
0.67
1
1
1
1

0
0.04
0.03
0.18
42.29
1
0.39
0.46
108.46
3.96
0.67
1
1
0.33
1
1
1
0.67

0.29
0.19
0.15
0.23
46.66
0.65
0.39
0.45
121.76
3.36
0.40
0.50
0.50
0.34
0.98
0.68
0.82
0.60

0.45
0.29
0.21
0.19
21.48
0.48
0.19
0.19
65.04
1.36
0.42
0.50
0.50
0.08
0.15
0.47
0.20
0.44

1,348
1,348
1,348
1,348
1,348
1,348
1,348
1,348
1,348
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
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G.4

Logistic Models
Table G.5: Precinct-Level Models: Vote to Approve Consolidaiton
Dependent variable:
Consolidation Approval
(Model 1)

(Model 2)

(Model 3)

Black

−3.083∗∗∗
(0.352)

−3.706∗∗∗
(0.403)

−4.058∗∗∗
(0.438)

Hispanic

−6.336∗∗∗
(0.656)

−5.380∗∗∗
(0.628)

−6.363∗∗∗
(0.707)

College Degree

−2.649∗∗∗
(0.486)

−2.222∗∗∗
(0.492)

−4.167∗∗∗
(0.598)

Median Income

0.031∗∗∗
(0.004)

0.035∗∗∗
(0.005)

−0.024∗∗∗
(0.008)

City Precinct (dummy)

1.275∗∗∗
(0.182)

1.283∗∗∗
(0.189)

1.447∗∗∗
(0.204)

GOP Vote

−1.528∗∗
(0.629)

−1.259∗
(0.650)

Voter Turnout

1.582∗∗∗
(0.405)

1.651∗∗∗
(0.436)
0.026∗∗∗
(0.003)

Median Home Value

Constant

−1.411∗∗∗
(0.248)

−1.800∗∗∗
(0.369)

−1.905∗∗∗
(0.395)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.

1,348
−641.983
1,295.966

1,348
−630.199
1,276.398

1,348
−573.157
1,164.313

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01

Note:
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Table G.6: Vote to Approve Consolidaiton: Precinct & County Variables
Dependent variable:
Consolidation Approval
−4.842∗∗∗
(0.690)
−0.065
(0.789)
1.948∗∗
(0.830)
−0.029∗∗∗
(0.009)
2.488∗∗∗
(0.263)
1.586∗∗
(0.793)
−0.045
(0.508)
0.020∗∗∗
(0.003)
24.107∗∗∗
(1.895)
−23.236∗∗∗
(1.773)
−3.552∗∗∗
(0.695)
1.544∗∗∗
(0.147)
−4.089∗∗∗
(0.831)

Black
Hispanic
College Degree
Median Income
City Precinct
GOP Vote
Voter Turnout
Home Value
Taxation
Law Enforcement
Minority Districts
Population Ratio
Constant
Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Note:

1,348
−457.273
940.545
∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
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Table G.7: Model 4 (Precinct & County Variables: Odds Ratios

(Intercept)
Black
Hispanic
College Degree
Median Income
City Precinct
GOP vote
Voter Turnout
Median Home Value
Taxes
Law Enforcement
Minority Districts
Population Ratio

Odds Ratio

95% CI

0.017
0.008
0.937
7.014
0.971
12.035
4.883
0.956
1.020
29, 487, 976, 467.000
0
0.029
4.681

[0.003, 0.081]
[0.002, 0.029]
[0.191, 4.310]
[1.379, 35.875]
[0.954, 0.989]
[7.281, 20.484]
[1.046, 23.523]
[0.353, 2.591]
[1.014, 1.027]
[787, 958, 980.000, 1, 344, 241, 055, 280.000]
[0, 0]
[0.007, 0.112]
[3.551, 6.315]
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Appendix H
Consolidation Referenda:
Additional Graphs
H.1

Bivariate Graphs

The following graphs demonstrate the bivariate relationship between two particular
variables of interest—median household income and adults with a college degree.

H.1.1

All Counties: 2000–2013

Income
Similar to the graphs presented in Chapter 4 (e.g. Figure 4.1) the following graph
shows the relationship between the precinct vote for consolidation and median incomes
over $100,000 in Jefferson, Hall, Bernalillo, Polk, Shelby, and Bibb Counties. In
this case, Figure H.1 demonstrates varying slopes and intercepts for each county,
indicating the need for a mixed (hierarchical) model.
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Figure H.1: Median Household Income (Varying Slopes & Intercepts)
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Education
Similar to Figure H.1 (above), Figure H.2 shows the varying slopes and intercepts
for each county with regard to the relationship between a precinct’s aggregate for
consolidation and education (the percentage of adults over 25 with a Bachelor’s
degree).
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Figure H.2: Percent of Adults With College Degrees (Varying Slopes & Intercepts)
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H.1.2

Individual Counties: 2000–2013

Louisville/Jefferson County, Kentucky (2000)
As shown in Figure H.3 and H.4, there is a strong, positive relationship between
higher votes in favor of consolidation and both median household income and adults
with a college degree in voting precincts.
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Figure H.3: Jefferson County: Median Household Income

Vote for Consolidation (%)

1.2

0.9

0.6

0.3

0.0

0.2
0.4
Adults (25+) With Bachelor's Degree or Higher (%)

0.6

Figure H.4: Jefferson County: Adults With College Degree
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Gainesville/Hall County, Georgia (2001)
Similar to Jefferson County, Figure H.5 and H.6 show a similar positive correlation
between a precinct’s median income and education with regard to the vote for
consolidation.
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Figure H.5: Hall County: Median Household Income
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Figure H.6: Hall County: Adults With College Degree
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Albuquerque/Bernalillo County, New Mexico (2004)
With the exception of Shelby County, Bernalillo County (Figure H.7 and H.8) is the
only other case which does not show a strong positive relationship between the votes
for consolidation and the socioeconomic factors in these precincts.
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Figure H.7: Bernalillo County: Median Household Income
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Figure H.8: Bernalillo County: Adults With College Degree
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Des Moines/Polk County, Iowa (2004)

Vote for Consolidation (%)

As shown in Figure H.9 and H.10, there is a strong positive relationship between
the percent of adults with a college degree and votes in favor of the consolidation
referendum in Polk County; however, this relationship is less clear with regard to
median household income (Figure H.9).
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Figure H.9: Polk County: Median Household Income
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Figure H.10: Polk County: Adults With College Degree
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Memphis/Shelby County, Tennessee (2010)
As noted earlier, Shelby County presents a unique case in which the votes for (and
against) consolidation become noticeably split in precincts with above-average median
income and education levels (as shown in Figure H.11 and H.12). Further research on
this particular case should be conducted in order to better understand the referendum
in Shelby County from both a qualitative and quantitative perspective.
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Figure H.11: Shelby County: Median Household Income
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Figure H.12: Shelby County: Adults With College Degree
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Macon/Bibb County, Georgia (2013)
Similar to Hall, Jefferson, and Polk Counties, precinct results in Bibb County (Figure
H.13 and H.14) show a strong positive trend related to median household income
and the percentage of adults with a college degree. While these factors may not be
deterministic, they certainly warrant further exploration when analyzing the voting
patterns and subsequent impacts in these precincts.
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Figure H.13: Shelby County: Median Household Income
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Figure H.14: Shelby County: Adults With College Degree
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